

EUROPA,  
ATLÂNTICO  
E O MUNDO  
MOBILIDADES, CRISES,  
DINÂMICAS CULTURAIS

**PENSAR COM**

MARIA MANUELA TAVARES RIBEIRO

EUROPE, THE ATLANTIC AND THE WORLD  
MOBILITY, CRISES, CULTURAL DYNAMICS

THINKING WITH MARIA MANUELA TAVARES RIBEIRO

**COORDENAÇÃO**

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Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra  
Coimbra University Press  
2017

## EU FRONTIERS WILL BECOME THE HARD BORDERS?

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### **Abstract**

The shock of refugee crisis from the fall of 2015 and terrorism in European Union space has called again into question the topic of European borders. In the present paper we intend to show that the process of the European integration has been marked by the division within the EU especially after the last enlargement eastward (2004/2007) take forms of fragmentation. Initially, the financial and economic crisis has produced new forms of division which have fragmentation aspect designed to create new European borders in the area of EU, but related to the internal process harmonization. Secondly, the Ukrainian crisis, due the implications on external security of European Union, will multiply the fragmentation, but in this case being disputed the national security of the states located on the eastern borders of the EU. Finally, the refugee crisis has led to a real psychosis of security not only at the external borders of the European Union but also to the internal borders reaching national security sensitivities of member states, hence there is danger that the EU not only to close between hard borders but to bring the European project decades ago.

**Keywords:** European Borders; EU frontiers; Eastern Europe; Enlargement; Ukrainian crisis; Refugee crisis

The economic-financial crisis and especially the refugee crisis had the power to “wake up” the nations from the member states from the confidence sleep in the guaranteed success of the borders of the European project as a project with open borders in the South up to the Saharian Africa, in the South-East up to the Near East and in the East up to the Caucasus and to the Western borders of Russia.

The success of the extension of the European Union towards the Eastern Europe with borders situated at the edge of fluid spaces in the East, South-East and South, should have brought for the New European Union, on one hand, the prosperity that was ensured in a European Union with well defined borders until the extension in 1993 and also an advantage through the newly opened markets and the flow of skilled Eastern workforce and on the other hand the assuming of the role of global actor, considering the territorial dimension and the geographic weight it had. These two new objectives could be achieved in the globalization context only through opening beyond its new external frontiers, through involvement in the nearby spaces in the direction of promotion of the values that lay at the basis of the European construction. Its external borders had to take the shape of the *Eurozones* being osmotic frontiers where the goods, ideas, values and people could cross both ways, also being safety filters for the access of what would put in danger the safety and prosperity of the European citizens. The processes and challenges that the EU was called to answer to in a relatively short time required energy and huge resources, but also the access to a phase in the European construction in order to enter a community management of the answers to these calls, thus becoming an effective safety regional complex<sup>1</sup>.

The economic-financial crisis, the Ukrainian crisis and especially the refugee crises appeared on the background of these unfinished evolutions in the European unification, hitting especially on the European borders.

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<sup>1</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 352-374

Therefore, the reactions towards the reaching of the frontiers of the European project as a *Euroliimes* project were divergent most of the times, with few convergence moments. For instance, if the economic-financial crisis was a soft touch of the integrity of the EU internal borders after which the member state reacted first through measures with financial-banking protection feature, seeking to shelter the financial-banking national institutions, in exchange the refugee crisis reached the internal frontiers the hard way, resulting in the reintroduction of controls at the internal borders and even the questioning of the Schengen space. If we talk about the external frontiers, we observe that both phenomena - the economic-financial crisis and the refugee crisis - started by being phenomena external to the EU frontier, but that hit strongly the internal community space through the domino effect.

The community answers to these two great challenges varied from the perspective of the European project which was supposed to be a *Euroliimes* and not a fortress. If in the case of the economic-financial crisis from the perspective of the preservation of the fluidization of the internal borders the Financial Stability Agreement (2012) was invoked, agreed by all the member states, except for Great Britain and the Czech Republic which re-brought the citizens' and member states' trust in the European project, in the case of the refugees at least until the date of elaboration of this study the European Union is still blundering, it has only hard solutions, the soft ones being very pale. In what regards the answers to the safety of the external borders, in the case of the economic-financial crises, the European Union had and still has a more and more coherent and prompt reaction (for example the measures taken in view of the supervision of the financial flows from inside but also to the exterior etc), in exchange in the case of the refugee crisis in the European Union is overcome by the reactions of the member states who started to build barb wire obstacles at their external borders and even at some external frontiers. The answers from Brussels are still awaited for, they are more and more divergent.

The two crises, but especially the last one, tend towards the creations of gaps between the Old Europe and the New Europe whose agendas

seem more and more different so that the enlargement of Europe does not guarantee the historical and geographical reconciliation<sup>2</sup>. Paradoxically, the fragmentation process between the Old and New Europe which seems very visible today overlaps other types of fragmentation forms, producing new frontiers, which go in parallel with the process of European process way before the unification of East and West<sup>3</sup>.

### 1. Future frontiers afterwards

An inventory of the fragmenting forms appeared in the post-adhesion period between the Old Europe and the New Europe is a complex and necessary enterprise<sup>4</sup>, which is poorly frequented, either it was considered in the years immediately after the extension an impiety by the majority of the auditors compared to the price of the extension or it was a fear not to be labelled as Euroskepticals and even anti-Europeans. This inventory proves us that what other researchers underlined as “the identity borders successively depicted over the European continent correspond to changing political context that play whit these profound lines according to pendulum-like needs”<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Cristina Blanco Sio-Lopez, “The Communication Frontiers of EU’s Eastward Enlargement: the Power of Discourse as Identity-Building and Boundary-Making Device”, in *EuroTimes*, Oradea, Oradea University Press, vol. 12, Autumn 2011, p. 40.

<sup>3</sup> See Andrew Morawcsik (eds, *Centralisation or Fragmentation? Europe Facing the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity and Democracy*, ), The Concile of Foreign Relations, 1998; Christopher Booker, Richard North, *The Great Deception. A Secret History of The European Union*, London, New York, Continuum, 2003, pp. 427-453

<sup>4</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier „Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Resarch”, in *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2002, 9 (4), pp. 500-528; Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier, *The Europenization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005; Magdalena Gora, Katarzyna Zielinska „Europenisation of the EU New Member States. Aspects and Research Agendas, in Magdalena Gora, Katarzyna Zielinska, *Emocarcy, State and Society. European Integration in Central and Eastern Europe*, Krakaw, Jagellonian University Press, 2011, pp. 13-28; Grzegorz Ekiert, „Dilemmas of Europenisation: Eastern and Central Europe after the EU Enlargement”, in M. Gora, K. Zielinska, *op.cit.*, pp. 37-62

<sup>5</sup> C. Blanco, Sio-Lopez, *op.cit.*, p. 33

One of the “soft” themes from the East-West perspective was the theme of regionalization and decentralization, which was supposed to lead towards a real territory convergence between the New Europe and the Old Europe especially in the post-adhesion period, which shows that the old internal frontiers in the states in the Eastern and Central Europe continued to exist in the post-adhesion period, either due to the miming of the decentralization and regionalization process in many states of the region or due to the Commission’s ambiguities and vagueness in its own regionalist agenda and institutional adaptations, but also due to real re-centralization policies led in the context of the difficulties caused by the economical-financial crisis<sup>6</sup>.

Another theme regarding the East-West fragmenting dilemma, as an identity boundary-type gap is the one referring to democracy. A series of authors showed that the essence of democracy in Eastern and Central Europe is represented by the adoption of the European values<sup>7</sup>. On one hand, some authors still consider that the theme of adoption of European values is only a utopia, considering that Central and Eastern Europe has adopted only the procedure-type democracy and only partially the function one, talking about a “superficial Europeanization”<sup>8</sup> while the

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<sup>6</sup> Ioan Horga, “The State remained the most important partner of the European Union in the field of regional policy in Central and Eastern Europe, in Ewa Latoszek, Magdalena Proczek, Agnieszka Klos, Marta Pachocka and Ewa Osuch-Ra, *Facing the Challenges in European Union. Re-thinking of EU Education and Research for Smart and Inclusive Growth (EuInteg)*, Polish European Community Studies Association – Elipsa, Warsaw, 2015, pp. 257-282; Ioan Horga, Ana Maria Costea, „The Regional Policy in the EUMS from Central and Eastern Europe between Decentralisation and Recentralisation”, in *Debater a Europa*, n.º 12, janeiro/junho, 2015, pp. 103-134, CIEDA/CEIS20, 2015, ISSN 1647-6336 <http://europe-direct.aveiro.aeva.eu/debaterueuropa/images/n12/ihorga.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> C. Blanco Sio-Lopez, *op.cit.*, p. 36; Helen Wallace, “The Europe that come in form the cold”, in *International Affairs*, 1991, 67, 4, p. 661; Pierre Hassner, “Europe beyond partition and unity: Desintegration or reconciliation?”, in *International Affaires*, 66, 3 (July 1990), p. 469

<sup>8</sup> Alina Mungiu Pippidi, “EU enlargement and democracy progress”, in Michel Emerson, *Democratization in the European neighbourhood*, Bruxelles, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005, pp. 16-17

*Democracy as Form of Life*<sup>9</sup> is still far away. On the other hand, other authors consider that this is a manipulation of European identity<sup>10</sup>.

Except for these phenomena that regard the process of adhesion of the Central and Eastern Europe States, there was a certain distance in what regards the external politics of these states in the post-Cold War era, characterized by a strong orientation towards NATO; actually they have become members of these alliance before the EU adhesion process was finalized and clearly stated to the USA. This will culminate with the 2003 Iraqi crisis when these states were placed next to some states in the Old Europe (Great Britain, Spain etc.) in the group that sustained the American intervention in this county and opposed to the European side formed especially by the Franco-German pair which wanted the continuation of negotiations and a limitation of the intervention. But this invisible frontier separates various external politics agendas, not only within the old members of the EU, but also between the old and future members.

It as a *multilateralist border*, in the opinion of Alexis Vahlas, that separates two visions of external policy, the unilateral one in the spirit of neorealism that features the American administration in general and a multilateral one in the spirit of the neoliberalism that features the options of external policy of the main EU actors (France and German) and by their force and the general opinions of Brussels in the European Institutions and to a great extent the NATO headquarters<sup>11</sup>. In fact this frontier separated a preventive vision of suveranist type from a legalist vision, but statically, in the spirit of international law that will be settled in Brussels in December 2003 by the adoption of an external policy strategy of EU known under the name of *Effective Multilateralism*<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Andrei Marga, "Democracy as Form of Life", in *EuroTimes*, Oradea, Oradea University Press, vol. 8, Autumn 2009 p. 142sq

<sup>10</sup> C. Blanco Sio-Lopez, *op.cit.*, p. 36;

<sup>11</sup> Alexis Vahlas, "The Concept of multilateralism as New Legal and Political Borders of the European Union Foreign Policy", in Ioan Horga, Ariane Landuyt, *Communicating the EU Policies Beyond the Bordes*, Oradea, Oradea University Press, 2013, p.196

<sup>12</sup> See European Security Strategy, 12 december 2003, pp. 9-10, apud A. Valhas, *op.cit.*, p. 197

which were adopted by the 15 member states and was then shared by the states that would adhere to the EU in 2004 and 2007. Actually, this concept will also be integrated in the content of the Lisbon treaty in 2009<sup>13</sup> becoming a trigger of success for EU's foreign policy and in its strong affirmation in the international space, as a consequence of the extension towards East, followed by a flattening of the frontiers that agitates the waters of the European unit before the conclusion of the adhesion process. Also the success of the extension led towards a real emancipation of his political borders in all the directions, but these successes are based only on circumstances<sup>14</sup>.

Two major phenomena had to appear so that these successes and implicitly the perception of the existence of the borders between Old Europe and New Europe be even more visible. On one hand, the economic-financial crisis which started a eurosceptical type of movement in Hungary. The Czech Republic and partially in Poland, which was propelled after the European election in 2014 until the European parliament and on the other side the Ukrainian crisis, which directed the intellectual evolutions towards a reconsidering of the EU agenda towards Russia, from the multilateralism towards unilateralism and which materialized in the rejection of the theme of national preferences of some states from the Old Europe towards those of the Baltic countries, Poland or Romania<sup>15</sup>.

## **2. The economic-financial crisis and the EU frontiers**

The economic-financial crisis led to the forming of several types of frontiers between the member states. First, it is about a general crisis of the European social-model<sup>16</sup> which manifests in two types, on one hand it was determined by aging population, local and regional disparities,

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<sup>13</sup> TUE, art. 21.1

<sup>14</sup> A. Valhas, *op.cit.*, p. 207

<sup>15</sup> Ana Maria Costea, *East versus West. When Politics Collide With Economics*, Bucuresti, Ed. Tritonic, 2015, pp. 257-295

<sup>16</sup> Jordan Gh. Barbulescu, *Noua Europa. Identitate si model european*, Iasi, Polirom, 2015



the challenge of creating durable social services in an unfavourable economic environment of the pressures of an unstable international market<sup>17</sup>. On the other hand, it is the European debt crisis that involved austerity policies which meant budget and salary cuts, which affected especially the consumption capacity of wide categories of the population, consequence with boomerang effect on the economy. This general crisis of the European social-model appears to be first frontier, between the states that were strongly anchored in the preseveration of the European social-model<sup>18</sup> and those who amended it with neo-liberal measures.

From this perspective in the crisis years it was about a Southern Europe more reclined towards the process of the exiting from the crisis keeping the equilibrium of the social European pattern and the Northern Europe oriented towards the application of austerity measures of neoliberal type.

A new frontier between the Old Europe and the New Europe is added to this North-South frontier related to the results of the economic integration obtained until 2008 when the Central and Eastern Europe knew the most important economic boom since the fall of the communism, thanks to the trade flows developed between Western Europe and Eastern Europe until the outburst of the crisis, when Central - Eastern Europe was a consumption market but also a supplier of components and goods for the Western market. The reduction of the activity of the Western Europe or its orientation compared to the world states with emerging economies will have devastating effects in Central and Eastern Europe.

Actually, the beginning of this economic frontier between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe starts becoming visible together with the effectiveness of the agreements of the World Trade Organization

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<sup>17</sup> Jaroslaw Kundera, Mirela Marcut, „Communicating the Socio-Economic Landscapes of the European Union”, in Ioan Horga, Ariane Landuyt, *Communicating the EU Policies Beyond the Bordes*, Oradea University Press, 2013, p.254

<sup>18</sup> Philip B. Whyman, Mark J. Baimbridge and Andrew Mullen, *The Political Economy of the European Social Model*, London, Routledge, 2012, p. 217; J. Kundera, M. Marcut, *op.cit*, p.253

through which the EU market opened on January 1st, 2005 to the products purchased from China. Us living in the Central and Eastern Europe have noticed that starting 2006 small and medium enterprises producing shoes, textiles and household items exported to Italy, Germany, Austria, France etc were closing one by one so that in 2008 those industries, accompanied by others in 2007 brought a very high unemployment rate everywhere.

Secondly, the economic-financial crisis caused most states from the Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) to reconsider at least twice the road list for the entrance in the Euro area, so that the border separating the Euro area from the states in Central and Eastern Europe were modified from optimistic timeframe, set before to economic crisis (e.g. 2011-2013), to a medium timeframe (2015-2017) in full crisis and up to a remote timeframe (2019-2023), while for states like the Czech Republic – a undetermined period. As a consequence, we observe as the states in the New Europe try to obtain shelter from the national frontiers in matters of currency, one of the last bastions of the sovereignty of these states.

Finally, discussing from the perspective of permeability / impermeability of the Eastern or Southern EU borders from the economic perspective, in relation with the European Neighbourhood Policy one can observe the oscillation between permeable frontiers before the economic crisis in EU and impermeable borders during the crisis<sup>19</sup>. It is well-know that in the year 2008 the European Commission observed that the European neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has not reached the parameters desired, considering that they cover too wide a space, of course that in the given analysis the economic relations between the member states and the states situated in the ENP area were taken into consideration. In our opinion the economic minuses of the ENP were not due only to the program

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<sup>19</sup> See Szabolcs Pasztor and Janos Penzes “Altering Periphery AT the Border: Mesuring The Borders Effect in The Hungarian-Romanian and The Hungarian-Ukrainian Border Zones”, in I. Horga, A. Landuyt, *op.cit.*, pp. 283- 313

itself, but also to the effects of the economic crisis that hit the EU over the ENP. The fact that the ENP was split in the Euro-Mediterranean Union (2008) in the Eastern Partnership and the Synergy of the Black Sea in 2009, as a measure of stimulation of the involvement of the Neighbouring policy. But in a rational analysis of the economic successes of the three programs we cannot sustain with many arguments that they produced a major mutation in the stimulation of the economic connections along the external frontiers of the EU until the economic crisis did not consume its energy and its effects did not cancel. As a consequence, we can conclude that the apparition of the crisis led to the loss of permeability of the external EU frontiers which was replaced by the impermeability process of the external EU borders.

### **3. The Ukrainian and the frontiers in the EU**

The Ukrainian crisis and the EU relations with Russia lead to the appearance of new types of borders frequented more or less by authors in this matter. First we have to deal with the border between two types of regional integration, the EU type, through the Eastern partnership and the one promoted by Russia through the Eurasian Customs Union. The choices of the EU integration by the eastern neighbours must accomplish the conditions which, according to the future developments, will deeply affect the core of state, governance system, security cultures and overall the European Security System<sup>20</sup>. From Russian perspective, the regional integration in Eurasian Customs Union represents a counterbalance to the EU project which aims to create an area of free trade, that might facilitate trade relations, investments, and preferential economic relations between Russia and its neighbors. The pillars of Eurasian

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<sup>20</sup> Dorin. I. Dolghi, "Rethinking Interest and Preferences within the EU-Russia Relations in the Context of Ukrainian Crisis", in *Eurolimes*, Oradea, Oradea University Press, vol. 18, Autumn 2014, p. 14.

Customs Union the project are: “the concept of global regionalization, a multipolar world and the geopolitical concept of Hinterland”<sup>21</sup>.

Second, the border between EU and Russia went from the perception of good relations that exist until the Vilnius Summit, to the one of poor relations starting 2014. Between 2000 and 2013 the EU and Russia since both tried to increase their influence over the Common Neighbourhood region. The EU worked through soft power and economic incentive Agreements and Accords and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements. and by what is considered carrot strategy. The Russia through hard power and possible sanction-higher gas prices, by banning the different exported goods, special from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and what it is called the stick strategy<sup>22</sup>. Together with the outburst of the Ukrainian crisis, the EU introduced a series of economic sanctions that aimed goods of people and companies directly related to the Kremlin administration. The political pressures and diplomatic sanctions added to this, culminating to Russia's exclusion from G8. As a retaliation to these measures, starting August 2014, Russia imposed a one-year embargo on the import of meat, fish, cheese, fruits vegetables from EU. Except this, Russia started a process of *divide et impera* within the EU member states, where some EU governments can oppose other sanctions or can promote the idea of lifting some sanctions or to finance the radical parties from across of Europe<sup>23</sup>.

Finally, the Ukrainian crisis led to the apparition of veritable borders between some of the states from the Old Europe and other from Northern Europe. This political and communication border, on one hand, states such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, Austria, Benelux states of the Old Europe, although they sustained the formulation of sanctions towards Russia, in the process of applying them they adopted

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 18

<sup>22</sup> A.M. Costea, *op.cit.* p. 102

<sup>23</sup> D. I. Dolghi, *op.cit.*, p. 25-26

a conciliation position, falling within the multilateralism logic<sup>24</sup>, from the EU external policy. States from the New Europe such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary joined them, shaping their positions in the same logic of multiculturalism with various levels of reporting, from an understanding towards Russia's interests in Ukraine, in the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia to the criticism of the sanctions imposed to Russia, such as the case of Hungary.

On the other hand there are states with firm positions that are appearing on a unilateralist scale from taking a firm stand until the condemning of the Russian administration for the intrusion in Ukraine's business. Here we find on one hand states from the Old Europe, such as Great Britain, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark and the states from the New Europe, the Baltic Countries, Poland and Romania. Due to their geopolitical position, at the Eastern border of the EU, their unilateral position stood out through an undoubtful sustaining of Ukraine's stability, on the request of the military state from NATO and the coordination of the political action in the Ukrainian stability, on the request of military support from NATO and the coordination of the political actions in the Ukrainian crisis with the United States these countries little by little are forming a block, called *Intermarium* in the past months<sup>25</sup>. According to Robert D. Kaplan the American Administration will have to put the safety of the *Great Intermarium amongst its priorities*. It is not only the problem of military aid, but also diplomatic commitments towards each of the countries in the Baltic space and the Black Sea. The purpose is

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<sup>24</sup> Alexis Vahlas, "The Concept of multilateralism as New Legal and Political Borders of the European Union Foreign Policy", in Ioan Horga, Ariane Landuyt, *Communicating the EU Policies Beyond the Borders*, Oradea University Press, 2013, pp. 195-208

<sup>25</sup> The concept of *Intermarium* reunites the states situated between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. It was created by the interbellum Polish leader Josef Pilsudski and it aimed the creation of a state-buffer between Germany and the USSR for the antagonise the imperial tendency of both these countries.

not only the resistance in front of Russia, but also the maintaining of the internal cohesion of the EU and NATO capacities<sup>26</sup>.

Actually, this border between the Old and New Europe in the context of the Ukrainian crisis was nothing but a more clear coagulation of the individual interests of the EU member states, on one hand and the states of the Old Europe with major economic interest in Russia. On the other hand the Member states in the New Europe, threatened in their strategic interest by Russia getting closer to the EU borders and implicitly the national borders of some states. Thus some divergences appeared within the EU between the Legitimacy of Political Priorities of EU and the EU Members States National Preferences<sup>27</sup>. This division among the EU member states is almost a dependent pattern that is adopted almost always in the case of Moscow. Partly, it was possible due to the energy card since ones of the largest powers of the EU are dependent of Russian gas: Germany, Italy, etc. Secondly, the same states have strategic partnership with Russia; therefore their preferences will be in accordance with their relationship. Thirdly, some EU member states developed almost generalized negative attitudes towards Russia, as the Baltic states, given the communist past, the Russian expansionist approach and the common border. All these behaviours have also political reasons. Within the EU have can also identify states that have largely economic preferences towards Kremlin, like France and Britain. All these differences, plus a fluctuant interests towards the Eastern part of Europe are creating the necessary premises for a dysfunctional strategy towards the EU.

Actually, even before the EU was confronted with this major crisis at its borders, still in 2008 in the context of the Georgian crisis, the EU member states kept their distinct national preferences relating to Russia.

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<sup>26</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, "Europe New Medieval Maps", in *Wall Street Journal*, 19 January 2016 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-new-medieval-map-1452875514>, Accessed 1.02.2016

<sup>27</sup> See *Eurotimes*, 18, *The Security Dimension of European Frontier vs the Legitimacy of Political Priorities of EU and EU Members States National Preferences*, edited by Dorin Dolghi and all (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2014).

Therefore, the EU and NATO were no longer working towards a de-securitization of the situation, since they witnessed a fragmentation among the member states national preferences and interests towards the regions or vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. Actually what happened in the case of the Georgian crisis and was about to repeat in many aspects in the case of the Ukrainian crisis was anticipated by some scholars. Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu<sup>28</sup> noticed even since 2007 the appearance of five groups of states with various orientations compared Russian Federation. First group is called *Trojan Horses* represented by Greece and Cyprus. These states “were prone to use their veto right in order to block EU policies that might affected the interest of Russia”<sup>29</sup>. The second group, call *Strategic Partners*, is represented by France, Germany, Italy and Spain states that have deveopped over the years bilateral strategic partnership whit Russia<sup>30</sup>. Third group, *Friendly Pragmatics*” developed a positive strategy towards Russia, but only from economic point of view. Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu identified several states: Belgium, Bulgaria, Austria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia<sup>31</sup>. In the forth group called *Frozen Pragmatic* we find the states as Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, Great Britain, Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark, Roamnia, whit economics preferences towards Russia, but choosing to develop cooperative approach towards the European framework<sup>32</sup>. The last group *New Cold Warriors* is know for leading hostile policy towards Moscow<sup>33</sup> and is represented by Lithuania and Poland<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>28</sup> Mark Leonard & Nicu Popescu, „A Power Audit EU-Russia Relations”, *FRIDE*, 2007, pp.29-30, accesed 2.02.2016 [http://fride.org/uploads/file/A\\_power\\_audit\\_of\\_relations\\_eu-russia.pdf](http://fride.org/uploads/file/A_power_audit_of_relations_eu-russia.pdf), ,

<sup>29</sup> A.M. Costea, *op.cit.*p. 121

<sup>30</sup> M. Leonard & N. Popescu, *op.cit.*, pp. 31-35

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 36-41

<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 42-47

<sup>33</sup> A.M. Costea, *op.cit.*p. 130

<sup>34</sup> M. Leonard & N. Popescu, *op.cit.*, pp. 48-50

The Ukrainian crisis caused some clarifications in the composition of these groups, but in essence the types of groups remain the same, with the mention that especially *New Cold Warriors* became more compact. Some countries, such as Poland, which had until the annexing of Crimea a friendly pragmatic attitude being very active through its external affairs minister Radoslaw Sikorski, who participated at the negotiations between the Ukrainian opposition and the regime of Viktor Yanukovych, in February 2014, in the Weimar format (France, Germany, Poland) became a very vehement critic of the annexing of Crimea and as a consequence we do not find it in the further negotiations related to the Ukrainian crisis. There was a breach between France and Germany who took over initiatives of the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in the format known under the name of Normandy and Poland, which was left aside. But all these data made Poland become a loudspeaker of a group made of the Baltic countries and Romania. This group I is joined by Bulgaria, together with NATO's decision to create six command centres in the region.

Taking into consideration Russia's action in the South Eastern part of Ukraine, the EU's strategy changed and the negative political national preferences tended to be more powerful, since the first stage of sanctions proved to be inefficient for a high level of regional security. States felt threatened by Russia's expansionist moves; therefore the EU's preference stopped reflecting the most powerful state's preference and the political driven ones took the leadership in establishing the common view of the entire organization. For the first time since the crisis erupted, the EU went further and passed beyond the minimum common denominator that reflected the will of the most powerful state as in September the EU adopted the sanctions against the Russian economic sectors<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> "Council Regulation (EU) No 959/2014 of 8 September 2014 Amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 Concerning Restrictive Measures in Respect of Actions Undermining or Threatening the Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty and Independence of Ukraine," *Official Journal of the European Union*, 57, L 271, 12 September 2014, accessed 20



Therefore, although the natural tendency of states is to cooperate in order to balance the threat, it depends on the threat's power. The EU member states seem to be blocked in a dependent relationship vis-a-vis Russia, but at the same time a possible war is a possibility that the West, especially the EU, cannot risk taking place in its own neighbourhood. At the same time it is not a rational choice to isolate Russia, because an isolated Russia will become more unpredictable, therefore no matter the result of the Ukrainian crisis (total fragmentation, federalization, maintenance of the status-quo) cooperation between the regional powers has to be achieved. From this triangle the Ukrainian state seems to have to lose the most especially in terms of stability, security, economy, even territorial integrity.

#### **4. The refugee crisis and the EU borders**

The penetration of the external frontier of the EU in the fall of 2015 by the refugees especially the one from Syria and other countries from the Near East or Northern Africa, followed by the terrorist attacks from Paris from November 13<sup>th</sup> and other forms of “intimidation” of the European Population at the end of 2015 put in front of the European Union on one side the problem of a new management of the external frontiers of EU in which the hard component be the dominant one, while the soft component shall be reduced to a minimum. On the other side, at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016 we saw how one by one the member states of the Schengen Space gave up the exclusive soft way to cross the internal borders of the EU, bringing at their national frontiers hard practices for the management and control of the frontiers.

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September 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:271:FULL&from=EN>; “Council Regulation (EU) No 960/2014 of 8 September 2014 Amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of Russia’s Actions Destabilising the Situation in Ukraine,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, 57, L 271, 12 September 2014, accessed 20 September 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:271:FULL&from=EN>.

In the context of the Ukrainian crisis and especially the refugee crises, we assist at a redivision of Europe, through the apparition of new frontiers, “but this time it is Eastern Europe that wants to draw closer to the U.S. because it increasingly doubts that NATO alone will be an effective defensive barrier against Russia. Meanwhile, the countries of Western Europe, worried about the tide of refugees and terrorist attacks at home, seek to draw closer to Russia (the Ukraine crisis notwithstanding) as a hedge against the chaos emanating from Syria”<sup>36</sup>.

In front of this field reality, in which we assist to a return to procedures and practices of management and control of the borders which seemed history especially within the EU and the reappearance of the “Europe Fortress” phenomena, at the external boundaries, the interpretations given to the sense of European frontiers know an explosion of forms especially in the mass-media, but also in the writings of various specialists, but mostly are treated with pessimistic accents. Up to the moment of writing this article, few voices were involved in a more balanced procedure and even fewer on an optimistic procedure. Regarding in a retrospective manner in the evolution of the internal and external borders of the EU in the last quarter of century, we observe that there were turning moments for the European construction, that were overpassed after adjustments of policies and punctual initiatives. We believe that also in the context of the refugee crises the adequate solutions will be found.

Thinking at the migration theme on the external frontiers of the EU it had a moderate, controllable character up until the Arab spring. The Schengen system faced this phenomena due to a mix supranational and intergovernmental features, involving the redistribution of responsibilities, transferring and assuming prerogatives, signaling a fundamental

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<sup>36</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, “Europe New Medieval Maps”, in *Wall Street Journal*, 19 January 2016, accessed 1.02.2016 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-new-medieval-map-1452875514>,

brake from traditional nationalist approach<sup>37</sup>, having in mind the diversity of new types of security challenges<sup>38</sup> la frontierele soft and open al UE. The wave of immigration from North Africa showed the differentiation of perception of security-insecurity relationship among the states that are bordering the EU are used as transit while other states are the destination countries, and accordingly the social, economic political and security implications are different and the EU did not provided yet a set of common instruments able to offer a comprehensive management. The main challenges for EU is to manage the dual features of its borders as access points but also surveillance ones<sup>39</sup>, to facilitating travel and the movement of persons on the one side and to enhancing security on to other side. The European Union must combining both inclusive and exclusive measures at its external frontiers, on the one hand delimiting itself from the outer world while on the other hand engaging in a policy of good neighbourhood for the assurance of peace and stability<sup>40</sup>.

On the other hand, this dilemma between inclusive frontiers and exclusive external border has preoccupied the specialists in the problem of migration outside the EU space and the one of the border security especially after the last EU extension wave, underlying various aspects of this phenomenon. For instance, even since 2006, Jef Huysmans making an analysis of the perception of the migration phenomenon in the academic political environment in the mass-media considers that the migration is a disturbing element to the normal flow of life and to the well-established common identity of Europeans, leading to societal

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<sup>37</sup> Ruben Zaiotti, *Culture of Borders Control: Schengen and the Evolution of European Borders*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011, p. 3-4

<sup>38</sup> Dorin. I. Dolghi, „Toward an EU Model of Security Governance within and beyond Its Borders”, in I. Horga, A., *op.cit.*, p .192

<sup>39</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>40</sup> Edina Lilla Meszaros, “Security Dimension of New EU External Communication: the Duplicity of Borders as

Surveillance and Access Points”, in I. Horga, A. Landuyt, *op.cit.*, p. 211

insecurity<sup>41</sup>. Rens van Munster drew the attention that a few years ago the phenomenon of migration was considered a peripheral question, entering under the competence of national states, turned into a major security issue at the level of EU as a whole<sup>42</sup>.

Adrian Favell observed that although the immigration problem is certainly a European question, the politics of immigration are still dominantly national in locus<sup>43</sup>. Detailing these observations one could observe that up to now there is a European cooperation also in matters of border control and entry policies, but in what regards the asylum policies and establishing the immigrants they are left on the states. But looking at the current situation of these policies we observe that except for little nuances, the things hardly changed. Paraphrasing Favell we can say that the immigration policy is dominantly a national issue everywhere because is in discussion the integration problem of the immigrants<sup>44</sup>. What was successfully made until the refugee crisis in matters of forms and coordination of immigration policies at European level represented only border control efforts and externalization of the safety aspects, by NATO. A. Favell considers the paradoxically there / it is a huge effort in redirecting the internal European integration project to external border construction policy, having as a consequence the alarming of the European citizen as EU is under siege<sup>45</sup>.

Actually, as Edina L. Meszaros observed, “in order to identify how the question of immigration has turned from a pure economic, humanitarian or social matter into a security concern in the European Union,

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<sup>41</sup> Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 2

<sup>42</sup> Rens van Munster, *Securitisating Immigration. The Politics of Risk in the EU*, New York: Plagrave Mcmillan , 2009, p. 1

<sup>43</sup> Adrian Favell, “Immigration, migration and free movement in the making of Europe”, in Jeffrey T. Checkel, Peter J. Katzenstein (eds), *European Identity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 174

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 175

<sup>45</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 176

it sufficient to make a brief historical overview of European building” from 1950<sup>46</sup> until the wave of enlargement in order to observe in every phase of the European construction the migration theme was a theme that planted anxiety, fear and worry within the population, as well as severe criticism, placing between brackets the viability of the European project from the member states and wobbling in the first phase, then a wider and wider coherence with the time passing by from the European institutions.

In what regards these opinions expressed in the academic, political environment of the mass-media we observe that all turn around the theme of securisation of migration, theme that started to appear in the international environment after September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, when the USA began to treat their immigration service as part of their national security apparatus<sup>47</sup>. After the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) the EU also showed a constant preoccupation related to the safety of migration. Actually in the European academic environment long before these events they observed that the theme of the migration safety must be approached from three perspectives: internal security, cultural security and the welfare state<sup>48</sup>.

Going in this direction, more and more specialists started to consider that migration per se is a first important safety theme not only by terrorist groups or organized crime networks, but also other improvement of phenomenon of immigration on the entire European society in general. These were followed by European political leaders. Looking beyond the legislative proposals and official discourses of political elites, today migration is seen as a threat rather an opportunity, the European Union has constructed various borders for defence. The EU started a process

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<sup>46</sup> E. L. Meszaros, *op.cit.*, p. 212-215

<sup>47</sup> Sita Bali, “Population Movement”, in Paul D. Williams, *Security Studies. An Introduction*, London, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 471; E. L. Meszaros, *op.cit.*, p. 217

<sup>48</sup> Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38, 5 (2000), p. 758, apud E. L. Meszaros, *op.cit.*, p. 217 .

of restrictive visas, conclusion of bilateral agreements with the origin countries of emigration for the acceptance of the returned immigrants<sup>49</sup> prove that the EU wished to take both hard and soft measures for the protection of the external borders. There are numerous studies performed by specialist in the academic field, but also political reports of some EU external borders, which mention the dynamics between the soft and hard measures in the control process of the external borders (e.g. Poland - Russia border; Morocco-Spain border; Greece - Turkey border)<sup>50</sup>. These measures led to the idea that the EU is a *gated community*<sup>51</sup> in which the accent is placed on selective permeability measures and filtering of those that represent a risk factor.

If until the Arab spring, 2011 Europe faced controllable waves of immigrants guided by economical reasons, once with this event occurred in the near vicinity of the EU, Europe found itself in front of a double phenomenon. On one hand the size of the immigrant waves that reached especially Italy and Malta put for the first time in impossibility the control at its southern borders. On the other hand the immigrant waves are included in real tornados of refugees gone because of the conflicts in countries such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and after 2013 - Syria. We see a new phenomenon of humanitarian refugees towards which the EU was not ready to manage, there was only a local preoccupation in the states of the Southern Europe.

The immigration as a results of conflicts became a very complex phenomenon that the EU has to face as long as on one side the number of those headed towards the EU frontiers reached levels impossibly to

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<sup>49</sup> E. L. Meszaros, *op.cit.*, p. 218

<sup>50</sup> *Ibidem*, p.

<sup>51</sup> Henk van Houtum and Roos Pijpers, "The European Community as a Gated Community : Between Security and Selective Access", in James Wesley Scott, *EU Enlargement , Region Bulding and Shifting Borders of Inclusion and Exclusion*, Aldershot, Asgate, 2006, p.59.

control, on the other side the filtering of the immigrants on humanitarian reasons by intruders with terrorist purposes became impossible

The civil war in Syria was the pivot that broke the European securitisation of migration sheath, because it produces one of the greatest population dislocation phenomenon after the Second World War that the humanity faced, involving populations dislocated as a consequence of the conflicts in Northern Africa. But together with these populations, victims of the conflicts, travelled people recruited from the conflicted regions<sup>52</sup> and recently people, European citizens, that deny the culture and civilization in the name of a radical Islamic fundamentalism. Until the summer of 2015 this human tsunami made pressures on neighbouring EU states (Turkey, Jordan) and on EU states from its external frontiers (Greece, Italy), but it erupted in the Autumn of 2015 collapsing on all the EU states putting in discussion a series of European security issues: *securitization of migration*, control of borders, Schengen Space.

I would like to discuss how independent the two questions are, calling up Angela Merkel's speech on February 6th, before the visit in Turkey: "we have to protect the external frontiers because we wish to maintain Schengen. If not, the free circulation space within the common market is questioned, which is the base of our wealth"<sup>53</sup>.

If until now the immigrants arrived in Europe were more or less integrated in the societies they were settling in, without disturbing much the allogeneic population, once with the immigration waves following the Arab Spring and the accumulation of discontentment in the host states between the descendants of the immigrants in the second half of the past century and the allogeneic population new phenomena started to appear in Europe - coagulations of young immigrants to protect or to defend certain actions considered to hurt their identity from the

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<sup>52</sup> S. Bali, *op.cit.*, p. 474-475

<sup>53</sup> <http://www.ziare.com/invazie-imigranti/germania/avertismentul-lui-merkel-schengen-e-in-pericol-trebuie-sa-ne-protejam-frontierele-externe-1407637>, accesat 7.02.2016

authorities and the citizens; the apparition of the extreme-right parties, xenophobic, anti-immigration parties.

The situation created with the refugee wave in the fall of 2015 and possibly with those that might follow can create an uncontrollable conflict, on one side between the European population that is threatened in its safety by the arrival of the immigrants and discontent by the poor reaction of the national authorities and especially those in Brussels and on the other side between the immigrants and do not have anything left to lose who bring to Europe practices and traditions that are considered hurtful of the European values. The situation calls for urgent measures at European and National level that must be coherent, regarding the management of frontiers, the EU safety policies to maintain its borders as *gated community*, otherwise we must head towards exclusive hard borders, with Europe becoming a fortress.

This is why we need measures to conclude on one hand a mixture of instruments. Intelligence, police, juridical, military and especially “smoke and mirrors” style of border control policies<sup>54</sup>. On the other hand it is necessary to create the European safety zone in the close neighbourhood especially in Turkey, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). Also, it is necessary that the safety of the external EU borders be assumed entirely by the EU through a border police with sole command which shall have numerous forces recruited from the national police and equipped with intelligent border control systems.

Conclusively we can assert that over a decade since was held the UE extension in the Est part and establishment of the borders on the axis Baltic Sea-Black Sea, the perception over the European borders performed from a *balanced optimism* (specifically to the years before the *economic boom* in Europe and in the same time, to the concluding of the fifth enlargement process) to a *moderate optimism* occurred in the

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<sup>54</sup> Douglas Massey, Jorge Durand and Nolan Malone, *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Migration in an Era of Economic Integration*, New York, Sage, 2002



context of the financial crisis continued with the Ukrainian crisis and to the Refugee crisis which in our view is a *border crisis*. This new turn has unsettled European scene to the point that we are at a very short distance that the European Union not only to be confined between hard borders but even to suffer some internal mutations which are able to get back the European project decades ago.

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