

Papers

- Constance Meinwald,
What Do We Think We're Doing?
Allan Silverman,
Plato, Platonists, Platonism
Francisco J. Gonzalez,
Plato's Perspectivism
Marina McCoy,
*Perspectivism and the Philosophical
Rhetoric of the Dialogue Form*
Melissa Lane,
*Antianarchia: interpreting
political thought in Plato*
David Ebrey,
*The Value of Rule in Plato's
Dialogues: A Reply to Melissa Lane*
Kenneth Sayre,
Dialectic in Plato's Late Dialogues
Mark A. Johnstone,
*Comments on K. Sayre, "Dialectic
in Plato's Late Dialogues"*
François Renaud,
*The Twofold Requirements of
Truth and Justice in the *Gorgias**
Debra Nails,
*Platonic Interpretive
Strategies, and the History
of Philosophy, with a
Comment on Renaud*

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Plato, Platonists, Platonism

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ABSTRACT

The paper examines different approaches to key metaphysical and conceptual claims in Plato's dialogues. It explores how different readers of Plato, beginning with Aristotle, make sense of the status of and the relations between some of the key Forms developed in different dialogues, to include the Form of the Good.

Keywords: Platonism, greatest kinds, The Good, ontology, Cherniss

I want to begin my contribution from consideration of the title of Professor Meinwald's paper: *What do we think we are doing?* 'We' here are participants in an inquiry into Plato's philosophy, however we conceive his philosophical contribution.

I think what we are doing is: Philosophy.

Let me tweak this way of putting my answer: what the study of Plato is ultimately for is philosophical activity. And while I am cautious in averring that Plato strongly believes (*diisxurizesthai*) anything, I think he strongly believes that philosophizing is the best thing one can do.

Like Meinwald, I want to offer some reflections on the prompt that brings us together for this workshop—What in your opinion *are the appropriate or correct principles for the study of Plato's philosophy?* In thinking about how to respond to this question I wonder whether different principles apply to the study of other historical figures. Maybe different principles apply to the study of the philosophy of Socrates, who wrote nothing, or the philosophy of Chrysippus, no complete work of whose is transmitted to us. At another extreme, as it were, different principles might apply to the study of a philosopher who leaves behind, in addition to a large corpus of published professional writing, volumes of letters, unpublished works of varying degrees of completeness, notes, drafts and so on. We could lay her esoteric against her exoteric works; see how works evolved from notes, to drafts, to treatise, etc. Add to all the above a doxographical tradition, understood here to include reports from others about what a figure wrote or said or meant. Contrast these cases with the study of a (fictional?) philosopher whose single treatise we might find in a monastery about whom no one else comments in the historical record. And then we might wonder whether it makes any difference whether the philosopher we are studying is dead. Truth is,

I do not see that different principles apply to the study of great versus obscure philosophers, or those who leave behind much or little in the way of work or doxography (Socrates and others who write nothing may be special), or ultimately that different principles apply to the study of dead versus living philosophers. Indeed I am suspicious of the difference between the History of Philosophy and Philosophy, so I'm going to ignore the presence of 'Plato' and ask the question: *What in your opinion are the appropriate or correct principles for the study of philosophy?* In my opinion, there are no correct or appropriate principles for the study, that is, the doing, of philosophy beyond, say, basic principles of charity—try to make a philosopher, oneself included, say something sensible and true if one can, and do it—philosophy— as well as one can. Check that; for I also believe, with Plato, that one should try to be as synoptic as one can be, to include not just trying to unite the various so-called fields of philosophy, but trying to avoid falling into the trap of thinking that there is only one way to do philosophy, or to write philosophy.

'No one expects to write, or be, like Plato'.¹
But we can try.

With Meinwald, and many others, I am happy to say that our primary object of study is the dialogues, that engaging with the dialogues in their individual settings is really interesting, that reanimating and engaging with the philosophical discussions they contain is of great interest philosophically, and that each seems manifestly to be finished and crafted as an artistic product that sets and pursues its own particular philosophical agenda. But if an individual dialogue is a starting point, my engagement with the philosophy contained therein soon takes me beyond the dialogue itself. Embracing Plato's advice to be synoptic, I look across dialogues, and over the centuries

at other philosophers. And here is where the prompt provided to the workshop has bite.

Let us consider the question about the correct principles that guide one's study of Plato's philosophy first in light of the different emphases just mentioned. Here there is no disagreement about whether it is Plato's dialogues that guide the two approaches. Both look primarily to Plato's writing. The difference rather is that on perhaps an extreme version of one approach, we might say that we should investigate the argument or position developed in an individual work without consideration of whatever is said about the same topic or roughly the same topic in another. Analysis of the *Philebus*' account of pleasure should disregard what Plato writes about pleasure in the *Gorgias* or *Republic*. On a perhaps extreme version of the second approach one might claim that it is necessary to consider what is said in the different dialogues about roughly the same topic, that, for instance, one cannot understand the first so-called part of the *Parmenides* (126-136a) without introducing the account of Forms, Being and Participation provided in the so-called Final Argument of the *Phaedo* (99c-107a).

Contrast these approaches, where the dialogue or dialogues of Plato are all that matter, with an approach that looks to the testimony of others, especially other Platonists, starting with Aristotle, and treats their remarks as providing reasons not to think that what is written in the dialogues is the ultimate authority for Plato's meaning.² Perhaps most notoriously we would consider Aristotle's remarks about unwritten doctrines, the One and the Indefinite Dyad as Plato's foundational principles, the reports of the lecture on the Good, and so on, as at least guides to what Plato thinks. Of course different figures within the long tradition disagree with one another about what Plato meant or said, which is one reason why appeals to the

tradition are made by interpreters of various persuasions, from Straussians to the Tubingen School, from G.E.L. Owen to Harold Cherniss. Cherniss is perhaps best known for favoring Plato's dialogues over the reports of the tradition, and in particular for his rejection of Aristotle's account of crucial aspects of Plato's metaphysics, e.g., that the separation of Forms and that the One and the Indefinite Dyad are Plato's metaphysical first principles. He discounts the former because he thinks Aristotle misreads Plato's texts on separation (deliberately to support his own metaphysical account of first principles). He rejects the latter because he thinks that there is no textual support for them as first principles. On the other hand, like most interpreters, Cherniss is selective in his appeal to the tradition, sometimes even to support his own interpretation when the Platonic text seems clearly to point in a different direction. Most famously he accepts the majority of the tradition, which maintains that the *Timaeus*' creation account of the cosmos should not be read literally but rather was meant for the sake of instruction, despite *Timaeus*' clear declaration that the Demiurge creates the cosmos.

Weighing the tradition or elements of the tradition against the texts, or using one dialogue to help with reading another are tricky matters. I suspect that almost all interpreters turn out to be selective in the manner just discussed with Cherniss: when it supports their view of what is said in a given passage of a dialogue appeals are made to sources external to the text. But perhaps we can all agree that a good principle to adopt when confronting the text of a dialogue is that attributions of content and meaning to Plato's dialogues and passages therein are often dicey. Sometimes it is unclear what Plato is even saying in a given passage. I am teaching the *Philebus* this semester. Consider the first element in the Gift passage

(16a9-10): 'whatever is said to be consists of one and many, having in its nature limit and unlimitedness', along with the opening lines of the four-fold ontology (23c1-5):

Socrates. 'Let us be very careful about the starting point we take'. Protarchus. 'What kind of starting point?' Soc. 'Let us make a division of everything that actually exists now in the universe into two kinds, or if this seems preferable, into three.' (Frede translation) In the first example, the force of the participle -having--and the *men/de* construction are unclear. In the second, the role of *nun* is unclear. Nothing in another dialogue or author can clarify their roles.

More often I am far from sure about what Plato means by what he says. The same two passages are examples. Is whatever is said to be the same as everything that exists now in the universe: are we talking about Forms, or monads, if they differ from Forms, and so-called particulars in both passages? And, ignoring the force of the participle, what is it to have in one's nature limit and unlimitedness? Additionally, as I read the text at 23c, when Plato writes that we should be very careful about a starting point and then delivers an obscurely expressed starting point, this is deliberate. Whether one appeals to the context of a passage, its dialectical or argumentative force, or other pragmatic considerations, the point Plato is trying to make in a given passage is often up for grabs.

When we try to determine what the Greek says, we look for help in Greek authors, LSJ, Smyth, Denniston, etc. And when we try to determine what Plato means, we look for help in all sorts of directions, from other Greek authors such as Xenophon or Isocrates, from other ancient philosophers, perhaps starting with Aristotle, and from other non-Ancient sources, especially philosophers. Looking for help is one thing. Deciding what use to make

of what someone else says about the same passage you are studying is another. After all, at least some of the same issues arise when we read another—what does her text say, what does her text mean, and why is the author saying it? You need a reason to think that your help has a better grip on the contested matter than you do—she’s smarter than you, has a privileged position, say by dint of temporal or physical proximity, does not suffer from competitive or other biases that you do.

There are, of course, different ways to approach the dialogues, three of which we might label historical, literary, and philosophical. I am concerned today with the latter. It should go without saying that within each approach there are differences: disagreement is the life-blood of the academy. Indeed it is clear that there was disagreement in the Academy and in the Academic and Platonistic traditions. Platonists too come in many stripes. More importantly, there are disagreements among philosophers about the basic questions of philosophy and the answers to the questions. I see no advantage to segmenting those who worry about the problems initiated by Plato into a privileged tradition and the rest. I remember saying to my undergraduate teacher, Robert Turnbull, that his Plato sounded a lot like Wilfred Sellars. He responded by wondering why that should matter and pressing me on why one couldn’t one learn as much about Plato by reading a nominalist as by reading a Platonist?

It seems to me that our need for help increases as we press deeper into any of the so-called fields within philosophy—ethics, epistemology and metaphysics is my preferred cleavage. I am a Platonist with respect to each of these subject matters. My inchoate attraction to Plato and Platonism began with my reading of the *Republic* in both my last year of high school and first year of college. But it was

reinforced, if not cemented, by reading Cherniss’ *The Philosophical Economy of Plato’s Theory of Ideas*,³ which I still regard as the best eleven pages I’ve read on the subject. It made me think about what a philosophical theory attempts to do and how one should think about the structure of a philosophical theory. At about the same time I read D.C. Williams’ *The Elements of Being*,⁴ which introduced to me the difference between general and special metaphysics. It thus provided a way to view Aristotle and Plato as worrying in a similar manner about how to think about primitive notions or principles of a (general) metaphysical theory while disagreeing about the special objects or beings that play the specific roles allowed for or demanded by those principles.

Some might consider this approach to Plato anachronistic or too much about Platonism and not enough about Plato. Maybe so. But, to repeat, if there is anything I take away from reading the dialogues, if there is ultimate meaning in them, it is: philosophize; keep working on the problems with others, yourself, and whatever else that can be pressed into service. And if there is anything that seems clear about Plato’s school, or lectures, or manner of teaching, it is that subscribing to a point of view, let alone his point of view, whatever it may be, is not a requirement of membership. Disagreement is the lifeblood of The Academy.⁵

These are general methodological remarks. So let me now turn to a more specific topic that separates those who look first and perhaps last to Plato’s texts from those who look to the tradition, namely what are Plato’s metaphysical first principles.

Let us take Cherniss as a reader who not only thinks that the dialogues are the master authority, but as a unitarian in so far as he thinks that there is little change of doctrine over time.⁶ (While I agree that the dialogues

are the master authorities, I think that the distinction between unitarian and developmentalist readings has grown rather stale and of little use.) Since time is limited, I want to concentrate on what I think is significant about Cherniss' account of the greatest kinds and the general issue of whether there is, like Tolkien's One Ring that rules them all, a master Form. Since many think that The Good is the master Form, I will conclude with some remarks about it. But there are other candidates, especially The One, a position held perhaps by Aristotle in his account of the One and the Indefinite Dyad and by Plotinus and the Neoplatonic Tradition.⁷

Precisely what to make of the so-called Greatest Kinds in *Sophist* (254d-255e) is a matter of no little controversy.⁸ One difficulty is that three of the five Greatest Kinds, namely Being, Same and Different, seem to many readers different from the two others, Motion and Rest: the three commune with all Forms and each other whereas Motion and Rest do not. A second difficulty is that some Forms that seem to qualify as greatest kinds, e.g., One or Unity Itself, are not included. On this difficulty, see below. According to Ryle, Being, Sameness and Difference turn out not to be Forms but ways of making statements, i.e., identity, non identity, and predicational statements. Ryle argued that Plato, as he came to appreciate the nature of the statement (*logos*), abandoned his earlier view, based on names and naming, of a substantive theory of Forms. All Forms, for Ryle, might then be treated as conceptual or linguistic entities of some sort.⁹ Some have argued that Cherniss shared the view that the greatest kinds are not Forms, but rather are concepts.¹⁰

I am certain that Cherniss did not hold that these kinds were anything other than Forms.¹¹ On the other hand, there is something to the charge about Cherniss' account of the communion of Forms, both in the *Sophist* and

elsewhere, which might give one reason to think that something conceptual or linguistic is at stake in thinking through how Forms are related to one another. Cherniss' longest discussion of these matters is found in the first and shortest chapter of *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Early Academy (ACPA)*, 'Diaeresis, Definition, and Demonstration'. There, in talking about the priority of genus or species, or any idea, to one another, he writes: "The example by which he explains the "intercommunication" of ideas in the *Sophist* (254b-257a) precludes the possibility of such a notion of those five ideas, and what is true of them is presumably true of all (254c). The relation of ideas to one another is that of implication or compatibility and its opposite, not that of principle and derivative or of whole and part."¹² Cherniss maintained that 'there are two things in which Plato is more interested than in the theory of ideas itself, for that theory, is, after all, only his way of satisfying these two requirements: first, that there is such a thing as mind which can apprehend reality, and second, that this reality which is the object of knowledge has absolute and unqualified existence.'¹³

In thinking through what Cherniss, Ryle, and others are worrying here it behooves us to keep track of at least two distinct, though related, concerns. One is how our thought and language, or better our way of theorizing about Forms, reflects the relations that obtain or fail to obtain among the *onta* we are talking about. The second is what are the relations between Forms—do Forms stand in relations to one another and if so what are those relations and between what Forms do they obtain?¹⁴

Cherniss, as I read *ACPA*'s discussion, was focused on the issue of how we are to regard the relation of the Forms mentioned in a definition to the Form that is being defined. In a nutshell, he is focused on the unity of the definition. His

claim is that *no* ‘ontological relation’ holds between the so-called parts of the definition and the definiendum. One might well wonder what the available ontological relations are besides whole and part, principle and derivative. What I refer to as participation and being are other candidates.¹⁵ Frede/Meinwald offer additional candidates.¹⁶ Now no discussion of the unity of the definition in Plato, or the relation of the linguistic definition to its ontological counterpart can afford to ignore Aristotle’s treatment of the issues in *Metaphysics Zeta*.¹⁷ And none of the aforementioned does: neither Cherniss nor Meinwald nor I dismiss Aristotle. Even if one does not accept his view of what Plato meant, we all take very seriously the concerns that unite and divide Plato and Aristotle over these incredibly knotty metaphysical issues. Moreover, I do not think Frede, Code, Cherniss, Meinwald or myself are trying to appeal to the tastes of our colleagues.¹⁸ (Indeed, I suspect that the reverse is more likely to be the case, that excellent metaphysicians like Kit Fine and Jonathan Schaffer are trying to ground (sic) their accounts in Aristotle and Plato.¹⁹) Of course there is no reason to refuse help from modern academics on these deep problems in metaphysics and language. Ryle’s insightful, influential, and probably mistaken account was deeply indebted to Russell and the Neo-Kantian Marburg School’s emphasis on the priority of judgment. When Verity Harte opens her excellent book with a discussion of Lewisian mereology she at once illuminates a set of problems shared by Lewis and Plato, distinguishes Plato’s response from Lewis’, and helps students and scholars who are less familiar with one or the other appreciate that philosophy is continuous with its history.²⁰

I said earlier that I find it useful to move beyond an individual dialogue in reflecting on the problems generated in our engagement with

a theme broached in a given work. With respect to how forms ‘combine’ and the relations on display in a division-- Cherniss’ notions of implication and compatibility--, it seems to me useful, for instance, and to reflect on what the late dialogues say about particulars and their properties, about how the Porphyrean trees that might be said to result from their collection are constructed. One issue is the status of mixtures. The argument at *Philebus* 23 -27 is less than pellucid. But it is not unreasonable to conclude that all mixtures are particulars. If so, one might think that whatever we make of Limit and Unlimited, no Form is a mixture of them. If combining is mixing, then no Forms combine with one another. What might look like a Form combining with another, e.g., Man with Animal, might then be viewed as a reflection of these Forms combining, or not, in the particular humans. In a perhaps different sense of combining, we might think of the relations between the *Timaeus*’ Geometrical Forms and the traditional Forms: in addition to the relation of Fire Itself to The Hot Itself, we would worry about the relation of Fire Itself to Triangle Itself, or to the Pyramid Itself.

To be sure, each of the claims in the paragraph above is controversial. Many, perhaps relying on the claim at *Philebus* 16a9-10, might argue that not all mixtures are particulars since Forms have Limit and Unlimited in them.²¹ Yet if they are mixtures of the same sort as those discussed in the four-fold ontology of 23-27, then somehow we need to find a way for there to be a (rational) cause of them. Others, myself included, would resist the claim that the sort of combining discussed in *Sophist* is the same as mixing in the *Philebus*, or that the relation of the traditional to the geometrical Forms in the *Timaeus* is the same as combining or mixing. My point, rather, is that the investigation of Plato’s metaphysical first principles with

respect to the relations between Forms must come to grips with each of these relations and the discussions of them in each of these dialogues.

When we turn to the *megista gene*, their interrelations, and the relation of other Forms to them, we face a different set of worries. First, there is the worry that at least some of these Forms do in fact seem to be predicable of all Forms, themselves included, in an ontological and characterizing manner, as opposed to the ‘merely’ conceptual manner in which the Forms in a tree are related to one another. Each Form is different from everything else, the same as itself, and so on. This is a non-trivial ‘and so on’. Of special concern, perhaps, is the Form of Being Itself. Broadly speaking, there are three related issues: 1) what to make of *Sophist* 255c14-15, the difference between being said *auta kath auta* and *pros alla*; 2) whether there is an existential reading of being in the *Sophist* or elsewhere in Plato; 3) what is the relation between Sameness and Being? I think it is fair to say that the Greek does not settle the matter. I also think it is fair to say that neither the *Sophist* nor any of the dialogues settles the matter. And therefore, I would conclude, none of the tradition, from Aristotle to Cherniss, Owen, Frede, Code, Gerson, Meinwald or me could settle the matter. All are trying to rationally reconstruct an account of principles that answers to our understanding of what Plato might be after in discussing these Forms and the special status they enjoy in both the linguistic and ontological realms.²²

A second worry concerns the possible difference between the more logical Forms such as Being, Sameness, Difference, and Unity, and Forms such as Motion, Rest, Beauty and especially the Good. For the remainder of my space I want to focus on the Good. What are we to say about this Form and Plato’s conception of it? If it is a *megiston genos*, and if, as I believe,

it is ontologically predicated of all Forms, then it follows that all Forms are good. Compare if Beauty is a *megiston genos*, and it is ontologically predicated of all Forms, then it follows that all Forms are beautiful. While some might balk at these conclusions, including, I think, Cherniss, I find them compelling. As I read the *Symposium*, the *Republic*, and other dialogues, Plato’s depiction of these Forms makes it perfectly reasonable to think that Forms are beautiful and good. Their beauty is what draws us, or some aspect of our souls, to them and their goodness makes our possession or knowledge of them a good thing, which in turn makes us, or our souls, good.

Plato writes disappointingly little about the Form of the Good, and what he writes is both hard to understand and embedded in a context that is fertile ground for a host of interpretative stances. Let’s consider the passage. Those who would be rulers must know the Form of the Good by taking a longer path than what has been traversed in prior discussion, since without it they will not know about justice, moderation and the other virtues, or anything else, at least to the extent that these are useful and beneficial. Socrates himself does not know what the good is and thus they ‘dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself.’ In its stead, Socrates says he can provide an offspring, an image, namely the Sun and its relation to the realm of becoming, to include its being the source of light, thereby the cause of vision by which the realm of becoming is seen, as well as the Sun itself, and the cause of the genesis and growth of the objects in the realm of becoming. It is not genesis, or light. The Good stands to the intelligible realm in an analogous manner. Instead of light it furnishes truth to the objects of the intelligible realm and instead of vision it provides knowledge to the soul. Knowledge and truth are ‘boniform’ in

virtue of their relation to the Good, but neither is the Good, ‘to the possession of which still higher honor belongs.’ Finally, instead of generation and growth, ‘the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence [*to einai te kai ten ousian*] is derived to them from it, though the Good Itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power’.

And Glaucon very ludicrously said ‘Heaven save us, hyperbole can no further go.’ (from *Republic* 506d-509d, Shorey 1930)

What are we to make of this passage and Form? First, it seems to me that there is no reason to think that Plato is being disingenuous in claiming that he does not know what the Good is. Hence, we should be reticent to stake too much of a claim on any of the inferences drawn from the analogy. Of course, others do view Socrates’ claim as disingenuous, Michael Erler at the workshop, for instance. If one thinks that Plato is holding back, then, as they recognize, a reason for the reticence is needed. Among the many possibilities would be dialogical considerations having to do with the state of mind of the interlocutors or what/whom they represent, or Plato’s general reluctance to commit to writing his most important thoughts. Second, the key claims are part of an analogy, the slipperiest of beasts. The sun is not genesis though it is the cause of genesis in the visible realm. Though unstated whether the sun is generated it seems to be a *gignomenon* for which the Good is responsible. The Good is not being and is the cause of being in the intelligible realm. But it too seems to be a being. Third, in the recapitulation at 517 the hyperbole about *ousia* is not found. The Good is the source of *aletheia* and *nous* and ‘anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have caught sight of this.’ Fourth, we should

reflect on the fact that The Good is discussed in no other dialogue. On the *Philebus*’ threshold of the good we find measure, beauty and truth. (64c) In other dialogues other Forms or notions seem to play some of the roles the Good plays in the *Republic*, especially Being Itself, the One Itself, and God (the Demiurge) or *Nous* Itself.

Speaking summarily, some, like Cherniss, in allegiance I think with Shorey, emphasizes the ethical or the domain of practical reason. The stated purpose for introducing the Good is the education of the rulers. They need to understand how the various virtues and everything else that pertain to the rule of the *kallipolis* for the good of the whole and each of its parts hangs together so as to be useful and beneficial.²³ With some effort one might connect the norms of practical thinking with epistemic norms in general to forge a link between Knowledge and the Good. Others might emphasize the metaphysical and the domain of theoretical reason. The link between Goodness and Unity and Being plays itself out at the level of Forms—the unity of the definition—at the level of particulars—the stable, unified structure of Phileban and Timaeian mixtures—and at the level of the cosmos, whose structure is a function of the goodness of the Demiurge. Now I am not sanguine about the distinction between Practical and Theoretical Reason, nor do I think it is found in Plato. With Cherniss, I think that the distinct Forms of Being, Sameness, Goodness and the One, forms all on a par with one another, each play a unique, if sometimes overlapping role in saving the ethical, epistemological and metaphysical phenomena. If, as Connie Meinwald eloquently put it, The One is ‘debuted’ in the *Parmenides*, we can think of Plato as debuting different greatest kinds in different dialogues, Beauty in the *Symposium*, Being in the *Sophist*, The Good in the *Republic*, and *Nous* (as Demiurge) in the

Timaeus. Along with whatever other Forms there are, they make our knowledge of an objective world possible and they make this world and our knowledge of it good. I do not think Plato had a finished picture of how this all plays out. But I do think that each dialogue and the dialogues as a whole offer the same instruction to all of us: Keep striving to figure it out; keep philosophizing. If you do that, it will be good.

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NOTES

- 1 Williams 1993, 111.
- 2 See Gerson 2005 and especially his 2014.
- 3 Cherniss 1977, 121-32
- 4 Williams 1953, 171-92
- 5 See Dillon 2003 and Gerson 2005.
- 6 My long-standing interest in Cherniss' interpretation of Plato has been brought to the fore in recent years first by Sarah Broadie's engagement with his reading of the *Timaeus* in her 2012, and then by Gerson's 2014 article. As a fan and follower of Cherniss I welcome the attention Gerson turns on him. I am somewhat skeptical of his assessment of Cherniss' impact on recent generations of scholars. Cherniss produced only a handful of Ph.D.'s. And in my experience, and for a variety of reasons, his books have been and seldom are assigned or read in most graduate programs.
- 7 Of Cherniss' view Gerson says: '[It] is committed to arguing that anything in the text of the dialogues that tends to support Aristotle's testimony about Form-Numbers and about the ultimate principles has to be explained away. Thus, the positing of the superordinate Idea of the Good in *Republic* is dismissed as hyperbole, and therefore

having no significance for metaphysics or even for ethics.’ Gerson 2014, 401; Cf. 402: [Cherniss] ‘took the bold yet exceedingly implausible step of dismissing the idea of the Good as something of a hyperbolic joke.’ Cherniss, at least in his published works, never says anything like this about the Good. I believe that Gerson is misled by Cherniss’ oft-repeated thesis that no Form, and a fortiori the Form of the Good, is on a metaphysically higher plane than any other Form. But this is compatible with treating some forms as having a different and greater role to play in one’s metaphysical or ethical theory than other Forms. It is perhaps worth remarking that despite the exhaustive footnoting in Cherniss 1944, Cherniss provided no *index locorum*. An enterprising graduate student, I was told, produced a samizdat index for the ancient authors.

8 See most recently Gill 2012, 149-76. My take on them can be found in Silverman 2001, 162-181. I think Ryle 1939 has exerted the greatest influence on generations of analytically oriented readers, especially Anglo-American readers.

9 Ryle, *ibid.*

10 Gerson 2014, 401 and 402. Gerson’s complaint, made at the workshop, that Cherniss confuses metaphysical and linguistic predication is plausible.

11 See below on Cherniss 1944, and, e.g., 1932, 275, or 1947, 142-55.

12 Cherniss 1944, 46.

13 Cherniss 1945, 83.

14 *Philebus* 14b-20a assures us that Plato was cognizant of the former.

15 See Silverman 2001, esp. Chapter Three.

16 See Meinwald 1992.

17 See especially Code 1986.

18 Cf. Gerson 2014, 402.

19 Fine 2012 and Schaffer 2009.

20 Harte 2002.

21 At the workshop Meinwald suggested that she thinks that Forms are mixtures of Limit and Unlimited.

22 In my case, I started from the striking similarity between Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Zeta 6 thesis that every primary substance is strictly speaking identical with its essence and Cherniss’ thesis that the Platonic conception of the Idea (Form) involves the identification of essence and existence.

23 See Cherniss 1932. Shorey 1930, 104 says: ‘We really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good it reveals.’