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BEING THE PHYSICIAN OF ONE'S OWN SOUL.  
ON A PLUTARCHAN FRAGMENT ON ANGER  
(FR. 148 SANDBACH)

I FRAGMENT 148: THE TEXT WITH TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

Among the fragments which Iohannes Stobaeus preserved under Plutarch's name in his *Anthology*<sup>1</sup>, there is one that deals with the passion of anger (*Flor.*, III, 20, 70 = fr. 148 Sandbach or fr. 27 Bernardakis). It is one of the more extensive fragments from Plutarch in Stobaeus' collection<sup>2</sup>, and contains some interesting ideas that can be connected with other passages in Plutarch's surviving works and that can be placed in a broader philosophical tradition. As such, it deserves to be examined for its own sake. However, the fragment also raises several difficult problems. First of all, the question of authenticity arises. Does Stobaeus offer the verbatim text as it was written by Plutarch, without any changes at all? Or does the fragment contain smaller or greater modifications, due to auctorial interventions of Stobaeus himself or of his source? Or should the fragment simply be attributed to someone else? Next to the problem of authenticity,

<sup>1</sup> On Stobaeus' use of Plutarch, see J. IRIGOIN, in his general introduction to the Budé edition of Plutarch's *Moralia* (*Plutarque. Œuvres morales*, Tome I, 1re partie (CUF), Paris, 1987), p. CCXXXII-CCXXXIV; R.M. PICCIONE, *Plutarco nell'Anthologion di Giovanni Stobeo*, in: I. GALLO (ed.), *L'Eredità culturale di Plutarco dall'Antichità al Rinascimento. Atti del VII Convegno plutarqueo, Milano-Gargnano, 28-30 maggio 1997* (Collectanea 16), Napoli, 1998, p. 161-201.

<sup>2</sup> Most quotations from Plutarch in the *Anthology* are short apophthegms, often attributed to the man who actually said them, rather than to Plutarch; cf. R.M. PICCIONE, *o.c.* [n. 1], p. 167.

one has to face that of the text corruption. Indeed, the fragment has reached us in a very corrupted state, as several places prove to be irreparably damaged.

Now a general discussion of the content and scope of this fragment, and final conclusions about its authenticity, presuppose a detailed analysis, where attention should be given both to problems of textual criticism and to the precise meaning of each separate text unit, discussed on its own and/or confronted with parallel passages from Plutarch's works and from other authors. Therefore, it might be useful to offer first the Greek text with translation and commentary.

Πλουτάρχου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ὀργῆς.

*From Plutarch, from the work On anger.*

Περὶ ὀργῆς: Although the work itself has unfortunately been lost, it has left some traces in later tradition<sup>3</sup>. Apart from this fragment preserved by Stobaeus, there can perhaps be found an allusion in Aulus Gellius (*Noct. Att.* I, 26, 7: *saepe eum de malo irae dissertavisse* (which suggests that Περὶ ὀργῆς may have been a lecture Plutarch gave on the topic), *librum quoque Περὶ ἀοργησίας pulcherrimum conscripsisse*). A work Περὶ ὀργῆς is also mentioned in Photius (*Bibl. codex* 161, 104a 31-32) and in the Lamprias catalogue (no. 93). According to Photius, Sopatros<sup>4</sup> offered excerpts from Plutarch's Περὶ ὀργῆς in his own work Ἐκλογαὶ διάφοροι (*Variou choice collections of extracts*), next to passages taken from other treatises. Quite remarkably, the works Sopatros quoted are placed quite close to one another in the Lamprias catalogue: *De vit. pud.* (no. 96), *De gar.* (no. 92), Περὶ ὀργῆς (no. 93), [*De cap. ex inim.* (no. 130)], *De*

<sup>3</sup> According to H. RINGELTAUBE, *Quaestiones ad veterum philosophorum de affectibus doctrinam pertinentes*, diss. inaug., Göttingae, 1913, p. 63, one should regard Περὶ ὀργῆς as a short page that was not completed by Plutarch, as a kind of note which he intended to use in some later work. His view was rightly rejected by K. ZIEGLER, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia*, in: *RE* XXI, 1, Stuttgart, 1951, p. 775.

<sup>4</sup> Presumably, Photius refers to Sopatros of Apamea, pupil of Jamblichus; cf. R. HENRY, *Remarques à propos des "codices" 161 et 239 de Photius*, in: *AC* 7, 1938, 291-293; J. IRIGOIN, *o.c.* [n. 1], p. CCXXX.

*tranq. an.* (no. 95); *Praec. ger. reip.* (no. 104), Περὶ πλούτου (not in Lamprias catalogue), *De prof. in virt.* (no. 87), *De tuenda* (no. 94) and *Con. praec.* (no. 115). This similarity in the arrangement of works may suggest that Sopatros (or his anonymous source; cf. Photius, *Bibl. codex* 161, 104a 18-20) made use of a manuscript in which the order of Plutarch's works closely resembled that of the Lamprias catalogue, and that at a relatively early date, the *Corpus Plutarcheum* already began to receive a certain standard shape<sup>5</sup>.

Ὅσα δ' ὀργῆ χρώμενοι πράττουσιν ἄνθρωποι, ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη τυφλὰ εἶναι καὶ ἀνόητα καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀμαρτάνειν.

*All the things men do with anger are necessarily blind and silly and completely miss the mark.*

τυφλὰ: According to Chrysippus, anger itself is blind (*De virt. mor.* 450C = *SVF* III, 390: τυφλὸν ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ πολλάκις μὲν οὐκ ἔᾶ ὄραν τὰ ἐκφανῆ πολλάκις δὲ τοῖς καταλαμβανομένοις ἐπιπροσθεῖ). It makes that the soul is no longer able to see or hear what is useful; *De coh. ira* 453F: πάντα παραχῆς καὶ καπνοῦ καὶ ψόφου μεστὰ ποιεῖ τὰ ἐντός, ὥστε μήτ' ἰδεῖν μήτ' ἀκοῦσαι τῶν ὠφελοῦντων; cf. also 454A; *De virt. mor.* 450C. If one is angry, one sees the things through a fog; *De coh. ira* 460A. Cf. also Aristotle, ap. Stob., *Flor.* III, 20, 55 (= fr. 660 Rose); Philodemus, *De ira* Col. XXXIII, 3 and XXXVIII, 34-40; Seneca, *De ira* II, 35, 5.

ἀνόητα: cf. *De ad. et am.* 61E; *De coh. ira* 458D; *De tranq. an.* 468B. Anger was commonly regarded as a kind of μανία: cf. *De coh. ira* 458E: τὸ δὲ θυμικὸν καὶ μανικόν; *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 199A (= Stobaeus, *Flor.* III, 20, 68); Seneca, *De ira* I, 1, 2; II, 12, 6; 36, 4-5; III, 3, 6; 39, 2; *Epist.* 18, 14 (= Epicurus, fr. 484 Usener) and 18, 15; Philodemus, *De ira* Col. XVI, 34-40; Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* IV, xxiii-52 and xxiv-53; Stobaeus, *Flor.* III, 20, 4; Horatius, *Epist.* I, 2, 62.

τοῦ παντὸς ἀμαρτάνειν: cf. *De coh. ira* 459B, 460C and 463E; Stobaeus, *Flor.* III, 20, 5: ἅπανθ' ὅσ' ὀργιζόμενος ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖ, ταῦθ' ὕστερον λάβοις ἂν ἡμαρτημένα; Libanius, *Vitup. ir.* 26: τὸ δ'

<sup>5</sup> Cf. also J. IRIGOIN, *o.c.* [n. 1], p. CCXXXI and CCXXXIII.



ἀμαρτάνειν πυκνὰ τῆς ὀργῆς ἔργον οἶμαι τοῦ λογισμοῦ μὲν παρεωσμένου, τοῦ θυμοῦ δὲ τυραινοῦντος; cf. also Stobaeus, *Flor.* III, 20, 10. Therefore, anger is the worst among the passions; *De cap. ex inim.* 90C: τὰ κάκιστα τῶν παθῶν οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργή; *De coh. ira* 455E: μισεῖται καὶ καταφρονεῖται μάλιστα τῶν παθῶν; cf. also 462F-463A; *De frat. am.* 481D; Seneca, *De ira* I, 1, 1: *affectum [...] maxime ex omnibus taetrum ac rabidum*; cf. finally Philodemus, *De ira* Col.VI, 27-29: οὕτως ἐστ[ι] π[ᾶ]σι φανερόν τὸ τὴν <ὀρ>[γῆν] ὄλον εἶναι κακόν; Seneca, *De ira* I, 20, 3; 21, 1; II, 12, 6; 36, 6; III, 1, 4-5; 3, 2.

οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ὀργῇ χρώμενον λογισμῶ χρῆσθαι, τὸ δ' ἄνευ λογισμοῦ ποιούμενον πᾶν ἄτεχνόν τε καὶ διεστραμμένον.

*For it is not possible to use one's reasoning while feeling anger, and anything that is done without reasoning is unskilful and distorted.*

οὐ γὰρ... χρῆσθαι: cf. *De coh. ira* 453E: ὁ δὲ θυμὸς οὐχ ἦ φησιν ὁ Μελάχιος τὰ δεινὰ πράσσει τὰς φρένας μετοικίσας, ἀλλ' ἐξουκίσας τελείως καὶ ἀποκλείσας; cf. also *TG* 2, 5; Seneca, *De ira* I, 1, 2: *rationali consiliisque praeclusa*; III, 39, 2. According to Aristotle, anger does to a certain extent listen to reason, although in a wrong way; *EN* VII, 7, 1149a 25-26: ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, and 1149b1: ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πῶς. But contrast Stobaeus, *Flor.* III, 20, 46 (= fr. 661 Rose): ἡ οὐχ ὀρᾶς, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ὀργῇ διαπραττομένων ἀπάντων ὁ λογισμὸς ἀποδημῆ φεύγων τὸν θυμὸν ὡς πικρὸν τύραιννον; and Theophrastus, ap. Stob., *Flor.* III, 19, 12: οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ μετ' ὀργῆς πρακτέον τοῖς φρονίμοις οὐδέν. ἀλόγιστον γὰρ θυμὸς, καὶ μετὰ προνοίας οὐδέν ἂν ποτε ποιήσειεν, κτλ.

ἄτεχνόν: As a rational and systematic operation, τέχνη is often combined with terms such as μέθοδος, λόγος/λογικός, etc. in Plutarch's works<sup>6</sup>, and some people consider arts to be offshoots of intelligence (*De fortuna* 99C). Cf. further Seneca, *De ira* II, 14, 3: *Pyrrhum maximum praeceptorem certaminis*

<sup>6</sup> See L. VAN DER STOCKT, *Plutarch on τέχνη*, in: I. GALLO (ed.), *Plutarcho e le scienze. Atti del IV Convegno plutarco, Genova-Bocca di Magra, 22-25 aprile 1991*, Genova, 1992, p. 292-293.

*gymnici solitum diunt iis quos exercebat praecipere, ne irascentur; ira enim perturbat artem et qua noceat tantum aspicit*; Libanius, *Vitup. ir.* 14: τοῦτο καὶ στρατηγὸν ἂν ποιήσειεν ἄχρηστον [...], οὐκ ἔχοντα χρῆσθαι τῇ τέχνῃ παρὰ τὴν ὀργῆν; cf. also 16.

λόγον οὖν ἡγεμόνα χρῆ ποιησάμενον οὕτως ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἔργοις, τὰς ἐκάστοτε προσπιπτούσας ὀργὰς διωθόμενον καὶ διανεύοντα, ὡσπερ οἱ κυβερνηταὶ τὰ κύματα προσφερόμενα.

*Man should, then, make reason his guide and in such a way put his hand to life's tasks, forcing his way through feelings of anger whenever they fall upon him, or bending away from them, just as steersmen do with the waves that surge towards them.*

λόγον οὖν ἡγεμόνα χρῆ ποιησάμενον: Feelings of anger should be subjected to reason: cf. *De sera num.* 551A: ὁ λογισμὸς τὰ δίκαια πράττει καὶ μέτρια τὴν ὀργῆν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἐκποδῶν θέμενος; *De aud. poet.* 26F-27A; *De coh. ira* 459AB; 460A-C; 464B; cf. also 454C; Plato, *Republ.* IV, 441e 4-6: οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῶ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδῆ ὑπηκόω εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου. In that respect, Fundanus sets an excellent example (*De coh. ira* 453B and 453C); Coriolanus, on the other hand, can be regarded as a bad example<sup>7</sup>. In general, reason is more fit to govern than anger (*De coh. ira* 459D: ἐπειθόμηνη ἡγεμονικώτερον εἶναι τοῦ θυμοῦ τὸν λογισμὸν).

The importance of reason is not limited to the passion of anger, of course: man should always follow reason as one's guide (*De virt. mor.* 450E: φύσει γὰρ προσήκει θεῖον ὄντα τὸν λογισμὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀλόγου; cf. Seneca, *De benef.* V, 25, 5: *paucis animus sui rector optimus*; cf. also *De ira* III, 25, 4), as obedience to reason is the same as following the divinity<sup>8</sup> (*De aud.* 37D: ταῦτόν ἐστι τὸ ἔπεσθαι θεῷ καὶ τὸ πείθεσθαι

<sup>7</sup> T. DUFF, *Plutarch's Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice*, Oxford, 1999, p. 89 and p. 210-215.

<sup>8</sup> On the place of the important Platonic doctrine of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ in Plutarch's works, see, e.g., H. DÖRRIE, *Le platonisme de Plutarque*, in: *Actes du VIII<sup>e</sup> Congrès de l'Association Guillaume*

λόγω; cf. also *De prof. in virt.* 81E<sup>9</sup>).

ὥσπερ... προσφερόμενα: This imagery taken from seamanship very often occurs in Plutarch's works<sup>10</sup>, and can be found several times in *De coh. ira*: see esp. 453F-454A; cf. also 456C and 460B. The same imagery in the context of anger occurs in Seneca, *De ira* II, 10, 8 and Sotion, *Περὶ ὀργῆς*, ap. Stob., *Flor.* III, 20, 54.

ἔστι γοῦν οὐκ ἔλαττον τὸ δέος, ὀργῆς ἀντιπρώρου κυλινδουμένης, αὐτόν τε καὶ σύμπαντα οἶκον [ἔστιν] ἄρδην ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἀνατρέψαι μὴ διαπλεύσαντα δεξιῶς.

*But there is no less serious fear, to be sure, that, when anger comes rolling in front of a man, he utterly destroys and ruins both himself and his whole family, if he does not skilfully sail through it.*

[ἔστιν]: The manuscript tradition reads οἶκόν ἐστιν before ἄρδην ἀπολέσαι. There is in any case some corruption of the text. Two solutions are possible:

[1] F. H. Sandbach reads ἔστιν, but is forced to add <δ'> before ἀντιπρώρου, interpreting as follows: "Certainly there is no less cause for fear, but when a wave of rage comes rolling head on against a man, he may capsize etc.". In this interpretation, the syntax of the

*Budé* (Paris, 5-10 avril 1968), Paris, 1969, p. 523-524; Id., *Die Stellung Plutarchs im Platonismus seiner Zeit*, in: R.B. PALMER - R. HAMERTON-KELLY (ed.), *Philomathes. Studies and Essays in the Humanities in Memory of Philip Merlan*, The Hague, 1971, p. 46-47; J. DILLON, *The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220*, London, 1977, p. 192-193; E. VALGIGLIO, *Divinità e religione in Plutarco*, Genova, 1988, p. 75-77; F. BECCHI, *Plutarco e la dottrina dell'ὁμοίωσις θεῶν tra Platonismo ed Aristotelismo*, in: I. GALLO (ed.), *Plutarco e la religione. Atti del VI Convegno plutarcheo (Ravello, 29-31 maggio 1995)* (Collectanea, 12), Napoli, 1996, p. 330-335.

<sup>9</sup> On the imagery in this passage, taken from the mysteries, see G. ROSKAM, "And a great Silence filled the Temple...". *Plutarch on the Connections between Mystery Cults and Philosophy*, in: A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ - F. CASADESÚS BORDOY (ed.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco. Misticismo y religiones místicas en la obra de Plutarco. Actas del VII Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Palma de Mallorca, 2-4 de Noviembre de 2000)*, Madrid-Málaga, 2001, p. 221-232.

<sup>10</sup> See F. FUHRMANN, *Les images de Plutarque*, diss. inaug., Paris, 1964, p. 70, n. 3.

sentence is rather awkward, and the first part of the phrase (ἔστι γοῦν οὐκ ἔλαττον τὸ δέος) is completely isolated and somewhat irrelevant: neither in what precedes, nor in what follows, any attention is given to the passion of fear. Probably, the insertion of <γάρ> instead of <δέ> might solve most problems.

[2] G. N. Bernardakis omits ἔστιν before ἄρδην. As a result, ἀπολέσαι and ἀνατρέψαι are infinitives dependent from ἔστι δέος (for the construction δέος ἔστι + inf.; cf. Xenophon, *Anab.* II, 4, 3; K.-G. II, 2, p. 6-7; it remains true, however, that the connotation is that of "hesitating to do something", which less fits with this context). In this solution, the presence of ἔστι δέος is not problematic at all ("there is fear that an angry man destroys himself") and the words οὐκ ἔλαττον can be regarded as an apt link between what precedes and what follows: "one should avoid the waves of anger, but there is no less fear of falling victim to them".

αὐτόν... ἀνατρέψαι: The disastrous consequences of anger are often emphasized in the tradition; *De coh. ira* 462A-C; 463AB; Aristotle, ap. Stob., *Flor.* III, 20, 65; Philodemus, *De ira* Col. VI, 8sqq.; VII, 26 - XII, 1; XXIII, 5sqq.; Seneca, *De ira* I, 5, 2-3; II, 23, 1; 35, 5-6; 36, 4-6; III, 1, 3; 3, 2-3; 5, 4-6; etc.; Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* IV, xxiii-52; Libanius, *Vitup. ir.* 8-18, 30 and 32; Stobaeus, *Flor.* III, 20, 7 and 37. In this case, the focus is on the individual, who might ruin himself and his family. The disaster is even greater when judges, politicians or rulers are concerned, as they might greatly harm other citizens or even the state; *De coh. ira* 458C and 458E; *Ad princ. iner.* 782C; *Comp. Alc. et Cor.* 2, 4-5; Philodemus, *De ira* Col. XXVIII, 21-30 and XXIX, 20-29; Seneca, *De ira* I, 2, 1-3; III, 2, 5-6; 5, 4; 16, 2-21, 5; Libanius, *Vitup. ir.* 2, 19-22; 33-34.

οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς αὐτὰ δεῖ καὶ μελέτης.

*But in any case, there is need of attention and practice.*

οὐ μὴν ἄλλ': This combination "normally denotes that what is being said cannot be gainsaid, however strong the arguments to the contrary:



marking, in fact, the deliberate surmounting of an obstacle recognized as considerable”<sup>11</sup>.

**ἐπιμελείας:** If one wishes to make moral progress in general, one should not be easy-going or indifferent towards one’s shortcomings; *De prof. in virt.* 85E-86A and fr. 53 Sandbach; cf. also *De lib. educ.* 2C; *De coh. ira* 464A. In the case of anger, one should take care that one does not neglect its beginning, for at the very outset, the passion can still be cured easily; *De coh. ira* 454E-455B; Seneca, *De ira* I, 8, 1 and III, 10, 1-2.

**μελέτης:** For the importance of μελέτη in controlling the passions, see, e.g., *De cap. ex inim.* 90C; *De tranq. an.* 465B and 476D; *De vit. pud.* 531B and F; *De gen. Socr.* 584E and 585A.

ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἀλίσκονται κατ’ ἄκρας οἱ παραδεξάμενοι τὸν θυμὸν ὡς σύμμαχον ἀρετῆς, ἀπολαύοντες ὅσον αὐτοῦ χρησιμὸν ἐστὶν ἔν τε πολέμῳ καὶ νῆ Δι’ ἐν πολιτείαις, τὸ πολὺ δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐπιπολάζον <σπουδάζοντες> ἐκκρίνειν καὶ ἐκβάλλειν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπερ ὀργή τε καὶ πικρία καὶ ὄξυθυμία λέγεται, νοσήματα ἤκιστα ταῖς ἀνδρείαις ψυχαῖς πρέποντα.

*And for that reason, those men are utterly ruined who admit temper as ally of virtue, taking advantage of it to the extent that it is useful in war and, by Zeus, in politics, while endeavouring to expel and banish from the soul its excess and prevalence, which is called anger and bitterness and instability of temper, diseases that are least becoming to manly souls.*

ἦ: This is the text of the manuscripts, accepted by G. N. Bernardakis. Somewhat further, the text is certainly corrupt. F. H. Sandbach proposes to read ἦ, which in fact entails some other text corrections and has far-reaching consequences for the interpretation of Plutarch’s philosophical position in this fragment. Again, the two alternatives should be discussed in detail:

[1] F. H. Sandbach proposes to change ἦ in ἦ and connects the phrase ἦ

<sup>11</sup> J.D. DENNISTON, *The Greek Particles*, Oxford, 1954, p. 28; cf. also J. BLOMQUIST, *Greek Particles in Hellenistic Prose*, Lund, 1969, p. 55-60.

καὶ μάλιστα ἀλίσκονται κατ’ ἄκρας with the short preceding sentence, placing a full stop after ἄκρας: “Not that success can be had without pains and training; otherwise men meet with utter disaster”<sup>12</sup>. But then, οἱ παραδεξάμενοι has no finit verb, so that Sandbach is forced to insert <κατορθοῦσι δὲ μάλιστα><sup>13</sup>. In this interpretation, Plutarch endorses the position of the Peripatetics, who were indeed convinced that θυμός could in some circumstances be regarded as an ally of virtue, provided that its excess is removed and that it is subjected to the guidance of reason. This position indeed fits in very well with what Plutarch defends in *De virtute morali*. Accordingly, Plutarch would in this fragment polemicize against the Stoics (who wanted to eradicate anger completely from the soul) and prefer the Peripatetic μετριοπάθεια to the much more radical ἀπάθεια of the Stoics. However, Sandbach’s interpretation also raises some difficult problems: the position he tries to reconstruct is in line with *De virt. mor.*, to be sure, but is diametrically opposed both to what Plutarch defends in *De coh. ira* (cf. 458E) and to the beginning of our fragment. Indeed, at the outset of this fragment, Plutarch precisely underlines that it is impossible to use reason if one is angry (οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τ’ ὀργῇ χρώμενον λογισμῶ χρῆσθαι), thus adopting not the Peripatetic, but rather the Stoic point of view. Cf. also Seneca, *De ira* I, 9, 2-3: *nam si exaudit rationem sequiturque qua ducitur, iam non est ira, cuius proprium est contumacia [...]. Itaque si modum adhiberi sibi patitur, alio nomine appellanda est, desit ira esse, quam effrenatam indomitamque intellego*; I, 7, 3-4; 8, 1-2; 19, 1-2.

[2] For that reason, the text of the manuscripts which is printed by

<sup>12</sup> F. H. SANDBACH’s interpretation is accepted by most authors; see J. DILLON, *o.c.* [n. 8], p. 189; *Plutarcho. Sul controllo dell’ira*. Introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento a cura di R. LAURENTI e G. INDELLI (Corpus Plutarci Moralium, 2), Napoli, 1988, p. 19, with n. 59; R. LAURENTI, *Lo Stoicismo romano e Plutarco di fronte al tema dell’ira*, in: I. GALLO (ed.), *Aspetti dello Stoicismo e dell’Epicureismo in Plutarco. Atti del II convegno di studi su Plutarco. Ferrara, 2-3 aprile 1987* (Quaderni del Giornale Filologico Ferrarese, 9), Ferrara, 1988, p. 40; F. BECCHI, *La nozione di ὀργή e di ἀοργησία in Aristotele e in Plutarco*, in: *Prometheus* 16, 1990, p. 84-85 (with note 141).

<sup>13</sup> It is true that such lacunae also occur at other places in Stobaeus; cf., e.g., *Flor.* IV, 5, 98 = *Ad princ. iner.* 780B.



G. N. Bernardakis deserves to be reconsidered. First of all, it requires much less interventions on the part of the editor: the term ἦ begins a new sentence, and οἱ παραδεξάμενοι can now be linked to the finite verb ἀλίσκονται. This ascribes to Plutarch exactly the opposite position: those who follow the Peripatetics do not follow the best course, but are rather utterly ruined. It is clear that this interpretation runs counter to Plutarch's position in *De virt. mor.*<sup>14</sup>. This opposition, however, can perhaps to a certain extent be explained by the different perspective of both works. In our fragment, as indeed in *De coh. ira*, Plutarch focuses on anger as on a serious illness of the soul, which should be cured. In such a psychotherapeutic context, the theoretical subtleties of the Peripatetic position were probably less useful than in the much more theoretical anti-Stoic polemic of *De virt. mor.*<sup>15</sup>. Furthermore, one should note that Stoic influences are more than once detected in *De coh. ira*<sup>16</sup>. For all those reasons, the text of the manuscripts should probably be accepted. The causal meaning of ἦ can then be explained as follows: the Peripatetics will be ruined because they accept (in some cases) anger and thus fail to maintain their ἐπιμέλεια and μελετή without interruption.

ὡς σύμμαχον ἀρετῆς: Cf., e.g., *De virt. mor.* 452B: τῶν δὲ παθῶν παντάπασιν ἀναιρεθέντων, εἰ καὶ δυνατόν ἐστίν, ἐν πολλοῖς ἀργότερος ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀμβλύτερος, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης πνεύματος

<sup>14</sup> Cf. also R. LAURENTI - G. INDELLI, *o.c.* [n. 12], p. 19, n. 59: "dunque, anche usata in modo ragionevole, sembra che l'ira non apporti giovamento. Il che crea un grosso problema, in séguito al confronto con altre opere plutarchee, segnatamente *virt. mor.*, che sottolinea l'importanza dell'ira razionale."

<sup>15</sup> Cf. D. BABUT, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, Paris, 1969, p. 96: "Rien n'est plus normal, en effet, dans un écrit sur les moyens de réprimer la colère, que de reléguer au second plan, voire d'avoir tendance à nier les aspects réputés utiles ou positifs de cette passion".

<sup>16</sup> See, e.g., A. SCHLEMM, *Ueber die Quellen der Plutarchischen Schrift Περὶ ἀσχημίας*, in: *Hermes* 38, 1903, p. 587-607; P. RABOW, *Antike Schriften über Seelenheilung und Seelenleitung auf ihre Quellen untersucht. I: Die Therapie des Zorns*, Leipzig-Berlin, 1914, p. 56-97 (Posidonius' Σύνταγμα περὶ ὀργῆς and Sotion's Περὶ ὀργῆς as sources of *De coh. ira*); D. BABUT, *o.c.* [n. 15], p. 94-97; *Plutarch. Essays*. Translated by R. WATERFIELD, introduced and annotated by I. KIDD (Penguin Classics), London, 1992, p. 172-173.

ἐπιλείποντος; see also 451C-452C.

ἔν τε πολέμῳ: According to Aristotle and his Peripatetic followers, anger should be regarded as useful in war, provided that it is guided by reason: see Seneca, *De ira* I, 9, 2: *Ira, inquit Aristoteles, necessaria est, nec quicquam sine illa expugnari potest, nisi illa implet animum et spiritum accendit; utendum autem illa est non ut duce sed ut milite*; *De ira* III, 3, 5: *sit aliquis et quidem de illustribus philosophis, qui illi indicat operas et tamquam utilem ac spiritus subministrantem in proelia, in actus rerum, ad omne, quodcumque calore aliquo gerendum est, vocet*; Philodemus, *De ira* Col. XXXII, 15-23: [ἐν τοῖς] πολέμοις κ[αὶ τοῖς ἀνα]λόγοις καιροῖς γ' ὄ[υ]κ εἶ[ναι] προσφέρεσθαι χω[ρὶς] ὀργῆς, ἢ θαρρεῖν ποιε[ῖ] καὶ πάντα ὄκνον ἀφα[ρ]εῖται καὶ δειλίαν κα[ὶ] ἀνικητῶς ποιεῖ μέχρ[ι] καὶ θανάτου μένειν; Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* IV, XIX-43: *Primum multis verbis iracundiam laudant: cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt, multoque et in hostem et in improbum civem vehementiores iratorum impetus esse etc.*; cf. also Aristotle, *EN* II, 9, 1109b 14-16; III, 3, 1111a 30-31; IV, 11, 1125b 31-32; 1126a 3-8; *EE* III, 1, 1229a 24-31; Seneca, *De ira* I, 13, 3; I, 17, 1 and III, 3, 1; Cicero, *De off.* I, xxv-89. See already the conviction of Plato, *Republ.* II, 375a 11-b 2; III, 410d 6-7 and 411a 5-b 4. The Peripatetic position was vehemently attacked by both Seneca (*De ira* I, 9, 2-11, 8) and Cicero (*Tusc. disp.* IV, xxii, 49-50; xxiii-52 and xxiv-53). Philodemus' Epicurean position is also opposed to that of the Peripatetics (*De ira* Col. XXXII, 35-38: καὶ παρο[ρῶ]σιν>], ὅτ[ι] χω[ρὶς] ὀργῆς ἔστι [τὸ] πολεμε[ῖν] κ[αὶ] ἀγω[νί]ζε[σθαι] κ[αὶ] π[ικρῶς] χει[ροῦν], κτλ.), although he does not agree with the complete rejection of anger that was advocated by the Stoics, since he distinguishes between a vain anger (κενή ὀργή) which is bad, as it originates from a completely wicked disposition, and a natural anger (φυσική ὀργή) which is good; *De ira* Col. XXXVII, 39 - Col. XXXVIII, 22.

Plutarch attacks the position of the Peripatetics in *De coh. ira* 458E: ἡ δ' ἀνδρεία χολῆς οὐ δεῖται· βέβαπται γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου· τὸ δὲ θυμικὸν καὶ μανικὸν εὐπερίθραυστόν ἐστι καὶ σαθρόν; cf. also 457D: ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία κατὰ τᾶλλα τῆ δικαιοσύνη συμφερομένη περὶ μόνῃς μοι δοκεῖ διαμάχεσθαι τῆς πραότητος, ὡς αὐτῇ μᾶλλον προσηκούσης. On the other hand, the Peripatetic position is defended



against the Stoics in *De virt. mor.* 451E (cf. also 452BC).

ἐν πολιτείαις: cf. Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* IV, XIX-43; Seneca, *De ira* III, 3, 5 and Philodemus, *De ira* Col. XXXII, 28-29. The position is attacked by Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* IV, XXIII, 51-52; cf. also Seneca, *De ira* II, 17, 1.

τὸ πολὺ κτλ.: cf. *De coh. ira* 463B: τὸ ἄγαν ἀφαιρετέον αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς ὀργῆς] καὶ τὸ ἄκρατον; cf. also *De virt. mor.* 443CD; 444BC; 444F-445A; 452A; Seneca, *De ira* I, 7, 1: *optimum itaque quidam putant temperare iram, non tollere, eoque detracto, quod exundat, ad salutarem modum cogere, etc.* This is clearly the Peripatetic position of μετριοπάθεια.

τὸ ἐπιπολάζον: cf. Stobaeus, *Flor.* III, 20, 9: ἐπιπολάζειν οὐ τι χρὴ τὸν θυμὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸν νόον.

<σπουδάζοντες>: conjecture of F. H. Sandbach. At least some intervention is needed, as the infinitives ἐκκρίνειν and ἐκβάλλειν remain in the manuscripts without governing verb. G. N. Bernardakis proposes to read τὸ ἐπιπολάζον θεραπεύοντες δέ>ον ἐκκρίνειν κτλ.; Buecheler prefers to change the participle ἀπολαύοντες in ἀπολαύειν κελεύοντες.

πικρία: cf. *De coh. ira* 454B; cf. also 459C. In Stoic philosophy, πικρία was regarded as one of the species of ὀργή (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II, 7, 10<sup>b</sup> = *SVF* III, 394) and defined as ὀργή παραχρήμα ἐκρηγνυμένη (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II, 7, 10<sup>c</sup> = *SVF* III, 395 and Andronicus, *Περὶ παθῶν* 4, p. 231 Glibert-Thirry = *SVF* III, 397). For Aristotle's position, see *EN* IV, 11, 1126a 19-21 and *EE* II, 3, 1221b 13-14.

ὄξυθυμία: The term nowhere else occurs in the *Corpus Plutarcheum*. According to Aristotle, ὄξυθυμία is a sub-species of the vice ὀργή: a man is called ὄξύθυμος if he is sooner angry than he should be; *EE* II, 3, 1221b 12-13.

νοσήματα: The imagery is traditional, and current in Plutarch's works; cf. *infra*, s.v. ἰατρός.

ἥκιστα... πρόποντα: Plutarch makes it perfectly clear that anger is no bravery, thus correcting the opinion of those who erroneously define anger in positive terms; cf. *De coh. ira* 456F and 462EF; cf. also *De ad. et am.* 56E; *De virt. mor.* 449AB; *De frat. am.* 482C; *Animine an corp.* 501B; Aristotle, *EN* II, 9, 1109b 17-18; Philodemus, *De ira* Col. XXXI, 14-17.

τίς οὖν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τούτων γίνεται μελέτη;  
What practice, then, does there in this field exist for adults?

ἐν ἡλικίᾳ: Somewhat odd, though the idea is perfectly clear: as it requires a great degree of rationally based exercise and training, the arduous process of moral amelioration is beyond the level of children, whose mental capacities are still very weak (cf., e.g., *De coh. ira* 458A: παιδαρίῳ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι) and who therefore are often subject to violent passions (*De virt. mor.* 447A; *De coh. ira* 458D). It is only when one passes from childhood to manhood that one becomes able to follow reason as one's guide; *De aud.* 37DE. Seneca makes a distinction, with regard to his precepts against anger, between the period of education and subsequent periods of life; *De ira* II, 18, 1.

ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ μάλιστ' ἂν ᾧδε γίγνεσθαι, πόρρωθεν ἡμῶν προμελετώντων καὶ προαπαντλούντων <τὸ> πλεῖστον, οἶον ἐν οἰκέταις τε καὶ πρὸς γυναῖκας τὰς γαμετάς.

*It seems to me that the best course would be the following, if we practise ourselves beforehand and from afar, and rid ourselves in advance from the greatest part, for instance in our dealings with slaves and towards married women.*

προμελετώντων: In Plutarch's works, the term only occurs twice, and each time in a negative sense: *De esu* II, 998B (men first practise their murderous instincts on wild animals, then on domestic ones) and *Fragm.* 116 Sandbach (by giving in to pleasures, one practises in advance old age in one's youth)<sup>17</sup>. On the practice of πόρρωθεν γυμνάζεσθαι on ordinary people, see *De cur.* 520D and *De vit. pud.* 532B; cf. also *De coh. ira* 454A: ἂν μὴ παρεσκευασμένον ἔχη τὸν οἰκεῖον λογισμόν, and somewhat further: οὕτω μάλιστα δεῖ τὰ πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν βοηθήματα πόρρωθεν λαμβάνοντας ἐκ φιλοσοφίας κατακομίζειν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν.

<sup>17</sup> One should note, however, that the authenticity of the fragment is rejected by U. VON WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDOERF, *Lesefrüchte*, in: *Hermes* 58, 1923, p. 84 and F.H. SANDBACH, *Plutarch's Moralia in Sixteen Volumes*, XV, *Fragments* (LCL), London-Cambridge, MA, 1969, p. 230-231.

προαπαντλούντων: conjecture of Sandbach; the manuscripts read προαπλούντων; other conjectures have been proposed (προαπολούντων: Bernardakis; προαθλούντων: P. Rabbow<sup>18</sup>), but none of them can be regarded as completely convincing.

ἐν οἰκέταις: cf. *De coh. ira* 459B: οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἐγγυμνάσασθαι τοῖς οἰκέταις ἢ πρὸς τὸν θυμόν; cf. also *De coh. ira* 459A; 459B sqq.; 460EF; 461A; 461E; 462A; the theme of anger towards servants was current in the tradition; cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* II, 3, 1380a 16-21; Seneca, *De ira* II, 25, 1 and 3-4; Philodemus, *De ira* fr. 10, 18 and fr. 12, 10-14; Col. XXIII, 35-XXIV, 36; Libanius, *Vitup. ir.* 9.

πρὸς γυναῖκας τὰς γαμετάς: The classic example is of course Socrates' temperance towards his notorious wife Xanthippe; see, e.g., *De cap. ex inim.* 90E and *De coh. ira* 461D; Diog. Laert. II, 36-37; Seneca, *De const. sap.* 18, 5; Athenaeus, *Deipnosoph.* XIV, 643F.

ὁ γὰρ οἶκοι πρᾶος καὶ δημοσίᾳ πρᾶος πολὺ μᾶλλον ἔσται, τοιοῦτος ἔνδοθεν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν οἶκοι πεποιημένος οἶος αὐτῷ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς εἶναι ἰατρός.

*For someone who is mild at home, will be much more likely mild in public life too, having been made within his house and by the members of his household such a man that he is for himself the physician of his own soul.*

ὁ γὰρ οἶκοι... ἔσται: cf. *De coh. ira* 462A: ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὰ πράγματ' εὐκολία καὶ πρὸς οἰκέτας εὐκολον ποιεῖ καὶ πρᾶον· εἰ δὲ πρὸς οἰκέτας, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πρὸς φίλους καὶ πρὸς ἀρχομένους; *De cap. ex inim.* 90E: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Σωκράτης ἔφερε τὴν Ξανθίππην θυμοειδῆ καὶ χαλεπὴν οὔσαν, ὡς εὐκόλως συνεσόμενος ἑτέροις, ἂν ἐκείνην ὑπομένειν ἐθισθῆ; Diog. Laert. II, 37.

πρᾶος: Mildness (πραότης) is one of the most important virtues in Plutarch's works<sup>19</sup>. Plutarch himself defines it as a mean between

<sup>18</sup> *O.c.* [n. 16], p. 64, n. 1.

<sup>19</sup> See, e.g., H. MARTIN, *The Concept of Praotes in Plutarch's Lives*, in: *GRBS* 3, 1960, p. 65-73; J. DE ROMILLY, *La douceur dans la pensée grecque* (Collection d'Études Anciennes), Paris, 1979, p. 275-307.

ἀναληγσία and ὠμότης (*De virt. mor.* 445A). According to Aristotle, πραότης is the mean between ὀργιλότης and ἀοργησία (*EN* II, 7, 1108a 4-9; cf. also *EE* II, 3, 1220b 38 and *MM* I, 7, 1186a 22-24)<sup>20</sup>. For the Stoic definition of πραότης, see Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II, 7, 11<sup>s</sup> (= *SVF* III, 632): τῆς πραότητος οὔσης ἔξεως καθ' ἣν πρᾶως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἐν πᾶσι καὶ μὴ ἐκφέρεσθαι εἰς ὀργὴν ἐν μηδενί.

καὶ δημοσίᾳ: Here, the focus is thus on public life (in opposition to what precedes: αὐτόν τε καὶ σύμπαντα οἶκον). This gives some information about the question what kind of readers Plutarch had in mind. As usual, he writes for the members of the aristocratic upper-class, who are interested in personal moral improvement and who also actively participate in public life.

ἰατρός: The end of the fragment raises some complex problems of textual criticism. The text of the manuscripts (πεποιημένος αὐτῷ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς εἶναι ἀγαθός) is hopelessly corrupt. The conjecture proposed by F. H. Sandbach, though far from certain, makes good sense. The imagery of anger as a disease that should receive treatment by a physician very often occurs in *De coh. ira* (cf., e.g., 453BC; 453D; 454C; 455B; 455E; 460C) and in other works of Plutarch<sup>21</sup>, and was common property of all philosophical schools<sup>22</sup>. In *De coh. ira*, Fundanus shows himself such a physician of his own soul.

## 2] FORM AND CONTENT OF THE FRAGMENT

### 2.1. INVENTIO

2.1.1. First of all, the fragment can be placed in a whole framework of traditional reflections on anger. Indeed, the passion of anger has received much attention in the age-old philosophical tradition that precedes

<sup>20</sup> Cf. also A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, *Aristotle's Treatment of the Concept of πραότης*, in: *Hermes* 110, 1982, p. 414-422.

<sup>21</sup> See F. FUHRMANN, *o.c.* [n. 10], p. 41-43 and 149-157.

<sup>22</sup> In Stoicism, the analogy proposed by Chrysippus was later attacked by Posidonius (Galenus, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* V, 2, 294.32-296.36 De Lacy = fr. 163 E.-K.); cf. I.G. KIDD, *Euemptosia-Proneness to Disease*, in: W.W. FORTENBAUGH (ed.), *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Didymus* (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 1), New Brunswick-London, 1983, p. 107-113. For Epicureanism, see, e.g., M. GIGANTE, *Philosophia medicans in*



Plutarch<sup>23</sup>. In nearly all important philosophical schools, anger was discussed at length, so that in the first century B. C., Cicero could already state that discussions on this subject could easily be found in many books<sup>24</sup>. And after him, the philosophical tradition on anger was further enlarged with always new treatises, in which the passion was analysed and methods were given to cure it. The reason for this remarkable attention was double: on the one hand, anger was regarded as the most conspicuous<sup>25</sup> and most common<sup>26</sup> of all the passions; on the other hand, it was the passion which could lead to the most destructive results, both in private and in public life, so that its prevention or therapy was not merely a theoretical *desideratum*. Besides, the theme *On anger* had gradually developed into one of the classic subject matters in the moral domain, which gave the author ample opportunity to show both his personal talents as a writer and thinker, and the successful truth of his own philosophical school.

Especially in the Stoa, anger received prominent attention. Next to a short discussion of the Stoic view on anger in Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes* (IV, XXI, 48-XXV, 55), Seneca's *De ira* has come down to us. But much has been lost as well. Already the first generations of Stoics wrote treatises *Περὶ παθῶν* (in which anger was no doubt discussed)<sup>27</sup>, and also in later generations the subject of anger was treated<sup>28</sup>. Also in Epicureanism, the passion of anger was analysed. As far as we know, Epicurus himself wrote

*Filodemo*, in: *Proceedings of the XIV International Congress of Papyrologists. Oxford, 24-31 July 1974*, London, 1975, p. 121-126 and J. SALEM, *Tel un dieu parmi les hommes. L'éthique d'Épicure* (Bibliothèque d'histoire de la philosophie), Paris, 1989, p. 9-21.

<sup>23</sup> See, e.g., J. FILLION-LAHILLE, *Le De ira de Sénèque et la philosophie stoïcienne des passions* (Études et commentaires, 94), Paris, 1984, p. 17-28; R. LAURENTI - G. INDELLI, *o.c.* [n. 12], p. 7-18.

<sup>24</sup> *Ad Quint. fratr.*, I, 1, 37.

<sup>25</sup> Seneca, *De ira*, I, 1, 7: *alii affectus apparent, hic eminent*; cf. I, 1, 5.

<sup>26</sup> Philodemus, *De ira* Col. XXX, 31-32: *παντὸς ἀππουται* [sc. αἱ ὀργαί; γένους ἀνθρώπων; Seneca, *De ira* III, 2, 1: *nullam transit aetatem, nullum hominum genus excipit*; cf. also III, 5, 1.

<sup>27</sup> Zeno (Diog. Laert. VII, 4 and 110), Sphaerus (Diog. Laert. VII, 178); Herillus (Diog. Laert. VII, 166) and Chrysippus (Diog. Laert. VII, 111; Galenus, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* II, 7, 156.7; IV, 4, 250.7; IV, 7, 284.4 De Lacy; etc.).

<sup>28</sup> Both Antipater of Tarsus (see Athenaeus, *Deipnosoph.* XIV, 643F) and Posidonius (fr. 36 E.-K.; cf. also J. ZUNDEL, *Ein griechischer Bücherkatalog aus Aegypten*, in: *RhM* 21, 1866, p.

no separate work on anger, although he occasionally discussed the passion in other works<sup>29</sup>. Philodemus, however, wrote a treatise *Περὶ ὀργῆς*<sup>30</sup>, where he also mentions other members of his school who dealt with anger<sup>31</sup>. Aristotle probably wrote a *Περὶ παθῶν*<sup>32</sup>, in which ὀργή received considerable attention<sup>33</sup>, and at least some of his followers focused on the passion too<sup>34</sup>. Finally, works entitled *Περὶ ὀργῆς* were written by the Cynic Bion of Borysthenes<sup>35</sup> and the Neo-Pythagorean philosopher Sotion of Alexandria, one of the teachers of Seneca<sup>36</sup>. Also after Plutarch's times, the theme of anger continued to be discussed<sup>37</sup>.

2.1.2. The fragment cannot only be placed into a very large tradition of works *On anger* (a tradition which makes its influence felt in our fragment

431; K. REINHARDT, *Posidonios von Apameia, der Rhodier genannt*, in: *RE* XXII, 1, Stuttgart, 1953, p. 568; J. FILLION-LAHILLE, *o.c.* [n. 23], p. 21-22) were author of a work entitled *Περὶ ὀργῆς*. Hecato wrote a treatise *Περὶ παθῶν* (Diog. Laert. VII, 110). For the position of Musonius Rufus and Epictetus, see R. LAURENTI, *o.c.* [n. 12], p. 34-40.

<sup>29</sup> See SV 62 and fr. 484 Usener (= Seneca, *Epist.* 18, 14); cf. also *Epist. ad Herod.* 77 and *RS* 1; see also Lucretius III, 288-313.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. esp. R. PHILIPPSON, *Philodems Buch über den Zorn. Ein Beitrag zu seiner Wiederherstellung und Auslegung*, in: *RhM* 71, 1916, p. 425-460; *Filodemo, L'ira*. Edizione, traduzione e commento a cura di G. INDELLI (La scuola di Epicuro. Collezione di testi ercolanesi diretta da Marcello Gigante, 5), Napoli, 1988. For parallels between Philodemus' *De ira* and Plutarch's *De coh. ira*, see G. INDELLI, *Considerazioni sugli opuscoli De ira di Filodemo e Plutarco*, in: I. GALLO (ed.), *Aspetti dello Stoicismo e dell'Epicureismo in Plutarco. Atti del II convegno di studi su Plutarco. Ferrara, 2-3 aprile 1987* (Quaderni del Giornale Filologico Ferrarese, 9), Ferrara, 1988, p. 57-64.

<sup>31</sup> Basilides and Thespiis (Col. V, 21); Timasagoras (Col. VII, 7) and Nicasirates (fr. 7, 15; Col. XXXVII, 5 and XXXVIII, 34-35).

<sup>32</sup> Diog. Laert. V, 23; R. LAURENTI - G. INDELLI, *o.c.* [n. 12], p. 13-14.

<sup>33</sup> For Aristotle's position towards anger, see, e.g., J. FILLION-LAHILLE, *La colère chez Aristote*, in: *REA* 72, 1970, p. 46-79; *Id.*, *o.c.* [n. 23], p. 203-210.

<sup>34</sup> Theophrastus (see, e.g., W.W. FORTENBAUGH, *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (Studien zur antiken Philosophie, 12), Amsterdam, 1984, p. 258-259; F. BECCHI, *o.c.* [n. 12], p. 69-70) and Hieronymus (fr. 21-23 WEHRLI; cf. F. BECCHI, *o.c.* [n. 12], p. 71-72).

<sup>35</sup> See Philodemus, *De ira* Col. I, 16-17.

<sup>36</sup> Some fragments are preserved in Stobaeus, *Flor.* III, 14, 10; III, 20, 53 and 54; IV, 44, 59; IV, 48b, 30; J. FILLION-LAHILLE, *o.c.* [n. 23], p. 261-272.

<sup>37</sup> Cf., e.g., the commentaries of Calvenus Taurus (ap. Aul. Gell., *Noct. Att.* I, 26, 3) and Libanius' *Vituperatio irae* (Foerster, VIII, p. 315-324). For christian authors, see, e.g., Basilus,

through different *loci communes* that are indicated in the foregoing commentary) but also into the broader context of psychotherapeutic literature. The ancient practice of *Seelenheilung* was based on two pillars, that is, κρίσις and ἄσκησις<sup>38</sup>. First, the passion itself was described in great detail, as a kind of diagnosis. Subsequently, a concrete treatment was elaborated, consisting of closely interrelated ἐπιλογισμοί and ἐθισμοί. The two great pillars of this moral psychagogical system can be found in this fragment. First, anger is described in very negative terms, as being opposed to reason and entailing destructive consequences. Next, attention is given to concrete practice, the importance of which is underlined. In that respect, the fragment closely resembles more than one psychotherapeutic essay of Plutarch.

2.1.3. One should finally note the presence of some philosophical controversy in this fragment. Probably, Plutarch here (just as in *De coh. ira*) attacks the Peripatetic doctrine according to which anger can be useful in some circumstances, thus taking the side of the Stoics on this particular point<sup>39</sup>. In any case, the traces of such polemics in this fragment point to Plutarch's familiarity with earlier source material, as the whole problem was much debated in previous philosophical tradition.

## 2.2. DISPOSITIO

The fragment can be divided into two great parts, that correspond to the theoretical distinction between κρίσις and ἄσκησις. Its structure can be reconstructed as follows:

### 1) κρίσις:

- a) - What is done in anger is necessarily bad
  - as it is done without reasoning

*Homilia X: κατὰ ὀργιζομένων* (PG 31, 353-372); Gregorius Theologus, *Carmina*, I, 2, 25: κατὰ θυμοῦ (PG 37, 813-851); Iohannes Chrysostomus, *Ecl. ex div. hom.*, XX: περὶ ὀργῆς καὶ θυμοῦ (PG 63, 689-694).

<sup>38</sup> See P. RABOW, *o.c.* [n. 16], p. 60-61; ID., *Seelenführung. Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike*, München, 1954, p. 340; H.G. INGENKAMP, *Plutarchs Schriften über die Heilung der Seele* (Hypomnemata. Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem Nachleben, 34), Göttingen, 1971, p. 74-124.

<sup>39</sup> The opposite interpretation is defended by F.H. SANDBACH; cf. commentary *ad loc.*

- and one should be guided by reason

- b) Furthermore, anger can entail dangerous consequences

### 2) ἄσκησις:

- a) transition:

- there is need of attention and practice
- therefore, the Peripatetic position is to be rejected

- b) practice:

- what practice does there exist in this field for adults?

\*one should practice oneself in advance, e.g. towards slaves and married women

\*for the man who is mild at home will be much more likely mild in public life too

It is clear, then, that the overall structure of this fragment is in line with the general structure of other psycho-therapeutic writings of Plutarch. However, exactly this observation also arouses some suspicion. It is quite remarkable indeed that the same way of structuring whole treatises can be detected in what is supposed to be an excerpt of but one small page.

## 2.3. ELOCUTIO

Several aspects of the style in this fragment are typical of Plutarch. One can in the first place think of the imagery taken from seamanship and of the numerous doublets<sup>40</sup>. On the other hand, the presence three times of τε καί<sup>41</sup> and of many instances of hiatus<sup>42</sup> make the attribution of the

<sup>40</sup> For doublets as a typical feature of Plutarch's style, see, e.g., B. BUCHER-ISLER, *Norm und Individualität in den Biographien Plutarchs* (Noctes Romanae, 13), Bern-Stuttgart, 1972, p. 25; TH. SCHMIDT, *La rhétorique des doublets chez Plutarque: le cas de βάρβαρος καὶ [...]*, in: L. VAN DER STOCKT (ed.), *Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch. Acta of the IVth International Congress of the International Plutarch Society. Leuven, July 3-6, 1996* (Collection d'Études Classiques, 11), Louvain-Namur, 2000, p. 455.

<sup>41</sup> A combination which Plutarch generally avoids; see K. FUHR, *Excuse zu den attischen Rednern*, in: *RhM* 33, 1878, p. 584-591.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. τυφλά εἶναι καὶ ἀνόητα, σύμπαντα οἶκον, μάλιστα ἀλίσκονται, νοσήματα ἤκιστα etc. On Plutarch's usual avoidance of hiatus, see, e.g., I. SCHELLENS, *De*



fragment to Plutarch less evident. Furthermore, two terms (ὄξυθυμία and προαπαντλούντων, the latter, however, being a conjectural reading proposed by Sandbach) occur that are not found elsewhere in the *Corpus Plutarcheum*. Finally, “we might hesitate to ascribe to Plutarch the poetic phrases ὀργῆς ἀντιπρώρου κυλιδομένης and ἀλίσκονται κατ’ ἄκρας [...] and the sentiments are more exaggerated, simplified, and obvious than is usual with him”<sup>43</sup>. These are stylistic features that cannot be ignored in a discussion of the fragment’s authenticity.

### 3 THE PROBLEM OF AUTHENTICITY

From what precedes, it has become clear that the question of the fragment’s authenticity is a quite complex one. On the one hand, the link to Plutarch seems fairly strong: both with regard to content and with regard to language, there are sufficient good arguments to connect this fragment with the Chaeronean. As appears from the particle δέ at the very outset of the fragment, the text that was excerpted was not the opening sentence of Plutarch’s work. Presumably, it contains material that was taken from the *corpus* of one of Plutarch’s lost psychagogical writings.

On the other hand, several elements seem to indicate that the fragment is not a verbatim quotation from Plutarch. Probably, Stobaeus, or his source<sup>44</sup>, strongly modified the original. The anthologist makes his influence felt in two ways:

3.1. First of all, the fragment probably consists of several autonomous passages which were originally located at different places of Plutarch’s treatise. In any case, there can be found in Stobaeus’ *Anthology* some beautiful examples which illustrate precisely this technique of excerpting. In *Flor.* III, 40, 3-4, for instance, he presents as one coherent whole quotations

*hiatu in Plutarchi Moralibus*, Bonnae, 1864; B. WEISSENBERGER, *Die Sprache Plutarchs von Chaeronea und die pseudoplutarchischen Schriften*, Straubing, 1895, p. 18-20.

<sup>43</sup> E. H. SANDBACH, *Rhythm and Authenticity in Plutarch’s Moralia*, in: *CQ* 33, 1939, p. 202-203.

<sup>44</sup> According to R. M. PICCIONE, *o.c.* [n. 1], p. 180-184, Stobaeus did not read Plutarch himself, but took his quotations from an intermediate source.

taken from *De exilio* 600F, 601C-D, 601F, 602B, 605AB and 605BC. In this case, the sentences themselves are hardly changed: only some slight additions (such as ἐρωτηθεῖς at the beginning of the fragment, or εἶτα somewhat further, in order to introduce another passage) and insignificant modifications (such as ἐάν instead of ὅταν or δὲ instead of μὲν γάρ) here betray the intervention of the anthologist. By means of different, originally disconnected, but authentic Plutarchan sentences, a new text is presented in Stobaeus’ *Anthology*.

This technique of excerpting explains the presence, in our fragment, of both κρίσις and ἄσκησις: in that way indeed, much material that was most likely dealt with in different sections of one work, could be concentrated in a relatively short extract. At the same time, it explains the sometimes rather abrupt transitions, which render the interpretation of the fragment quite difficult (e.g. the introduction of the position of οἱ παραδεξάμενοι, which was interpreted both as the ideal behaviour (Sandbach: κατορθοῦσι δὲ μάλιστα) and the course that should absolutely be avoided (Bernardakis: μάλιστα ἀλίσκονται κατ’ ἄκρας); cf. commentary *ad loc.*).

3.2. Furthermore, in some cases, the personal contribution of Stobaeus, or his source, is not limited to slight additions or modifications. Two examples should make this clear<sup>45</sup>:

PLUTARCH, *AN SENI* 784E

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄ γε Ξενοφῶν περὶ  
Ἀγησιλάου γέγραφεν, αὐτοῖς  
ὀνόμασιν ἄξιόν ἐστι παραθέσθαι·  
“ποίας γάρ”, φησί, “νεότητος οὐ  
κρεῖττον τὸ ἐκείνου γῆρας”.

STOBAEUS, *FLOR.* IV, 50C, 92

Ξενοφῶν περὶ Ἀγησιλάου φησί “ποίας  
γάρ νεότητος οὐ κρεῖττον τὸ ἐκείνου  
γῆρας”.

and

<sup>45</sup> Cf. also R. M. PICCIONE, *o.c.* [n. 1], p. 167-172, where some other passages are discussed.

PLUTARCH, *AN SENI* 786BC

εἰ γὰρ Νικίας ὁ ζωγράφος οὕτως  
ἔχαιρε τοῖς τῆς τέχνης ἔργοις,  
ὥστε τοὺς οἰκέτας ἐρωτᾶν  
πολλάκις, εἰ λέλονται καὶ  
ἠρίστηκεν.

STOBAEUS, *FLOR.* III, 29, 85

Νικίας οὕτως ἦν φιλόπονος. ὥστε  
πολλάκις ἐρωτᾶν τοὺς οἰκέτας, εἰ  
λέλονται καὶ εἰ ἠρίστηκεν.

Both passages illustrate how the anthologist does not hesitate to reformulate what he found in his source, shortening some passages and paraphrasing other<sup>46</sup>. This working method may explain the presence, in our fragment, of short phrases such as ἔστι γούν οὐκ ἔλαττον τὸ δέος<sup>47</sup> or ἐν ἡλικία.

3.3. One may conclude, then, that our fragment is the result of the two excerpting techniques mentioned above. Separate sentences were selected, sometimes modified, and presented as one coherent whole. Their original context has been omitted, or occasionally paraphrased in few words<sup>48</sup>. As appears from the instances of hiatus and the frequency of τε καί, the interventions of the anthologist should not be underestimated. And yet, there remains in the end little doubt that he borrowed his material from Plutarch, probably from a lost work *Περὶ ὀργῆς*, given the fact that, even taking into account the anthologist's complex excerpting techniques, *De cohibenda ira* does not qualify for being his ultimate source.

<sup>46</sup> Such paraphrases can depend on the anthologist's own purposes, as appears especially from the second example, where Plutarch's οὕτως ἔχαιρε τοῖς τῆς τέχνης ἔργοις is paraphrased as οὕτως ἦν φιλόπονος. In this way, the whole excerpt fits in even better with the whole chapter, which is precisely about φιλοπονία.

<sup>47</sup> If, at least, one prefers F. H. SANDBACH's interpretation (cf. commentary, *ad loc.*). The phrase could then be interpreted as an extremely short paraphrase of an argument that Plutarch elaborated much more in detail (e.g. the function of fear as a means to cure anger: *De coh. ira* 454CD; Seneca, *De ira* I, 10, 1).

<sup>48</sup> Another beautiful example which strongly corroborates this conclusion is the interesting parallel between *Flor.* IV, 4, 20 and *An seni* 783E-F; cf. R. M. PICCIONE, *o.c.* [n. 1], p. 171-172.