

DEMOCRACY AT WORK: PRESSURE AND PROPAGANDA IN PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL

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CHAPTER 5
TRUST IN LULA DA SILVA AND THE BRAZILIAN
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

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
Introduction

In 2006, Lula da Silva was elected president of Brazil for his 2nd term with more than 60% of the valid votes in the second round. But his party (PT) only obtained 83 of the 513 seats of the Chamber of Deputies, which was very fragmented: 21 parties got representation at the national legislative. A decisive factor for the government to organize a parliamentary majority came from the fact that the president conquered a consensual popular leadership facing the public opinion. As a result, his main measures could not be directly contested by the political class, under the risk of punishment of this class by the voters. New presidential elections would take place in 2010 and not only trust in Lula was high (849%) but also 48% of the electorate rated his political action as excellent (grade 10).

²⁴ This article is a result of researches financed by the Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais (Fapemig), by the Comissão Permanente de Pessoal Docente (Capes) and Fundação Carolina (Espanha), that provided me the necessary resources through the Projeto Pesquisador Mineiro (PPM) and the postdoctoral scholarship. I thank the Institute of Social, Political and Economic Researches - Instituto de Pesquisas Sociais, Políticas e Econômicas (IPESPE) for the given data on presidential elections.

The popularity of Lula has been a guiding factor for the rhetoric of his succession, as a strategy of clear opposition against the popular former president would reduce the reelection chances for the deputies and the election chances for the opposition candidate for president.²⁵

Chart 1: Trust in Lula da Silva – 1stRound, 2010



Source: National Survey on 2010 Presidential Election. Ipespe / Research Group Public Opinion: Political Marketing and Electoral Behaviour (UFMG).

It was from the statement of the electorates' trust in Lula that political parties organized their electoral alliances and adapted their political communication. The campaigns would be axed around 'who would be the best to represent the improvements headed by Lula.' The strategy centered on a leadership only has an impact on societies where voters tend to act independently of partisan orientations, which is the case for most of the Brazilian electorate, half of which has no preference for any

²⁵ In Brazil, the elections for president and representatives take place at the same time. The presidential elections occur in two rounds and the elections of representatives are proportional elections with open lists.

of the parties and 7% of which even failed to answer which would be their preferred party.²⁶

The Brazilian campaigns of 2010 for the succession of Lula da Silva, in 2010, evidenced the President and the continuity of the policies implemented by his government. Lula had already occupied this function for eight years (2003-2010) and was unable to be reelected, as the Brazilian Constitution does not allow more than two consecutive terms as Chief of the Executive. So he supported the then Minister Dilma Rousseff (PT) as his successor, elected in the second round with 56% of the valid votes. The victory of the *petista* resulted in the third consecutive national mandate of the same party, unprecedented in the political Brazilian history.

Voters evaluate the actions of the mandate and may reward those who made good governance and punish those who did not exercise a good one (Fiorina 1981, Key 1966). But elections are not only plebiscitary occasions in which the voter acts as rational judge of political and administrative actions. Besides the satisfaction with the administration, other theorists emphasize that the electoral preferences are a result of the individuals' position in social groups (Lazarsfeld 1948) and the psychological links between voters and parties (Converse 1964, Campbell 1960). In addition to such links, the context is also important because it affects the conclusions of the elections (Lewis-Beck *etal*2008).

For some theorists of the rational choice (Popkin 1981), the voter makes his choice based on imperfect and incomplete information. He makes use of cognitive shortcuts that give a meaning to these fragments so they become knowledge. The image is a cognitive shortcut that simplifies the decision and is either a typical heuristic vote or low information reasoning one. As information is crucial for decision making, to the extent that voters do not follow politics on a daily basis but need information to decide their vote, they can find this information in what is published by the media, the campaigns and their conversations

²⁶ National Survey on the 2010 presidential elections. Ipespe/ Research Group Public Opinion, Political Marketing and Electoral Behaviour (UFMG)

about politics. Thus, there is an interaction process between the daily collected information and the ones channeled by the media.²⁷ A large international bibliography agrees with the theoretical premises that '*electoral campaigns matter*' (Coma 2008, Beadoux *et al* 2007, Martinez 2004, Holbrook 1996), because they are able to bring large amount of information about parties and political conjuncture, build/destroy images and place candidates in the electoral race.

Political communication has become essential for the flow of information between politicians, the media and the voters. This importance comes from the fact that most of the occidental democracies go through a process of independence of voters towards political parties, which gives place to an audience democracy (Manin 1995). Citizens are less and less aligned with political parties, detached from those ideologies based on economic cleavages and exposed to various sources of information. The rarefaction of the faithful voter increases the electoral volatility and brings out new ways of voting - useful vote, opinion vote, protest vote among others, paving the way for the mediatization of the politics.

Various studies in Brazil have been focused on electoral behavior attempting to isolate the main structural and conjectural factors that influence the voting (Rennó and Cabello 2010, Martins Junior 2009, Zucco 2008, Carreirão 2002, Barreiras 2002, Singer 2000, Camargo 1999). These studies provided important contributions to the understanding of Lula's victory and his adversaries' in different elections. But they are still insufficient to explain the results obtained in 2010, an election in which the politician was not part of the dispute. For this reason, Telles and Ruiz (2010) tested a set of variables drawn by precedent studies to see what could have altered the choice of candidate in 2010. Through statistical analysis and multinomial²⁸models, the tests suggested that support for

²⁷ Regarding the approach on media of the theoretical school of political behavior, see Mundim (2010)

²⁸ Variables used in the model: socio-demographic – gender – age, education, family income and region; political- parties, left-right scale, interesting policies, government, Retrospective: assessment of the economy; campaigns–exposure to HGPE (Free Electoral Advertisement Time).

Rousseff was greater the more positive was the index of trust in Lula, and otherwise when regarding Serra, (Brazilian Social Democratic Party-PSDB), who has been more associated with distrust in Lula.²⁹ Although Lula has not participated in the 2010 elections, trust in the president was the most significant factor for the voter's decision.

By observing the typical American voter, who has low involvement with political issues and little ability to develop coherent ideological thinking, Lewis-Beck *et al* (2008) argue that the voter is independent from parties and has little interest in politics. Such characteristics impact the competition, by reducing the ideological diversity of the supplies, by maximizing the use of the personal appeals and by increasing electoral volatility. In the presence of volatile and independent voters, the campaigns and political communication gain relevance in Brazil (Bezerra and Mundim 2011, Lavareda and Telles 2011, Lourenço and 2007, Oliveira and 2007, Ribeiro 2004). Advertisement displayed on the Free Electoral Advertisement Time can change the voting intentions (Figueiredo and Aldé 2010), both enabling and consolidating the previous disposals (Lourenço 2003) or as main source of information for the middle voter (Veiga 2001). Political parties are competing to obtain votes and for this reason, they have to influence the agenda and public opinion, and manage the image of the candidates. Campaigns consider the actions that are related to the disputes to establish public issues, with the objective to consolidate positions or change voters' opinions.

Within the analytical field that integrates short term factors to the electoral process, the pretensions of this article are the following: *What are the axes that guided the presidential elections of 2010? How did the trust in Lula impact these campaigns?* We assume the electoral market is regulated and that the characteristics of the party system affect the choices of the parties (Norris 2009). It is understood that the consequences of this position is that the campaigns are important for the

²⁹ Although it could be argued that trust in Lula is associated with the perception of the economy, the evaluation of government and economics only residually explain trust in the president.

vote decision, because they are able to *articulate the demand and the supply in a regulated electoral market*. To win the elections, the candidates make use of their functional and individual characteristics, such as competence, leadership and integrity (Stokes, 1963). Based on the Stokes' directional theory, the empirical answer found by this article is that *the axis of the 2010 campaigns was the dispute over the symbolic representation of Lula's third term*, as the former president could not compete for another mandate.

In a context where the majority of the voters are disconnected from the political parties, the personal political predispositions are *activated* by the candidates. Due to the high popularity of the incumbent, the competitors have chosen to adjust themselves to the demand and to make use of the only strategy that could increase their chances of victory: maintaining the *status quo*, personalist appeals and an association to the symbolic capital of Lula da Silva. Personalism is still highly present in Brazilian political parties (Baquero and Freitas 2011). There remains a hyper-valuation of the leaders, due to the lack of trust in representative institutions (Moisés 2010). The persistence of personalism can be demonstrated empirically by examining the dissociation of the vote obtained by Lula in his previous participations as a candidate for president - occasions in which he expanded his electoral base support - and the results obtained by the PT in elections to the Chamber of Deputies. Since 2002, there is a gradual distance between the electoral territories of Lula and the ones of the PT (Soares and Terron 2008; Terron and Soares, 2010). The increase of Lula's support in the poorest classes of the population has been interpreted as the phenomenon of *Lulism* (Singer 2009). It could then be found, since the elections of 2006, a new kind of voter, more faithful to the president and less attached to the propositions of any political party.

The argument of this article is that Lula's leadership has been the main element to conquer voters. The aim is to check *how* the reputation has been important in the campaigns of 2010. The relevant question is not *whether* leaders matter or how much they are important, but *how* they matter and *why* they are important. The data analysis is based on

two surveys, made with the Brazilian electorate in the two rounds of 2010, in September and October, they had gathered 3 000 (three thousands) interviews in each round, with error margins of 2.5 pp and a confidence interval of 95%. Beyond the quantitative survey, this article brings data from programs shown on the Free Electoral Advertisement Time, which is on radio and television from August on and during all the campaign.


The prestige of Lula in the public opinion

Nine candidates run for the presidential election of 2010, including Dilma Rousseff (PT), representing the government, who competed colligated with the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB); José Serra, from the main opposition party (PSDB), who competed in alliance with the Democrats Party (DEM); and Marina Silva, former Minister of Lula's government and recently affiliated to the Green Party (PV). Considering their ideological composition, the coalitions could be formally classified, regarding the head and vice-president candidate, as center-left (PT/PMDB); center-right (PSDB/DEM) and center (PV).

Lula could not be a candidate for a third term, but he indicated a name for his succession: Dilma Rousseff. However, his candidate was running an election for the first time. For that reason, she did not dispose from an electorate already engaged behind her. Without any previous parliamentary action and being someone who never held major positions, the former minister inaugurated her first electoral experience under the sign of the dependence to the prestige of Lula.

Once the supplies have been defined, the campaigns oriented themselves around the president. The electorate prestige of Lula and the impact of his support can be seen in chart 2, in which we can remark that 64% of the voters could vote for a candidate under the influence of the former president: 43% would definitely vote for the candidate supported by Lula and 21% might vote for the candidate he indicated.

Chart 2: Prestige of Lula in 2010 elections: his support to the candidates



Source: National Survey on 2010 Presidential Election. Ipespe / Research Group Public Opinion: Political Marketing and Electoral Behaviour (UFMG). Question: *Lula's support to a candidate of the presidential election of this year: a) you will choose this candidate b) you may choose this candidate or c) you will not vote for the candidate supported by President Lula.*

Leaders with positive evaluation are very important during electoral campaigns, and for that, Lula's support became the main element in 2010. Dilma's campaign so aimed to convince that, more than a substitute to Lula, she would make possible his own presence in the government. Lula being constitutionally prevented for running a new presidential election, the victory of Dilma symbolized the popular attribution of a third term to the PT, and the return of the former president.

But there were doubts about Dilma's capacity to politically and emotionally involve Lula's voters. Although a popular politician may transfer prestige, the degree of uncertainty in this situation was high because Lula had an emotional link with the Brazilian voter. It would be "easier to transfer prestige than emotional links" (Lavareda cit. in Costa

and Marques 2009, s./p). For these reasons and uncertainties, even the opposition was trying to be accredited as inheritor of Lula's project.

However, the following tables show that Lula transferred his prestige to the candidates, and that this did not depend on the affiliation to political parties or ideologies. It is shown that Lula could alter election results. He became the main element of the campaign, surpassing the partisan identities.

Table 1: Candidate you would vote for if he was supported by Lula – 2nd round

Candidate	Frequency	%
Dilma	996	33,2
Serra	1472	49
Don't know/ No answer	536	17,8
Total	3004	100

Source: National Survey on 2010 Presidential Election.. Ipespe / Research Group Public Opinion: Political Marketing and Electoral Behaviour (UFMG). Question: Finally, if Lula decided to support Serra in this election, for whom would you vote: Dilma or Serra?

The data shows if Lula supported Serra, he would get 49% of the votes of the electorate, meaning that Serra would be hypothetically elected, considering that his percentage of valid votes would reach more than 50%. And, as will be seen in the tables below, the endorsement of Lula would result in capturing voters. Lula could transfer his votes either to his candidate or even to his main opponent.

Due to Lula's capacity to attract the voters, the choice to employ the rhetoric of the situation and continuity was perceived as the only option for the competition. The candidates avoided placing themselves as clear opponents to Lula and, more than through their political programs, sought to seduce the electorate by emphasizing personal and functional attributes, avoiding attacks against President Lula but disqualifying his candidate, specifically through the social networks.

The Free Electoral Advertisement Time - FEAT: the messages

Political campaigns in Brazil are mainly promoted through the media. The advertising spots and the Free Electoral Advertisement Time (FEAT), on radio and television, are the most traditional ways of communication with the electorate. The FEAT distributes equal portions (one third) of the time among all parties; another proportion (two thirds) is allocated according to their legislative representation. The FEAT is displayed during 45 days, in two daily blocks of 30 minutes each. If no candidate obtains more than 50% of the votes in the first round, there is a second round and the time of each advertising block is shortened to 20 minutes. The frequency and time of appearance are the same for both candidates who succeeded the best scores in the first round.

The objective of the FEAT is to democratize the access of the parties to the media and to expand the political information, that can be transmitted simultaneously all across the country. However, the access to the FEAT is unequal. Parties with a small representation and that compete alone have only a little time of advertising. Major political parties or groups of parties get a larger allowance of free advertising time, resulting in easier access to their ideas by the public. Although the parties have access to display their political programs for free, financial costs to conquer voters are high. The professionalization of politics and the centrality acquired by television require the hiring of specialized technical teams, which led Brazil to be the country with one of the most expensive and professionalized election campaigns in the world (Rocha Neto, 2008). On many occasions, campaign expenses declared by parties in Brazil are higher than the spending of the American parties. The inequality occurs not only concerning the access to the FEAT, but as well the distribution of financial resources. Although the parties have resources coming from the party fund, the legislation allows donation by private entities. The money collected establishes differences in starting points and influences election results, which undermines the principle of equality among participants in the political dispute. Parties that are supported by richer groups collect

more money and do campaigns that cost millions (Speck 2010a, 2010b). Moreover, there is a logic of concentration of financial resources: these are offered to parties and candidates with greater ability to interfere in the decisional process (Santos 2009).³⁰

In Brazil, voters make use of the free electoral advertisement time to get information about the campaigns. Tables 7 and 8 present data that confirms the central importance of the media in the dispute of 2010. It can be seen that more than over the interaction with people or through the press, it was through the radio and the television that voters followed the campaign and the day-to-day politics.³¹

Table 2: Main sources of information on the campaign – 1st round –2010 Elections

Main Source of Information	Frequency	%
News on TV	1993	65,9
Advertisement on TV or Radio	581	19,2
Talking to people	116	3,8
Internet	97	3,2
Newspapers/Magazines	92	3,0
Radio news	43	1,4
Other source	10	0,3
Did not answer	30	1,0
Don't know	64	2,1
Total	3026	100

Source: National Survey on 2010 Presidential Election. Ipespe / Research Group Public Opinion: Political Marketing and Electoral Behaviour (UFMG). Question: *Until now, how did you Sir (Madam) mostly obtain information about the campaign for president?*

³⁰ On the other hand, regarding the publicizing of information on campaign accountability: "Brazil has one of the most advanced mechanisms for collecting and publicizing information, with high access through the Internet. There is no other country in South America that has reached the same level. Only in the United States and Canada are similar systems found" (Speck, 2010a: s/p).

³¹ For a discussion on the information, electoral advertisement time and campaign see Maa-karoun(2010).

For 85.1% of the voters, the television was the main source of information about the campaign, either to follow the political news (63.9%), or to watch the political advertisement (19.2%). More recently, social networks have gained importance in parties' strategies, despite the fact that only 3.2% of Brazilians have used the Internet as the main source to get information about politics. Finally, the usage of reading newspapers and magazines was not a characteristic of this public, as only 3% of voters acceded to the press to get information about the campaign. On the other hand, it is verified in Table 5 that more than half of the electorate (50.5%) stated they often followed the elections through the television.

Table 3: Frequency with which the voter followed the election on television
1st round - Elections 2010

	Frequency	% valid	% accumulated
Often	1528	50,5	50,5
Sometimes	859	28,4	78,9
Rarely	426	14,1	93,0
Never	208	6,9	99,8
Did not answer	2	0, 1	99,9
Don't know	3	0, 1	100,0
Total	3026	100,0	

Source: National Survey on 2010 Presidential Election. Ipespe / Research Group Public Opinion: Political Marketing and Electoral Behaviour (UFMG). Question: *And could you tell me how often you Sir (Madam) are informed about the elections through: Newspapers and Magazines/TV/Radio/ Internet.*

The diffusion of the FEAT marks the beginning of the Brazilian campaigns and the prime time for politics, during which the voter is more attentive to politics. Although the main part of the voters who had already chosen their candidate claimed that they had decided their vote before the diffusion of election programs (63.9%), and more than 30% reported having decided their vote after the beginning of the electoral advertisement time. The FEAT was important to consolidate the faithful votes and capture the attention of undecided voters. Finally, more than half the electorate (54.4%) was exposed to the electoral programs in the first round of the 2010 presidential elections.

Table 4: Exposure of the voter to the Free Electoral Advertisement Time (Radio/TV) - 1st round, Elections 2010

Exposure to the FEAT	Frequency	% valid
Yes	1646	54,4
No	1308	43,2
Did not answer	34	1,1
Don't know	38	1,3
Total	3026	100,0

Source: National Survey on 2010 Presidential Election. Ipespe / Research Group Public Opinion: Political Marketing and Electoral Behaviour (UFMG). Question: *Did you Sir (Madam) watch television or listen to the radio sometime during the electoral advertisements for a party or presidential candidate, those programs displayed on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays at 1 p.m. and 8:30 p.m.?*

Given its importance as a source of information, the time available during the electoral advertising time is one of the main factors that orientate negotiations between the parties. The time distribution of the FEAT for the 2010 elections gave advantage to the candidate of the government. Dilma Rousseff (PT) competed colligated with the PMDB, party with the main representation at the Chamber of Deputies. This alliance allowed her to dispose of the longest advertisement time, with 10 minutes and 38 seconds. In second position, José Serra (PSBD), colligated with the Democrats Party (DEM), had 7 minutes and 20 seconds. Marina Silva (PV) disposed only of 1 minute and 24 seconds, but still got nearly 20 million votes (20% of the electorate).

The analyses of the FEAT allows us to check which were the major "brands" used by candidates in their campaigns—biographical, disqualification, generalists, etc. besides the possibility to examine their speeches. To analyze the campaign rhetoric, Figueiredo *et al* (2000) developed a model based on the two axis 'situation' and 'opposition'. According to this model, politicians hypothetically frame the world according to their political position on this axis. Pro-government candidates claim that 'the current world is good and the future will be better'; the opposition tries to convince the voter that the present situation is bad and could be good in the future if he/she wins.

What has been the axis of the 2010 campaign? Unlike in the model developed by Figueiredo *et al*, the opposition did not take the statement that 'the actual world is going bad'. From the rhetorical situation – 'this world is good and the future will be better'- most of the campaigns to succeed Lula da Silva were limited to the defense of the *status quo*, lacking of candidates positioned as 'opposition', personalistic rhetoric and some moral discourse.

But for what reason did the candidates give up the opposition rhetoric? Could good marketing change this tendency? In 2002, when Lula was elected for the first time, the candidate who represented the opposition to the then government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) had more chances to win. In 2010, the succession of Lula reversed this logic: at that moment, the tone was more about the representation of the continuity. The use of situation's rhetoric by candidates was due to the existence of a public opinion highly favorable to the president and that was mainly procured by the sense of well-being provided by economic growth and trust that the electorate had in him (Telles and Ruiz, 2011).

The political marketing, even if extraordinary, could not reverse the trend of continuity, which was strong and sharp. However, in cases where candidates behave as "similar products", a calculated marketing strategy and communication could make the difference. Thus, most campaigns opted to promote movement toward the center of the spectrum and political parties were discursively distributed into the same ideological space. The actions of the political communication were coordinated so that the main actor became President Lula da Silva. As a result, the agendas of the campaign were axed around the themes that would convince voters that their candidates were the best to manage the policies proposed by Lula. For competitors, the discourse was to maintain the *status quo*, without proposing significant changes that could afraid the *lulists*.

So, how to build the image of a candidate who had no parliamentary experience or charisma and was unknown to the public? Many are the discursive strategies that can be used during a campaign. Montero (1999) identifies thirteen of these strategies. Among them, the campaign of Rousseff widely used three of these discourses, always axed on President

Lula: (i) the invocation of the principle of authority, (ii) the search for consensus facing another authority or control, and (iii) the image or icon to replace the word.

The observations of the programs shown in the election advertisement time brought us to the conclusion that Dilma performed as someone instructed by Lula to represent him in a third term. Being supported by the prestige of the former president, she would ensure the continuity of governmental actions for a better future for Brazil. From the discursive model of Montero (1999), we can observe that Lula has been quoted as an authority regarding his position as Head of Government. He was also a witness to the political and professional background of Dilma, who was accredited as a choice for the mission of representing him in the government. And to strengthen the connection of the candidate with the President, Lula appeared beside Dilma in all advertising programs. The main slogan of Dilma's programs – 'For Brazil to keep changing'-and numerous spots communicated her association with the President.

The experiment of 'transfer of prestige' can be illustrated by the program aired during the last FEAT³² before the 1st round, which summed up the discursive strategy of this campaign. Lula speaks to Brazil as the greatest political authority in the country. Beyond an authority, the president is the witness and icon of the program. In this testimony, he unites the electorate by means of positive feelings of affection, stating that 'to vote for Dilma is to vote for me'. But he also appeals to fear, concluding with a threat, saying that 'with Dilma, nothing will stop':

Lula: You, who believe in me and my government: do not doubt us, vote for Dilma. Like me, Dilma cares about poor people, respects life, peace, freedom and religion. Voting for Dilma is voting for me, with the conviction of a better government. Brazil is on another level today, the government works hard and with Dilma, nothing will stop. She is the sure way to keep Brazil changing (ROUSSEFF, FEAT, 9/30/10).

³² The FEAT was on air from August 17 to October 28 of 2010, with an interval between the 1st and 2nd rounds.

Serra (PSDB) adopted the slogan 'Brazil can do more' and opted for the speech that Montero (1999) identifies as 'depolitization', meaning the avoidance of conflicting content. He represents the main opposition to the government, representing a weak position where public opinion is satisfied with the current world. He was the wrong choice of candidate, completely misplaced – no marketing action could make Serra win if he employed the rhetoric of opposition. But a dubious speech could improve his position and get him to run the second round against Dilma Rousseff.

In 2010, Serra's campaign was ambiguous: he was neither situation nor opposition. He stated that the current world was good and he was the most appropriate choice to continue with the good things and improve what was bad. Serra fought for the *lulist* electorate and, in a questionable episode concerning effectiveness, used the image of President Lula for his own television program. Alongside Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former president from PSDB, Lula was shown as being responsible for the positive changes through which the country passed.

By analyzing all the programs shown during the first round, Panke *et al* (2011) found the prevalence of personalism and negative campaign on advertising, Serra's television program, aired in FEAT during the first round, dealt mainly with his biography, history and political accomplishments (50% as a candidate). A significant amount of time was devoted to the disqualification of the candidate Rousseff (14%). (Panke *et al*, 2011: 11).

Despite some mistakes during his campaign, Serra benefited from his exposure in the media. Bezerra and Mundim (2011) made an econometric model in which they included media variables and concluded that 'voters with more political attention- that capture precisely the exposure and the approval of voters to the flow of political information available, especially for the press coverage - were more likely to vote for Serra than for Rousseff.' Although the number of informed voters that are aware of politics is a minority in Brazil, among the few people most exposed to media coverage, the probability of voting for Serra was greater.

In 2010, the scenario of polarization between the PT and the PSDB, usual during the Brazilian presidential elections, was altered by the

presence of Marina Silva (PV).³³ With only 1.23 minutes on TV, the candidate of the PV candidate obtained more than 19.6 million votes and generated a 'green wave':

If there was something that could be appropriately called 'wave' in that election, it had been created by Marina at the end of the first round. Well, if throughout the whole campaign the curve of mentions to Dilma was typically placed higher than the others, the night before the first round Marina Silva's mentions on Twitter had already been at a similar level as Dilma's. (Silva *et al* 2011: 16)

Votes for this candidate were responsible for leading to a second round, which opposed Dilma Rousseff and Serra. Marina, a former minister of Lula's government, claimed that she had helped the President carry out good projects, but did not take responsibility for the mistakes made by that administration. She appeared as a new political force and a protector of the ethics that PT formerly represented, making the impression that the party had abandoned its ethical principles when it came to govern the country. She also introduced her life story and her background in poverty, similarly to Lula, and placed herself as the inheritor of the claims of the social movements.

Marina Silva invested in social networks and reached out to a young population connected to new technologies, performing an original campaign. Since she had little time in which to display her electoral program, she worked around her low visibility in traditional media by choosing to invest in *online* and *offline* networks. Marina tried to capture potential PT voters who were dissatisfied with the political problems and cases of corruption inside the government. But she also spoke to the middle class and to the most conservative religious groups, particularly the evangelicals, as could be testified in Belo Horizonte (Telles and Dias 2011).

According to Panke *et al* (2011), the Green candidate devoted a significant part of her program to social issues. But she also used part of her time to

³³ In 2002, Ciro and Garotinh ogot more than 30% of the votes, but none of them could achieve individually the vote for Marina.

disqualify competitors, without directly attacking Lula, spared by all the main candidates. This strategy worked and Marina reached first place in important capitals and cities which had until then been islands of the government and administered by the PT, such as Belo Horizonte and Brasilia.

The electoral campaign was key for all candidates. It allowed Dilma to be associated to President Lula, and so to represent continuity; it allowed Serra to reduce his rejection, to penetrate into segments of the middle classes and to consolidate the opposition in the South and Center-west regions of the country. As for Marina Silva, the campaign allowed her to establish a connection with a portion of the public that felt dissatisfied with the country's political situation and made it possible for her to present her candidature as an alternative for change.


Voters and the image of the campaigns

The behaviour related to the act of voting cannot be explained only as an effect of the calculations made by party leaders. One has to wonder how the voter would react to political strategies and electoral engineering. The question of how votes are decided in a particular election is subject to how the voter expresses his circumstantial feelings towards parties, the conjunctural problems and his position relatively to the instrumental and symbolic qualities of the candidates. When these elements lead the voter to the same direction, he will show interest in the campaign. The guidelines contained in the same direction consolidate previous preferences; contrary to pressures that can result in indifference toward the candidate (Converse 1964).

The success of former Minister Dilma assumed that voters should be predisposed to vote for the continuity of the PT government; at the same time, the candidate should be identified as the one having the best personal and functional attributes to represent this continuity. In the 2010 elections, in addition to these classical elements, the possibility of a transference of votes from President Lula to his candidate was the main factor to be considered. Empirically, the questions that would be asked were the following: What is the perception of the present and future world

held by the electorate? How did they evaluate the government defended by the candidate? Are voters willing to maintain the current situation?

Chart 3: Voting intentions, 1st and 2nd round – 2010 Presidential



Source: Datafolha

In the opinion surveys, the curves of voting intentions show the continuous growth of the PT candidate, who surpassed her main opposition candidate, Serra (PSDB), while still in the pre-campaign period - before the start of the FEAT. The central matter was to clarify whether the support obtained by Dilma Rousseff in the pre-campaign period was *circumstantial* or *crystallized*. In July 2010, two variables indicated the wish to confirm the continuity: the satisfaction with governmental policies (76%) and the approbation of the methods used by Lula to administrate the country (83%). In addition to that, voters wanted a president who would give continuity to the current government, or made only a few changes (65%).³⁴ This consolidated the idea that the election should maintain the status quo and a predisposition to the use of retrospective vote - where voters examine the background of candidates/coalitions and estimate the possible effects of their permanence in the future. This combination of positive evaluations certainly advantaged the candidate of the government.

³⁴ IBOPE, JOB631/2010, April of 2010.

Another point concerns the voters informed by the partisan's preference. The party of the candidate had the sympathy of a considerable part of the electorate. Not less than 30% said they prefer the PT; that result reached 37% in the Northeast, but only 16% of the electorate in the South. The profile of *petism* has been changing and is growing within the layers of society with of lower income and education levels. Many voters remain loyal to the party, even when leaders do not bear attitudes consistent with their expectations. This can be explained by the presence of a mechanism of selective inattention in the cognitive map of voters; in other words, what individuals perceive about the party is affected by what they want to receive (Converse1964). In a competitive election, the fact that the candidate starts a campaign with many voters willing to choose their party makes a significant difference in the stability of their voting results.

Dilma Rouseff needed the prestige of the president. For that reason, the pre-campaign focused on the image of Lula da Silva. The result was that, in July 2010, 80% of voters were already aware that the former minister was being supported by the president. However, this strategy could be insufficient: although one third of the electorate said they would vote for the candidate nominated by Lula, other 32% were willing to vote *depending on who is the candidate*³⁵. This meant that on the one hand Lula transferred votes, but on the other hand, Dilma Rouseff would have to present herself to voters who were willing to follow the advice of the president, but who would also evaluate what she had to offer. The work to persuade those voters turned out to depend only on the candidate and, in this aspect, the political marketing would be crucial to project her image.


Another dimension interferes with the conduct of the voter: their orientation relatively to the candidate, their symbolic and instrumental qualities. Serra was regarded as the most experienced (64%), most fulfilling (40%) and most prepared to act as (45%). But his weakness was located in another cleavage: 45% believed that the candidate, if elected, would defend the rich and big business names (50%), and believed that he was the most authoritarian (35%). In the opposite direction, the strength of

³⁵ Instituto Vox Populi, 15th and 18th of May of 2010.

Dilma resided in an image associated with the defense of the poor (37%) and the women (45%).³⁶

The candidates used the political marketing to reduce their weakest points. But campaigns are effective when they strengthen elements already available, as political guidelines act as filters for the reception of the information provided. It was up to political marketing to construct the image of Dilma beyond a faithful follower of the candidate Lula da Silva, and Serra needed to establish his speech of change without losing his loyal voters, since the election was fought under the sign of continuity. Dilma achieved to be associated with important pillars as a strong economy.

Chart 5: Perception of the campaigns of Dilma and Serra by the electorate – 1º. Turno, 2010



Source: National Survey on 2010 Presidential Election. Ipespe / Research Group Public Opinion: Political Marketing and Electoral Behaviour (UFMG). Question: *In your opinion, what does (READ THE NAME OF THE CANDIDATE) do the most during his/her campaign: communicates proposals, or criticizes other candidates? None of these (DO NOT READ) DN NA.*

As seen through the evolution of voting intentions, Dilma started the pre-campaign placed ahead Serra, but it was with the beginning of FEAT that the candidate consolidated her support, increasing the distance between

³⁶ Datafolha, 20th and 21st of May of 2010

her and the opponent. The electoral program was important for her to communicate positively with the voter and to be strongly associated to the best evaluated President of the history of Brazil. The campaign proposed by Serra was, on the contrary, perceived by voters as a campaign that was mainly criticizing the other candidates (44.2%) instead of communicating proposals (37.8%). Above all, despite articulating the rhetoric of continuity, Serra was perceived by voters as the anti-Lula, with 75% of the electorate indicating him as an opponent to the president.

Conclusion

In 2010, the voter was satisfied with the political performance of Lula, trusted him and did not want changes. This satisfaction would hardly be modified by political marketing, what indicated that the presidential election would be based on the choice of the candidate who would better represent the continuity. Despite the fact that voters become increasingly pragmatic in their choices, personalism is not something that can be forgotten in Brazilian politics. Lula's leadership was the main element mobilized in the 2010 elections. To captivate the *lulists*, the parties made use of the situation axe and the strategies reproduced the classic patterns of personalization, monopolizing rhetoric of continuity and moral judgments.

These elections were contended under different conditions than those found in precedent disputes. For the first time after the return to democracy, Lula would not be a candidate. The focus of the presidential election, which until then had been based on candidates grouping themselves as favorable or unfavorable to Lula, could not occur once again. But despite Lula not being a candidate, the trust of the people in him guided the elections, contended regarding the choice of voters who wanted his third term. The immediate effect of this strategy was that competitors converged to the political center and highlighted any of their characteristics that would make it possible to categorize them as 'political heirs of Lula.' As the electoral market is affected by previous rules, strategies took into account the mechanical and psychological effects of these norms and

were adjusted to the demands of the voters. This resulted in the central axis of this election being less about *issues positions* and more about the dispute over the representation of the ‘third term’ of Lula.

The success of the “third term” strategy was made possible by the combination of the following conditions: (i) the presence of a reduced link between voters and parties, (ii) use of personalism in the appeals of the campaigns, (iii) weakened opposition, (iv) reduction of the number of competitors, which made the election a referendum, (v) psychological effect of rules in the useful vote, (v) public opinion satisfied with the administration of the President, and (vi) the possibility of transferring prestige from the president to the candidate for his succession.

The political communication during the Free Electoral Advertisement Time was fundamental to polarize the dispute by promoting the thesis of the plebiscitary election and consolidating the image of Dilma as a symbolic representative of Lula. As she was little known by the general public, the political marketing was crucial for Dilma to persuade the electorate. The president was able to transfer prestige to his successor and the victory of this strategy shows that the main explanatory key to the success of candidates in those elections has been the ability to place himself/herself as a messenger of the third term of Lula. More than a case study, the 2010 elections in Brazil show that short-term factors such as electoral campaigns matter in vote decisions. Furthermore, these results confirm the directional theory, stating that the current disputes are less articulated by the distribution of ideological parties on a one-dimensional scale and more by valences. Thus, further than being a reflection of demands in a perfect electoral market, candidates have been associated with valences, which emerge in elections as singular characteristics.

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