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TRIUMPH OF THE ΠΑΝΤΟΠΟΡΟΣ?

THE IMAGE OF THE SELF-INVENTED AND SELF-INVENTING ΔΕΙΝΟΝ IN *ANTIGONE*'S FIRST STASIMON

M. JORGE DE CARVALHO¹

Abstract: This paper focuses on *Antigone*'s first stasimon and tries to work out its meaning. The key question to be answered is: what image of man underlies the famous choral ode? This key question can be divided into several sub-questions: 1) In what sense is man said to be δεινόν and indeed the most δεινόν thing of all? 2) What is the connection between this feature and the self-invented and *self-inventing* being (viz. the *self-invented* and self-inventing *empire*) the first three stanzas of *Antigone*'s first stasimon are all about? 3) What does “παντοπόρος” stand for? Is this the *key notion* for understanding man? 4) Is man really παντοπόρος? 5) Why do the Theban elders claim that, even if the epithet fits like a glove, “παντοπόρος” is far from being the last word on man?

Key-words: Sophocles, *Antigone*, First Stasimon, Ode to Man, “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ”, δεινόν, εὔρεσις, τέχνη, Man, Philosophical Anthropology, Ancient Greek Thought, *Kulturentstehungslehre*.

Resumo: Este estudo incide sobre o primeiro estásimo da *Antígona* de Sófocles e procura analisar o seu significado. A questão a que tenta responder é a seguinte: que imagem do ser humano se encontra expressa nesta ode coral? Tal questão encerra várias outras: 1) Em que sentido se diz que o homem é algo δεινόν – e mesmo até o mais δεινόν de tudo? 2) Qual a relação entre esta característica e o ser *auto-inventado* ou auto-inventor (o “império auto-inventado ou auto-inventor) de que falam as três pri-

Résumé: Cet exposé porte sur le premier stasimon de l'*Antigone* et cherche à cerner son sens. La question-clé est la suivante: quelle image de l'être humain nous offre cette ode chorale? Cette question-clé renferme plusieurs sous-questions: 1) En quel sens l'homme est-il δεινόν, voire ce qu'il y a de plus δεινόν ? 2) Quel est le rapport entre δεινόν (voire le comble du δεινόν) et l'être *inventé par lui-même* et *s'inventant soi-même* (ou l'«*empire*» inventé par lui-même et s'inventant

¹ Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas/New University of Lisbon, I.E.F., University of Coimbra. Email: cmja@fesh.unl.pt. ORCID: 0000-0002-1192-8061

meiras estâncias deste estásimo? 3) Que significa exactamente παντοπόρος? É este conceito decisivo para se entender o ser humano? 4) É o homem efectivamente παντοπόρος? 5) Por que razão os anciãos de Tebas sustentam que, ainda que o epíteto “assente como uma luva”, παντοπόρος está longe de ser a última palavra sobre o ser humano?

Palavras-chave: Sófocles, *Antígona*, primeiro estásimo, παντοπόρος, “πολλὰ τὰ δεινά”, δεινόν, εὔρεσις, τέχνη, Homem, Antropologia Filosófica, Pensamento Grego Antigo, *Kulturentstehungslehre*

soi-même) dont il est question dans les trois premières strophes du premier stasimon de l'*Antigone*? 3) Que signifie au juste «παντοπόρος»? Le concept de παντοπόρος est-il décisif pour comprendre l'être humain? 4) L'homme est-il vraiment παντοπόρος? 5) Pourquoi les vieillards de Thèbes soutiennent-ils que, même si l'adjectif «παντοπόρος» nous va comme un gant, il n'arrive pas à saisir la nature de l'homme ?

Mots-clés: Sophocle, *Antigone*, premier stasimon, “πολλὰ τὰ δεινά”, παντοπόρος, δεινόν, εὔρεσις, τέχνη, être humain, anthropologie philosophique, pensée grecque ancienne, *Kulturentstehungslehre*

1. A few introductory remarks

Sophocles' *Antigone* is cryptic (both in its single components and as a whole) and poses an “enigma” of its own. The first stasimon is no exception to this. On the one hand, it is a piece of the puzzle; on the other hand, it is *itself a puzzle* (and not an easy one at that). But the problem is that in this case you cannot deal first with the smaller puzzle, as if it were independent of the whole. The first stasimon is deeply embedded in the rest of the play; it presupposes the *preceding scenes* and indeed the *other Theban plays* (it alludes to and refers back to them); and at the same time, it *points ahead* to the events that follow. To use the well-known Homeric formula, it looks “ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω”². To be sure, the first stasimon has its own meaning and contributes its mite to the “final result”: to the *Antigone* as a whole (to what V. Woolf once termed the “complete statement” every literary work is all about).³ But the fact remains that in its connection with the rest of the play the first stasimon is pretty much like a *word* or a *part of a sentence* in its connection with the *whole sentence*: though it has a meaning of its own, everything depends on the *other words* – and indeed on *all* the words; for the meaning conveyed by each word can be significantly changed (and what is

² See notably *Il.* I, 343, III, 109, XVIII, 250, *Od.* XXIV, 452.

³ V. Woolf, “How It Strikes a Contemporary”, in: *The Essays of V. Woolf*, ed. A. McNeillie (San Diego/NY/London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 358.

more: it can be *completely changed*) by the rest of the sentence. Hence, any separate consideration of the first stasimon is almost inevitably doomed to be inadequate and seriously distorted. Without the rest of the play, the first stasimon finds itself out of context and pretty much like a fish out of water.

Having said this, it must be added that we cannot afford to follow this principle here, for space does not allow us to study the whole play (let alone the whole sequence of the Theban plays). We must therefore concentrate on the first stasimon. That is, we must leap *in medias res*; we must start literally *in the middle* of the *Antigone* and *leave out the rest of the play*. In short, we must resign ourselves to dealing with “a fish out of water”.

However, in order to make up for this severe shortcoming, we can recall a few essential points, and – given the limitations of space – paying some attention to them is our next best alternative.

First, we must remind ourselves of the tremendous *pressure* (of the “*high voltage*” *atmosphere*) that characterizes the Theban plays – and in particular the *Antigone*. The extraordinary sequence of events that provides the framework for the play is *the very opposite of life as usual* (of what V. Woolf once called the “nondescript cotton wool”⁴ of daily life). The protagonists in these plays are confronted with life and its bewildering mysteriousness. “What is what?” “What means what?” “How is all this possible?” “How to make sense of what happens?” “How can this be happening to me?” “What to do?” “What to expect?” “What can be done?” “What is and is not in one’s power?” – the protagonists of the Theban plays experience these questions, as Keats once put it, “upon their pulses”.⁵ They are living emblems of these questions or of answers to these questions, and of how all our answers to them turn out to have feet of clay. On the one hand, what we are dealing with in Sophocles’ Theban plays is not idle questions asked in quiet reflection (in “quiet corners”). They are *pressing* questions: life itself raises them and puts them at the very centre of the protagonists’ lives. It is a matter of knowing (or not knowing) *what you are dealing with, where you stand* – it is a matter of *desperate need for some compass in uncharted waters*. And on the other hand, what is at stake in these plays is *comprehensive questions regarding life itself*, in all its puzzling intricacies and inconsistencies, in all its staggering horror: the equation of life and death – “What are we?” “Where are we?” “What are we to do?”, “How do we connect the dots”? In other words, the tremendous pressure (the “high voltage” atmosphere) that characterizes the Theban plays has to do with an acute awareness a) that life is all about

⁴ “A Sketch of the Past”, in: V. Woolf, *Moments of Being*, ed. J. Schulkind (London: The Hogarth Press, 1985), 70.

⁵ J. Keats, To Reynolds, 3 May 1818, in: *The Letters of John Keats 1814-1821*, ed. H. E. Rollins, vol. 1 (Cambridge: University Press, 1958), 279.

trying to figure out enigmas viz. an overall enigma, b) that we are constantly at a crossroads, c) that everything can turn out to be very different from (and indeed the exact opposite of) what it seems to be, and d) that what we do can turn out to have consequences that are very different from (and indeed the very opposite of) those hoped for or expected.

In short, the Theban plays stand for a picture of life in which everything is at stake, everything is the question, and everything is ἐπὶ ζυροῦ ἀκμῆς.⁶ They stand for *the whole thing* – the “panoply of life” – *throbbing with questions*. Or, to express it in musical terms, they stand for a “*tutti fortissimo*” of questions. Their protagonists face the thunderstorm of life, as Hölderlin puts it, “mit entblößtem Haupte” (“without a head covering”).⁷ And the plays remind us that there is such a thing as this “*tutti fortissimo*” of questions, that there is such a thing as a *thunderstorm of life*, in which one finds oneself “without a head covering” – indeed, that life may turn out to be this *thunderstorm in disguise*, this *total thunderstorm*, this *capricious thunderstorm* that strikes when least expected.

The first stasimon is set against this background. To be sure, in the parodos there seems to be some relief from this tension. The chorus seems to believe that the worst is over, and that one can go back to “life as usual”. But both the opening scene and the first epeisodion show dark clouds gathering in the horizon. And on the other hand the very relief viz. the confident atmosphere of relief that characterizes the parodos may remind the viewer (or the reader) that in the earlier stages of the Theban saga similar changes for the better have turned out to be illusory. More than anything else, they showed human *blindness* and proved to be the epitome of the proverbial calm before the storm. These previous changes for the better suggest that when everything seems to be all right, when the problems seem to be solved, they do not necessarily vanish without trace. They may continue to pile up unnoticed – so that lurking beneath the gleaming surface lies the very opposite of it. Put another way, the previous events cast a shadow upon the very alternative to the “high voltage atmosphere” we have spoken of. They draw attention to the fact that the very belief that life as usual can go on may be unfounded, and that big troubles often come in innocent-looking packages. In sum, they remind us that there is a particularly dangerous kind of *clouded sight*, namely the type that does not seem to be so.

Secondly, we must bear in mind that what we are dealing with here is a *tragic choral ode*, and that this kind of ode is supposed to meet some formal requirements, and to play a particular role in the framework of an ancient

⁶ Il. X, 173.

⁷ F. Hölderlin, “Wie wenn am Feiertage...”, in: *Sämtliche Werke*. Große Stuttgarter Hölderlin-Ausgabe, ed. F. Beissner, vol. II (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1951), 119f.

tragedy. This is not the place to discuss this question in any detail. But we should not forget that this form is anything but irrelevant and pay attention to certain main features that may help us understand what *Antigone*'s first stasimon is all about.

On the one hand, there is a connection between a choral ode and the surrounding parts of the play. On the other hand, a choral ode has very little to do with the development of the plot. One of its distinctive features is what might be described as a certain "*prise de recul*", a certain degree of *detachment* from what is going on in the play. The chorus may well be involved in what is going on and affected by it, but it does not take part in the action the way the protagonists do. In this sense, the chorus provides a *view from outside* – from a "witness point of view" or "from a third person point of view": from a point of view *other than the protagonists*'. It can also be said that choral odes express at least some degree of *reflection* on what is going on in the play. They present a "*comment*" on the events on stage and they are usually characterized by a more or less *contemplative* attitude. This does not mean that the chorus does not react to the development of the plot: it only means that its reaction has what might be called a rather *contemplative* or *reflective* nature.

This feature is closely connected with the fact that choral odes usually put events *in a wider context*. Contrary to the protagonists, the chorus keeps some distance from the immediate context, and tries to put the plot *into perspective*. Hence, choral odes usually involve some *shift from the particular to the general*, from the immediate events to a *meditation* on them and to *the larger picture*. They look beyond the immediate circumstances – they look for *interrelationships, analogies, common patterns* and the like. They let themselves take a sideways glance at *other dots*, as it were (and indeed both within and outside the framework of the play). They concentrate on the *connection between the dots* and try to make sense of it. In this sense, choral odes are all about *fathoming the significance* of (or extracting some *meaning* from) what is going on in the play. In short, they give voice to a *panoramic view*, both in the sense of a bird's eye view *encompassing other realities and events outside the play* and in the sense of some comprehensive insight into *how things are in general*.

This brings us to another important aspect. In each play the chorus is composed of a certain kind of people (in this case it is a chorus of Theban elders, and not – say – of captive enemies or whatever). And the fact that it is composed of a certain kind of people means that what they say is *not fully unbiased*, for they are an "interested party" and view things *from a certain angle*. But, on the other hand, as pointed out above, choral odes are characterized by a certain degree of "*prise de recul*" or *detachment*; they often take the form of a *general examination* and seem to lay claim to a *universal vali-*

dity. In other words, choral odes often seem to present a broader view both a) because their *scope is wider* than the immediate circumstances of a play and b) because of the seeming *universality of the point of view* from which things are observed. More often than not it is difficult to determine how far the view they take is *relative to who they are* – or whether the choral odes serve as a mouthpiece of the author, whether they want to be understood as the expression of universal truth claims, etc. Thus, the very form of choral odes casts a shadow of *uncertainty* over their meaning and purport.

But this is not all. In addition, it should be borne in mind that if there is a connection between choral odes and the surrounding parts of a play, it is not exactly the kind of connection one might expect. Above all, it is *not a direct and straightforward connection*. Often enough, there is no simple thread of continuity, no smooth and seamless transition from the scene or scenes preceding the choral ode. It is quite the reverse: more often than not the transition is volatile; it goes “by leaps and bounds”. And it is no exaggeration to speak of a somewhat “*cubist*” *juxtaposition of perspectives and differently scaled objects*, and of a *dynamic collision of different angles*.

It is thus not unusual for choral odes to be somewhere between a *comment* on what is going on in a play and a *self-contained entity*. Furthermore, as far as the comment is concerned, it is often difficult to determine what exactly the chorus is referring to. For example, if we take the connection between Antigone’s first stasimon and the preceding scenes, there is a considerable amount of uncertainty as to where the Theban elders’ sympathies lie, and what exactly they have in mind. Are they referring to the unknown breaker of Creon’s edict? Or are their words aimed at Creon himself – at his “haughty consciousness of power” viz. at his “stern determination to direct and shape nature and human beings as expertly as one might a boat or a piece of metal”⁸ Is the first stasimon to be understood only from the point of view of what the Theban elders are likely to know? Or are their words to be understood both from their own point of view and in the light of what the audience knows (so that the chorus’ words are aimed not only at the unknown *man* who perpetrated the illegal burial, but at Antigone whom the audience suspects – or “knows” – to be the author of the deed)?

What is more, if the first stasimon looks “*ἄμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω*”, is it not so that it could also be referring to what happens later in the play (i. e. to further events that fit in with what the Theban elders say and substantiate their view about man)? And is it not so that the first stasimon is also subject to the possibility of being *seen in a new light* and of taking on quite a *dif-*

⁸ That is, at his *τέχνη*-like understanding of state power. The words between quotation marks are taken from. M. Griffith (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), on 162-163.

ferent significance when compared to what happens in the rest of the play? And this in turn is closely connected with a further possibility, namely that the rest of the play somehow *calls into question* the validity of what the first stasimon claims to be true. In other words, can one exclude that the views expressed in the first stasimon are only what might be called *partial truth*, a one-sided view, or indeed a particular stage of understanding (that can – and should be – revised) rather than a final assertion of truth? If this proved to be the case, then the whole point of the first stasimon would be not so much that it is in line with both what happens before and what happens after, but rather the *tension* or *conflict* between what it says and the rest of the play.

In the final analysis, there is this whole range of possibilities. One does not know which of them applies. And it should be borne in mind that this is not necessarily an *either/or issue*. It is also possible that the question is more complex than this, and that it turns out to be a *both/and issue*. I. e. it is also possible that the first stasimon has different aspects to it, and that its relationship to the rest of the play is so intricate that *several of these possibilities apply at the same time*. But be that as it may, the point is that there is this whole range of possibilities, and that the question is far from settled. The result being that for these various reasons a choral ode can be complex and puzzling even if its content is relatively plain. In other words, a choral ode – in this case *Antigone's* first stasimon – can be *sibylline for purely formal reasons*: owing to the nature of a choral ode as such and to the complexity of its relationship to the rest of a play. Thus, in the final analysis, if made in the context of a choral ode, even the plainest statement is not entirely plain. And, to top it all, most of what the Theban elders say in *Antigone's* first stasimon is, as we shall see, anything but plain; so that what we are dealing with here is the very *opposite of a clear-cut view* – of *univocal meaning*.

2. Several important allusions

Having said this, let us turn our attention to the content of *Antigone's* first stasimon. Before anything else, we should not forget that the opening lines contain a double *allusion*. The moment they come into play they *evoke* something else, and, what is more, something not belonging to the *Antigone* (or, for that matter, to Sophocles' Theban plays): on the one hand they contain a “formal allusion” to a common stylistic device and link the first stasimon to the ancient tradition of the stylistic device in question (which, incidentally, was a very rich one); on the other hand, they seem to be an almost verbatim allusion to one well-known instance of the said stylistic device. These two allusions may escape the modern viewer (or reader), but it is safe to assume that they would not have escaped the ancient Athenian theatre spectator.

First, one should keep in mind that the opening lines bear the well-known form of what German philological *Forschung* termed a *Priamel*. This word has taken root, and a *Priamel* is a series of parallel statements or listed alternatives that are used to single out one point of interest by contrast and comparison, so that they serve as foils for enhancing a claim, the subject of a literary work (or of a new section within such a work, etc.).⁹ To be more

⁹ Or, as Bundy puts it, a *Priamel* is “a focusing or selecting device in which one or more terms serve as foils for the point of particular interest”. See E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* (Berkeley/LA: University of California Press, 1962, repr. 1986), 5. H. Race, *The Classical Priamel from Homer to Boethius* (Leiden: Brill, 1982), IX, summarizes his views as follows: “A *Priamel* is a poetic/rhetorical form which consists, basically, in two parts: ‘foil’ and ‘climax’. The function of the foil is to introduce and highlight the climactic term by enumerating or summarizing a number of ‘other’ examples, subjects, times, places, or instances, which then yield (with varying degrees of contrast or analogy) to the particular point of interest or importance”. On the *Priamel*, the superlative-*Priamel*, etc., see notably F. W. Bergmann, *La priamèle dans les différentes littératures anciennes et modernes* (Strasbourg: Decker, 1868), O. Crusius, “Elegie”, in: A. F. Pauly, G. Wissowa (ed.), *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, vol. 5, Demogenes – Ephoroi (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1905), col. 2260-2303, in particular 2269ff., F. Dornseiff, *Pindars Stil* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1921), 97ff., H. Fränkel, “Eine Stileigenheit der frühgriechischen Literatur”, *Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, phil.-hist. Kl. (1924), 63-127, in particular 94 and 120ff. = Idem, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*. Literarische und philosophiegeschichtliche Studien (München: Beck, 1955, 1968³), 67ff., 90ff., R. Oehler, *Mythologische Exempla in der älteren griechischen Dichtung* (Aarau: Sauerländer & Co, 1925), 49f., 78, W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion* (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1928), H. Fränkel, “Review of W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion*”, *Gnomon* 6 (1930), 1-20, in particular 18ff., F. Dornseiff, *Die archaische Mythenzählung*. Folgerungen aus dem homerischen Apollonhymnos (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1933), 3f., 78ff., W. Kröhling, *Die Priamel (Beispielreihung) als Stilmittel in der griechisch-römischen Dichtung*, nebst einem Nachwort: Die altorientalische *Priamel* (Greifswald: Dallmeyer, 1935), C. M. Bowra, *Greek Poetry from Aleman to Simonides* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936, 1961²), 180ff., W. A. A. van Otterlo, *Beschouwingen over het archaische element in den stijl van Aeschylus* (Utrecht: Broekhoff, 1937), 11ff., 60ff., E. Drerup, “Der homerische Apollonhymnus. Eine methodologische Studie”, *Mnemosyne* 5 (1937), 81-134, in particular 117, V. Gordziejew, “De Prologo Acharnensium”, *Eos* 39 (1938), 321-350, in particular 328ff., W. A. A. van Otterlo, “Beitrag zur Kenntnis der griechischen *Priamel*”, *Mnemosyne* 8 (1940), 145-176, E. Fraenkel (ed.), *Aeschylus Agamemnon*, vol. II, Commentary on 1-1055 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950, repr. 1974), on 899-902, D. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*. An Introduction to the Study of Ancient Lesbian Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 55f., F. Dornseiff, *Kleine Schriften* 1: Antike und alter Orient: Interpretationen (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1959), 379ff., H. Friis Johansen, *General Reflection in Tragic Rhesis*. A Study of Form (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1959), 18f., 42ff., E. R. Dodds, *Euripides Bacchae* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960, repr. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), on 902-

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precise, the opening lines of the first stasimon bear the form of a specific kind of *Priamel*, namely of what might be termed a *superlative-Priamel*. A *superlative-Priamel* focuses on a certain range of comparison (on different things that are characterized by a certain quality or common denominator) within which something is said to be *superlative*. In other words, a *superlative-Priamel* focuses on something (a given reality, an activity, some kind of good, some kind of evil, etc., etc.) and singles it out as being the *nec plus ultra*, either *in general* or *within a given range of comparison*. It often takes the shape of a *list of goods* or *evils* that climaxes in a superlative.

Sometimes a *superlative-Priamel* does more than just single out a *culmination point*: it takes the form of an *order of rank* and names the *second best* good or the *second worst* evil, the *third best* good or the *third worst* evil, as if it were awarding the first, the second and the third prize in a competition. There are also cases in which a *superlative-Priamel*, while calling our attention to the fact that *different people take different views* on certain issues, tries to *settle the matter* and presents either a “*personal*”, more or less idiosyncratic opinion or what claims to be *the last word* on the matter.

In some cases, it is difficult to determine whether a *superlative-Priamel* is anything more than a rhetorical or stylistic device, meant for emphasis and intensification.¹⁰ But on the other hand, there seems to be more to it than that. There seems to be an essential connection between the *superlative-Priamel* and the very structure of human non-indifference viz. of our concern for ourselves. As a matter of fact, human non-indifference always seeks *the best*: nothing less than the *superlative*; if the *superlative* turns out to be beyond reach (and compromise seems unavoidable), then it seeks the *second best*; if this proves to be unattainable, then it seeks the *third best*, and so on and so forth. And pretty much the same applies to the negative superlative: our life is all about *avoiding the worst*; the *second-worst* scenario is preferable to the *worst*, and the *third-worst* scenario is preferable to the *second-worst*, and so

E. Alexiou, *Der Euagoras des Isokrates: ein Kommentar* (Berlin/N.Y.: de Gruyter, 2010), 67, C. Chiasson, “Herodotus’ Prologue and the Greek Poetic Tradition,” *Histos* 6 (2012) 114-143, A. Rodighiero, *Generi lirico-coralì nella produzione drammatica di Sofocle* (Tübingen: Narr, 2012), 66ff., M. Sialaros and A. Doxiasdis, “Sing Muse of the Hypotenuse: Influences of Poetry and Rhetoric on the Formation of Greek Mathematics”, in: M. Asper (ed.), *Writing Science. Medical and Mathematical Authorship in Ancient Greece* (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2013), 367-409, in particular 386f., and 404, Z. Adorjáni, *Pindars sechste Olympische Siegesode. Text, Einleitung und Kommentar* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2014), 116, 133, and R. Hunter, “Sweet Stesichorus: Theocritus18 and the Helen Revisited”, in: P. J. Finglass, A. Kelly (ed.), *Stesichorus in Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 145-163, in particular 157f.

¹⁰ On the rhetorical value of superlatives (viz. on what he terms “la retorica dei superlativi”), see notably L. Battezzato, *Linguistica e retorica della tragedia greca, op. cit.*, 53ff.

on and so forth. All this means that the “map of life” or the “moral compass” we need in order not to live in “uncharted waters” has pretty much the same structure as a superlative-*Priamel*. It is a very complex superlative-*Priamel* (or, to be more precise, a very complex *set of superlative-Priameln*). And on closer inspection it emerges that most instances of superlative-*Priamel* we find in Ancient Greek Literature are, as it were, contributions to this “map of life itself” (contributions to the complex set of superlative-*Priameln*) without which there is no “moral compass” and life remains *terra incognita*.

This brings us to a further point. As previously mentioned, some well-known instances of superlative-*Priamel* indicate that different people take disparate views on these matters. But even when no emphasis is put on this, the fact that there is a variety of dissenting superlative-*Priameln* on the same subject-matters looms in the background of any superlative-*Priamel* and reminds us that the “map of life” or the “moral compass” superlative-*Priameln* are all about is *anything but self-evident* – that this is the realm of ἀμφισβητήσιμον (...) καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές, as Plato puts it in the *Gorgias*¹¹, and indeed the realm of the ἀμφισβητήσιμον *par excellence*. The problem with the much needed “map of life” (or with the much needed “moral compass”) is that there is no such thing as an indisputable and absolutely reliable superlative-*Priamel* (or an indisputable and absolutely reliable set of superlative-*Priameln*) – and that, as far as the conduct of life is concerned, even the most obvious “cardinal points” can turn out to be deceptive, so that, as Sophocles’ Theban plays do not cease to remind us, “life is uncharted”.

Now, the very form of the opening lines “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδεν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει” – the simple fact that these words link the first stasimon to the said tradition of superlative-*Priameln* – alludes to this whole complex.¹² On the one hand, this connection evokes the intrinsically *controversial* nature of superlative-*Priameln* – how they have to do with *life’s opaqueness* and with the fact that every major moral-compass issue is difficult to judge and open to debate.¹³ On the other hand, this connection raises

¹¹ *Gorgias*, 451d9-e1.

¹² On the use of πολλά, πολλοί and the like in ancient Greek tragedy and in other ancient Greek texts, see notably E. Fraenkel, “Eine Anfangsformel attischer Reden”, *Glotta* 39 (1960), 1-5 = Idem, *Kleine Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie*, I: Zur Sprache. Zur griechischen Literatur, vol. I (Roma: Ed. di Storia e Letteratura, 1964), 505-510 and K. Sier, *Die lyrischen Partien der Choephoren des Aischylos*. Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1988) 196. Sier summarizes Fraenkel’s claim as follows: “Ebenso dient der Einsatz mit πολλά, πολλοί etc. in der Tragödie und bei den Rednern oft dazu, einen anderen Gedanken kontrastiv vorzubereiten.”

¹³ This is even more the case as it was a very common practice (viz. a very common literary device) to present a certain event or a certain action (and indeed all sorts of things) as δεινότατον, πάντων δεινότατον or δεινότατον ἀπάντων (viz. δεινότατον πάντων). In a

a series of questions: Is the Theban elders' superlative-*Priamel* just a *stylistic or rhetorical device* (is it only a matter of *emphasis*) on which we should not waste our time and energy? Or are the Theban elders making a *serious claim to truth*? Are these people expressing just an *idiosyncratic* opinion (and indeed just making a comment in passing on a rather *specific* situation)? Are they saying that, though other people may think otherwise, *for them* “οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει”? Or are they making a “full-blooded” *universal claim* about the essential nature of human beings? And is the culmination statement of the *Priamel* to be understood *literally* (so that there really is *nothing* more δεινόν than man)? Or is it just an *emphatic way* of saying that man is extremely δεινόν?¹⁴

In short, on the one hand, the superlative-*Priamel*-form links the opening lines of the first stasimon to the whole complex of “moral-compass” questions superlative *Priamel* are very often associated with. On the other hand, the superlative-*Priamel*-form renders these lines ambiguous. As pointed out above, the very fact that we are dealing with a choral ode creates a certain amount of ambiguity. But the superlative-*Priamel*-form endows these opening lines with an additional *touch of ambiguity* they would have even if they were otherwise quite plain.

way, the Theban elders join a long list of people who have their say on this matter. See notably Herodotus, *Historiae* VII, 10. 65, Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 1298, Thucydides, *Historiae* 2.51.4, 3.37.3, 3.43.2, 3.59.2, 3.82.2, 5.93.1, 6.49.2, 7.42.3, Aristophanes, *Aves* 514, *Thesmophoriazusae* 478, *Plutus* 429, 445, 1112 (see also *Vespae* 908, 1032, and *Ecclesiazusae* 471), Euripides, *Medea* 658, *Electra* 1226, Isocrates, *In Callimachum* 18.4, *In Lochitem* 20.1, *De bigis* 11.7, *Trapeziticus* 12.3 and 14.6, *Panegyricus* 128.2, *Plataicus* 18.1, 45.1 and 52.1, *Nicocles* 14.2, *Evagoras* 64.5, *Archidamus* 55.6 and 83.2, *De pace* 14.5, *Areopagiticus* 59.7, *Antidosis* 23.2, 35.4, 165.6, 213.1, 250.1, 294.3, *Philippus* 52.2, Ps.-Plato, *Demodocus* 381e8, *Isaeus*, *De Cleonymo* 38.2, 43.7 and 51.3, *De Dicaeogene* 11.2, *De Philoctemone* 35.2, *De Aristarcho* 5.3 and 23.5, Andocides, *De mysteriis* 19.8, 24.5, 39.2 and 51.3, *De reditu suo* 1.5, *De pace* 1.6, Lysias, *Areopagiticus* 23.1, *In Agoratum* 94.3, *Ἐπὲρ τῶν Ἀριστοφάνους χρημάτων* 33.3, *In Nicomachum* 29 1, *In Diogitonem* 24.2, *Fragmenta* 3.2., 2, 344.16, Demosthenes (viz. Ps.- Demosthenes), *De falsa legatione*, 2.6, 103.3, 149.2, 201.4, *Adversus Leptinem*, 48.4, 126.4, 133.2, *In Midiam*, 15.7, 79.8, 141.6, 215.2, *Adversus Androtonem*, 74.1, *In Aristocratem*, 90.3, *In Timocratem*, 72.3, 187.7, 194.9, *In Aristogitonem* 2, 7.1, *In Aphobum 1*, 53.3, *Contra Phormionem*, 6.5, 45.5, *Contra Lacritum*, 28.1, *Contra Pantaenetum* 60.5, *Contra Nausimachum et Xenopeithea*, 22.8, *Contra Leocharem*, 41.1, 53.6, *In Stephanum 1*, 57.1, *Contra Nicostratum* 2.3, *Contra Calliclem*, 20.3, *In Dionysodorum*, 17.1, and *Contra Ebulidem*, 59.1, 65.2.

¹⁴ As we have just seen, the very nature of the stylistic device we are dealing with here – the *Priamel* – leaves room for ambiguity and doubt. But then again, this ambiguity does not weaken the impact of what the Theban elders are saying; for, be that as it may, they are putting man *at the top list of δεινά* – and this alone is already a *striking* and indeed an *extraordinary* claim.

*

So much for what we have termed the “formal allusion” and the link between the first stasimon and the ancient tradition of *superlative-Priamel*. Let us now turn our attention to the second point: the concrete instance of superlative-Priamel the first lines of this choral ode are alluding to. When you think of it, the Theban elders are not simply presenting a superlative-Priamel of their own. It is virtually certain that their words are a *recognizable* paraphrase or variation on the opening lines of another famous choral ode, namely the first stasimon of Aeschylus’ *Choephoroi*¹⁵: πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ τρέφει / δεινὰ δειμάτων ἄχη / ποντιαί τ’ ἀγκάλαι κνωδάλων / ἀνταίων βροτοῖσι πλή- / θουσι βλάπτουσι καὶ πεδαίχμοι / λαμπάδες πεδάοροι / πτανά τε καὶ πεδοβάμονα· κάνεμόεντ’ ἄν / αἰγίδων φράσαι κότον. ἀλλ’ ὑπέρτολμον ἄν- / δρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγει / καὶ γυναικῶν φρεσὶν τλημῶνων / παντόλμους ἔρωτας, ἄ-/ ταισι < > συννόμους βροτῶν;¹⁶ The obvious and striking simi-

¹⁵ 585ff.

¹⁶ Euripides imitates this passage (and further reinforces its misogynist line of thought) in Fr. 1059: “δεινὴ μὲν ἀλκὴ κυμάτων θαλασσίων, δειναὶ δὲ ποταμῶν καὶ πυρὸς θερμοῦ πνοαί, ... ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν οὕτω δεινὸν ὡς γυνὴ κακὸν”. See also Sophocles, Fr. 189, 682, Euripides, *Andromacha*, 269-274, and *Hecuba*, 1178-82. On the connection between these texts, see, for example, L. C. Valckenaer, *Diatribes in Euripidis perditorum dramatum reliquias* (Lugduni Batavorum: I. Luzak, A. le Mair, 1767), 147c, T. Stanley, *Commentarius in Aeschyli tragoedias ex schedis auctoris mss. multo auctior ab Samuele Bullero editus* (Halis Saxonum: Gebauer, 1832), in Choephoros 583, T. W. Peile (ed.), *The Choephorae of Aeschylus*, With Notes, Critical, Explanatory and Philological (London: Murray, 1840), on 571, A. Witzschel (ed.), *Sophokles Antigone mit kurzen deutschen Anmerkungen* von G. C. W. Schneider (Leipzig: Geuther, 1844²), on 334ff., F. W. Schneidewin (ed.), *Sophokles IV, Antigone* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1856³), on 332, N. Wecklein (ed.), *Sophoclis Tragoediae recens. et explan.* E. Wunderus (Leipzig: Teubner, 1878), on 332, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone* (Cambridge: University Press, 1891), on 332, T. G. Tucker (ed.), *The Choephoroi of Aeschylus* (Cambridge: University Press, 1901), on 585, U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Griechische Verskunst* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1921), 516, W. Kranz, *STASIMON. Untersuchungen zu Form und Gehalt der griechischen Tragödie* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1933), 195f., P. Friedländer, “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ”, *Hermes* 59 (1934), 54-63, in particular 59 and 61, W. Schadewaldt, *Sophokles und Athen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1935) = Idem, *Hellas und Hesperien* Gesammelte Schriften zur Antike und zur neueren Literatur in zwei Bänden (Zürich/Stuttgart: Artemis, 1970), 370-385, in particular 14 (379), W. A. A. van Otterlo, *Beschouwingen over het archaische element in den stijl van Aeschylus* (Utrecht: Broekhoff, 1937), 14, C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), 84, J. C. Opstelten, *Sophocles en het Grieksche Pessimisme* (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff’s Universiteitsmaatschappij, 1945), 125, P. Groeneboom (ed.), *Aeschylus’ Choephoroi* (Groningen: Wolters, 1949), on 585-562, R. F. Goheen, *The Imagery of Sophocles’ Antigone. A Study*

larity between the two texts makes it highly unlikely that we are not dealing here with an *intentional quote* from the well-known Aeschylean parallel text.

On the one hand, the opening lines of the two choral odes take the form of a superlative Priamel on the very same subject, namely τὰ δεινά. On the other hand, they share the same *way of expression* or the same *diction*: “πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ τρέφει δεινά” viz. “πολλὰ τὰ δεινά”, followed by a contrast-

of Poetic Language and Structure (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), 53, H. Friis Johansen, *General Reflection in Tragic Rhesis. A Study of Form*, (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1959), 16ff., 31, 43f., I. M. Linfoth, “Antigone and Creon”, University of California Publications in Classical Philology 15 (1961), 183-260, in particular 196, G. Thomson (ed.), *The Oresteia of Aeschylus*, vol. II (Amsterdam/Prague: Hakkert/Academia, 1966), on *Choeph.* 585, G. Müller, *Sophokles Antigone* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1967), 89, R. Coleman, “The Role of the Chorus in Sophocles’ Antigone”, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 18 (1972), 4-27, in particular 10, R. W. B. Burton, *The Chorus in Sophocles’ Tragedies* (Oxford/N. Y.: Clarendon Press, 1980), 96, J. Pinsent, “Sophocles, Antigone 332-375”, *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 8 (1983), 2-4, G. A. Staley, “The Literary Ancestry of Sophocles’ ‘Ode to Man’”, *The Classical World* 78 (1985), 561-570, in particular 563f., 565-568, A. F. Garvie (ed.), *Aeschylus Choephoroi* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), on 585-593, K. Sier, *Die lyrischen Partien der Choephoren des Aischylos*. Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1988), 196, G. Crane, “Creon and the ‘Ode to Man’ in Sophocles’ Antigone”, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 92 (1989), 103-116, in particular 105, R. Garner, *From Homer to Tragedy: The Art of Allusion in Greek Poetry* (London/N. Y.: Routledge, 1990), 81, A. P. Burnett, *Revenge in Attic and Later Tragedy* (Berkeley/LA/London: University of California Press, 1998), 172, D. Cuny, *Une leçon de vie*. Les réflexions générales dans le théâtre de Sophocle (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2007), 139f., 291, K. Matthiessen (ed.), *Euripides Hekabe*. Edition und Kommentar (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), on 1182f., D. Susanetti (ed.), *Sofocle: Antigone* (Roma: Carocci, 2012), on 332, D. Cairns, “From Solon to Sophocles: Intertextuality and Interpretation in Sophocles’ Antigone”, *Japan Studies in Classical Antiquity* 2 (2014), 3-30, in particular 7f., and D. Cairns, *Sophocles: Antigone* (London/Oxford/N.Y./New Delhi/Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2016), 60f. P. Groeneboom, *loc. cit.*, points to a possible connection with Hesiod, *Theogonia*, 581f. (“τῆ δ’ ἐνὶ δαίδαλα πολλὰ τετεύχματο, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι/κνώδαλ’ ἤπειρος πολλὰ τρέφει θάλασσα”). It is perhaps no coincidence that there is textual uncertainty about whether to read “ὄσ’ ἤπειρος πολλὰ τρέφει” or “ὄσ’ ἤπειρος δεινὰ τρέφει”. See M. L. West (ed.), *Hesiod Theogony* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966, repr. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), on 582). West quotes two parallel passages, namely the Homeric Hymn *In Venerem*, 4-5 (“θηρία πάντα, ἡμὲν ὄσ’ ἤπειρος πολλὰ τρέφει ἦδ’ ὅσα πόντος”) and *Cypria*, 7.12 (“θηρί’ ὄσ’ ἤπειρος αἰνὰ (δεινὰ Welcker) τρέφει”). Another passage, namely the Homeric Hymn *In Tellurem matrem omnium*, 3-4 (“ἡμὲν ὅσα διὰν ἐπέρχεται ἦδ’ ὅσα πόντον ἦδ’ ὅσα πωτῶνται, τάδε φέρβεται ἐκ σέθεν ὄλβου”), is perhaps also relevant. Cf. T. W. Allen, W. R. Halliday, E. E. Sikes (ed.), *The Homeric Hymns* (Oxford/Amsterdam: Oxford University Press/Hakkert, 1963²), 352 and S. Douglas Olson (ed.), *The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite and Related Texts*. Text, Translation and Commentary (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), 132.

ing clause: “ἀλλ’ ὑπέρολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι κτλ.” viz. “κούμεν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει”. This particular way of expression creates a very *emphatic superlative*; for if there are πολλά τὰ δεινά (viz. if πολλά γὰρ τρέφει δεινά), it is very significant that the thing in question somehow manages to be δεινότερον, and indeed τὸ δεινότατον (the superlative). In other words, if there were not that many things that were δεινά (and *a fortiori* if there were only *very few*), then it would not take much to be τὸ δεινότατον. But, on the contrary, if there are many things that are δεινά (and in particular if many of them are δεινά *in a very high degree*), then the thing in question must be *outstandingly* δεινόν in order for it to surpass everything else in δεινότης.

Last but not least, the opening lines of the two stasima we are talking about share the same view as to what is δεινότερον, and indeed τὸ δεινότατον; for both of them come up with the idea that *human beings* are τὸ δεινότατον.¹⁷ Now, this comes as a bit of a surprise, mainly for two reasons.

First, the very nature of what is at stake in superlative-Priamel calls *other things* to mind, namely *external things* or, to be more precise, things *that come to our lives*: whatever *shapes one’s life* and determines *what becomes of it*; things that *happen to us* or *fall upon us*; things *one can achieve*, *fates one can suffer* and the like. But both the citizens of Argos in Aeschylus’ *Choephoroi* and the Theban elders in Sophocles’ *Antigone* seem to share the view that in this case *we ourselves* are the superlative (the *quintessence* of δεινόν, the *paragon* of δεινόν – *the most δεινόν thing of all*), and that if we really want to know where we stand and what we are dealing with, we must realize this.

As for the second reason why this view comes as a bit of a surprise, it has to do with the fact that the semantics of ἀνθρώπος differs significantly from our common idea of human beings or mankind. This is not the place to discuss this question in any detail. But it should be borne in mind that, among other things, the ancient Greek notion of ἀνθρώπος – or, to be more precise (for such generalizations are dangerous), what might be described as the ancient *mainstream* understanding of what this word stands for – is shaped by the *negative* contrast with the θεοὶ ῥεῖα ζῶοντες¹⁸ and by an acute awareness of human *fragility* and *weakness*: of human *limitation*, *dependence* and *failure*. To put it in a nutshell, more often than not ἀνθρώπος – viz. what we are – is closely associated with the idea of ἀσθένεια φύσεως (of ἡ σύμπασα

¹⁷ Strictly speaking, the Theban elders do not mention τὸ δεινότατον; but since their claim is that οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει, it is more than plain that they have in mind the *superlative* and are depicting mankind as τὸ δεινότατον.

¹⁸ *Il.* VI, 138, *Od.* IV, 805, V, 122.

τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἀσθένεια, as the Athenian in Plato's *Laws* puts it).¹⁹ But, if this is so, then to think of human beings as something *superlative*, and indeed as *the most δεινόν thing of all* – marks a significant *shift* from this traditional mainstream approach.²⁰ To be sure, this shift is much more pronounced in the case of *Antigone's* first stasimon than in the case of the *Choephoroi*²¹ – and we take the opportunity to emphasize that nothing we have said means that the two *stasima* say pretty much the same thing. As mentioned above, *Antigone's* first stasimon begins with a *variation* on the opening lines of the first stasimon of the *Choephoroi* – and *variation* is the key word here. Sophocles' Theban elders refer to Aeschylus' words – but this does not mean that they cannot use the allusion as a starting point to say something quite different.

But this is not all. As pointed out by G. A. Staley²² and J. Davidson,²³ the opening lines of the first stasimon in Aeschylus' *Choephoroi* provide an easily recognizable allusion to several *Homeric passages*. And the same holds for the opening of *Antigone's* first stasimon. Among the Homeric passages in question two are particularly important, namely:

a) *Od* XVIII, 129-131: “τοῦνεκά τοι ἔρέω, σὺ δὲ σύνθεο καί μευ ἄκουσον· / οὐδὲν ἀκιδνότερον γαῖα τρέφει ἀνθρώπιον / [πάντων ὅσα τε γαῖαν ἐπι πνεῖει τε καὶ ἔρπει]”

and

b) *Il* XVII, 446-447: “ὄν μὲν γάρ τί πού ἐστιν οἰζυρότερον / ἀνδρὸς πάντων, ὅσά τε γαῖαν ἐπι πνεῖει τε καὶ ἔρπεται”.²⁴

It is not difficult to see that there is a *common pattern* between all these passages (*Od*. XVIII, 129-131, *Il*. XVII, 446-7, *Choephoroi*, 585ff. and *Anti-*

¹⁹ *Leges* 854 a1. See notably W. Schütz, *ΑΣΘΕΝΕΙΑ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ* (Diss. Berlin, 1964).

²⁰ As we will see in a moment, *δεινόν* is *equivocal*. But at any rate its semantic field has little to do with the idea of *ἀσθένεια*: pretty much in any of its meanings the word suggests something *very different from* – and indeed *the very opposite of* – *ἀσθένεια*.

²¹ For several reasons and not least because in Aeschylus' *Choephoroi* the chorus refers not to the human race but to unrestrained human passion: according to the citizens of Argos unrestrained human passion – i.e. *ἔρως* (that is, something that can be understood as an *external force*) – is τὸ δεινότατον.

²² See G. A. Staley, “The Literary Ancestry of Sophocles' ‘Ode to Man’”, *op. cit.*, in particular 262f.

²³ J. Davidson, “Starting a Choral Ode: Some Sophoclean Techniques”, *Prudentia* 23 (1991), 31-44, in particular 43. See also C. Utzinger, *Periphrades Aner*, *op. cit.*, 32.

²⁴ Davidson also refers to *Od* XI, 427 (“ὡς οὐκ αἰνότερον καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο γυναικός”) and Pindar, *O* 1, 28-29 (“ἦ θαύματα πολλά, καὶ πού τι καὶ βροτῶν φάτις ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀλαθῆ λόγον δεδαίδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις ἐξαπατῶντι μῦθοι”).

gone, 332f.). This common pattern includes several components. To be sure, not all of them are present in all four passages; but there is a set of “metonymic” connections between all of them. On the one hand, as pointed out above, the opening lines of *Antigone*’s first stasimon inevitably evoke the passage of the *Choephoroi*. On the other hand, what the Theban elders say also evokes the *Homeric* lines in question. But this allusion is further reinforced by the fact that the opening lines of Aeschylus’ choral ode echo the very same Homeric passages – and indeed in such a way that they have yet other points of contact with them. One can therefore speak of an intricate net of allusions and of a *multi-layered* foil for the opening lines of *Antigone*’s first stasimon.

Of the several components of the common pattern we are talking about the one that interests us most here is the obvious *structural parallelism*: either a) οὐδὲν (or something similar) + comparative and a second term of comparison (namely *mankind* or something *human*) or b) the other way around (as in the *Choephoroi*), namely: the suggestion that a “human phenomenon” – female ἔρωσ – is second to nothing else. And the result is what might be called a similar “sound bite”: “οὐδὲν ἀκιδνότερον”, “οὐ μὲν γάρ τί πού ἐστιν οἰζυρώτερον”, “οὐδὲν δεινότερον”.

But the point is that this formal parallelism evokes a yet deeper connection among all the passages we are talking about.

On the one hand, these four texts show mankind in a very different light. The two Homeric passages speak of man’s *frailty* (they belong to the above-mentioned tradition of the discourse on *human fragility* and ἀσθένεια φύσεως). According to them, a) there is nothing *weaker* or *feebler*, and b) there is nothing *more wretched*, *more miserable*, and more *woeful* than man. Aeschylus’ citizens of Argos refer to ἔρωσ (and in particular to *women in love*). But they strike a very different tone – for they stress not human frailty (not οὐδὲν ἀκιδνότερον viz. οὐδὲν οἰζυρώτερον) but rather “οὐδὲν δεινότερον”. Sophocles’ Theban elders represent a further step in this direction and state quite plainly: “οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον”. In a way, the four passages we are talking about *rectify* or *amend each other*. They form a *series of contrasting images of man*. The very fact that there is a striking formal similarity between them only makes this divergence all the more obvious. All in all, the point is that the opening lines of *Antigone*’s first stasimon could not fail to evoke this series of *contrasting* images of man as the background against which the Theban elders make their statement.

But, having said that, it should also be kept in mind that, on the other hand, there is a *common denominator* or a *line of continuity* between the contrasting statements (viz. the contrasting images of man) we are talking about. This common denominator or line of continuity has to do with the idea of what might be termed a *negative prominence of man*. In other words, both

the two Homeric passages in question and the opening lines of the first stasimon in Aeschylus' *Choephoroi* suggest that man is exceptional *in a negative sense*: that we *surpass everything else and are outstanding in a negative way*.

Whether this is also the case with the first stasimon of Sophocles' *Antigone* remains to be seen – for everything depends on the sense in which the Theban elders claim that οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει. To be sure, the opening lines of the first stasimon cannot fail to evoke this common denominator – and thereby the idea of the *negative prominence of man* – as the background against which the Theban elders make their statement. But, as pointed out above, by the same token they also evoke a series of *contrasting* claims (of claims that seem to *rectify or amend each other*) – and thereby the possibility of a *further correction* (namely one that breaks free of the idea of *negative prominence*).

In short, the very wording of the opening lines – and the fact that they are enmeshed in this intricate net of allusions – makes them fraught with tension among various possibilities and indeed full of “suspense”.

3. What about δεινά?

But here we face a problem: what do the Theban elders have in mind when they speak of τὰ δεινά? One would think that there is a clear and straightforward answer to this question. But in fact there is not. And here is where the problem lies. In other words, from the very beginning it is perfectly clear that we are dealing with τὸ δεινόν, τὰ δεινά, τὸ δεινότερον, τὸ δεινότατον and the like. And it is also perfectly clear that the Theban elders are presenting a superlative-Priamel within this range of comparison – that they have a definite view on what is the most δεινόν thing of all. But the problem is a) that the words in question have a very wide range of meanings and b) that the opening lines of the stasimon do not show *what meaning of δεινόν, τὰ δεινά, τὸ δεινότερον, etc., is being used* – the result being that in the final analysis we simply do not know what the superlative-Priamel we are dealing with is all about.

Let us take a closer look at this question. It is not possible in this short account to give more than a brief outline, which makes no claim to be exhaustive and does not try to discuss the connection between the various senses, the primary meaning, etc.

On the one hand, δεινός denotes something *fearful* or *fearsome*, *terrible*, or *grievous*, something *dreadful*, *terrifying*, *scary* or *frightening*, such as the *violence of monstrous beings and elemental nature* or the *violence of shocking misdeeds* and the like. It conveys the idea of *terror* and *horror*, of something *shocking*, *disturbing*, *devastating*, *outrageous* or *ghastly*. On

the other hand, it can also designate *dangers, ills, sufferings* (the hard, harsh and cruel – things difficult to endure, etc.). In addition, the word can also be used in the sense of something *formidable, tremendous, prodigious, or colossal*, of something *stupendously great or marvellously strong or powerful*. It is used to describe whatever has a *wonderful effect* – things of *extraordinary magnitude, the mighty or the awful*. Furthermore, δεινός can convey the idea of something *strange, uncanny, or “unheimlich”*. But the word is also often used for anything *overwhelming, wondrous, marvellous or incredible* – for any source of *astonishment, amazement or admiration*. But this is not all, for δεινός can also refer to *extraordinary skills* – i.e. to something *outstandingly skilful, able, ingenious or clever*, to a high degree of *resourcefulness, inventiveness* and the like. Last but not least, this shade of meaning can be used *pejoratively* in the sense of *too clever, over-clever, etc.*

Hence, δεινός covers a vast spectrum of meanings, and indeed so much so that it can have not only the *worst possible* but also rather *positive* connotations. It is used both to express *distaste, disapproval or horror*, and as a word of *praise and commendation*.²⁵

²⁵ For a thorough discussion of the broad gamut of meanings δεινός stands for, see notably J. Schweighäuser, *Lexicon Herodoteum quo et styli Herodotei universa ratio enucleate explicatur et quam plurimi musarum loci ex professo illustrantur, passim etiam partim Graeca lectio partim versio latina quas offert argentoratensis editio vel vindicatur vel emendatur* (Oxonii/Londini: W. Baxter/Vincent & Whittaker, 1825), *sub voce*, F. Ellendt, *Lexicon Sophocleum* vol. 1. (Regismonti Prussorum: Bornträger, 1835), 403, F. Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum Sive Vocum Platoniarum Index* (Lipsiae: Weidmann, 1835, repr. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956), 431ff., H. Cary, *A Lexicon to Herodotus*, Greek and English, Adapted to the Text of Grisford and Baehr (Oxford/London: J. Vincent/H.G. Bohn, 1843), *sub voce*, T. W. Peile (ed.), *The Choephoræ of Æschylus, op. cit.*, on 571, P. P. Dobree, *Adversaria*, vol. 1, ad historicos philosophos oratores praeter Demosthenem spectantia (Berlin: Calvary, 1874, repr. ed. J. Scholfield, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 179, A. Hug (ed.), *Platons Symposion* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1876), and A. Hug, H. Schöne (ed.), *Platons ausgewählte Schriften, V: Symposion* (Berlin: Teubner, 1909³), on 177a, G. Gebauer, *De hypotacticis et paratacticis argumenti ex contrario formis quae reperiuntur apud oratores atticos* (Zwiccaviae: Thostius, 1877), *passim*, L. Campbell (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments*, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879²), on 332, J. H. H. Schmidt, *Synonymik der Griechischen Sprache*, vol. III (Leipzig: Teubner, 1879), 528, J. H. H. Schmidt, *Handbuch der lateinischen und griechischen Synonymik* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1889), 726f., J. Adam (ed.), *Platonis Euthyphro* (Cambridge: University Press, 1890), 40, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments IV: The Philoctetes* (Cambridge: University Press, 1890), on 502f., 1225, 1380, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone* (Cambridge: University Press, 1891), on 332, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments V: The Trachiniae* (Cambridge: University Press, 1892), on, 298, 476ff., 1135, Appendix on 476, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments VI: The Electra* (Cambridge: University Press, 1894), on 26, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments, VII: The Ajax* (Cam-

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To be sure, it should also be borne in mind that there are certain aspects that may suggest a narrower understanding of “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει” and indeed that these lines are to be taken *in a negative sense*.

First, as Gregory Crane has shown, πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ was a regular phrase used to express the idea of “many bad experiences” (“terrible things that someone has done or suffered”) and the like.²⁶ There is no denying that the association between πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ and this stereotype phrase was pretty natural. And this leads one to understand “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ” in this light. But even so this is not enough to make one sure, right from the start, that this specific meaning (or, for that matter, a *negative* nuance of δεινός) is what the Theban elders’ words are all about.

Secondly, as mentioned before, the opening lines of *Antigone*’s first stasimon allude to the opening lines of the first stasimon in Aeschylus’ *Choephoroi*. Now this background has two major effects. On the one hand, it

seus in Ancient Thought (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2011), 43, D. Susanetti (ed.), *Sofocle: Antigone, op. cit.*, on 96, on 332-383 (p. 223) and 332, J. S. Starkey, *Sophocles the Honeybee: Dramatic Context and Interaction* (Diss. University of Colorado, Boulder, 2012), 257f., J. C. Collins, *Jebb’s Antigone* (Diss. Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, 2015), 44ff., 71f., and D. Cairns, *Sophocles: Antigone* (London/Oxford/N.Y./New Delhi/Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2016), 60.

²⁶ Cf. G. Crane, “Creon and the ‘Ode to Man’ in Sophocles’ *Antigone*”, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 92 (1989), 103-116, 105 note, and C. Utzinger, *Periphrases Aner*. Untersuchungen zum ersten Stasimon der Sophokleischen »Antigone« und zu den antiken Kulturentstehungstheorien, *op. cit.*, 30f. In the 5th and 4th Century, the phrase appears in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*, in Isocrates, Isaeus, Andocides, Xenophon, Plato (viz. Ps.-Plato), Lysias (viz. Ps.-Lysias), Demosthenes, Aristotle, Dinarchus and Licurgus Orator. See notably *De prisca medicina* 3 and 13, Isocrates, *De pace* 79 and 105, *Areopagiticus* 17, *Panathenaicus* 207, *Archidamus* 64 and 93, *Antidosis* 127, 2, *Panegyricus* 52 and 168, *Philippus* 42, Isaeus, *De Philoctemone* 5, *De Apollodoro* 4, Andocides, *De mysteriis*, 7, Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 7.1.40, *Anabasis* 5.5.8, *Philippus* 42, 3, Plato (viz. Ps.-Plato), *Cratylus* 395d7, *Symposium* 197b6, *Republica* 573d7, *Leges* 900a3-4, *Alcibiades Minor* 138c4, Lysias (viz. PS.-Lysias), *Contra Simonem* 1, *In Agoratum* 43, *Υπερ τῶν Ἀριστοφάνους χρημάτων* 4, *Περὶ τῆς Εὐάνδρου δοκιμασίας* 1, *In Ergoclem* 1, *In Diogitonem* 1, 18, *Epitaphius* 72, 1, Demosthenes, *De corona* 271, *De falsa legatione* 3, 9, 85, 91, 121, 189, 240 and 257, *In Midiam* 20 and 151, *Adversus Androtionem* 1, 15, *In Timocratem* 88, *Contra Pantaenetum* 33 and 57, *In Cononem* 8, *Contra Calliclem* 19 and 26, *Epistula* 4, 7, and 11, Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* 1166b12, Dinarchus, *In Demosthenem* 101, and Lycurgus Orator, *Oratio in Leocratem* 41. The currency of the phrase (πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ) may have been the origin of the interpolated καὶ in the opening lines of the first stasimon in Aeschylus’ *Choephoroi*. See notably T. W. Peile (ed.), *The Choephoræ of Aeschylus*. With Notes, Critical, Explanatory and Philological, *op. cit.*, on 571: “(...) καὶ post δεινὰ addunt libri omnes, quod metri causa ejecit Heath. Ortum illum haud dubie e glossa cujuspiam qui meminerat dictionis πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ (...)”.

suggests that τὰ δεινὰ is to be taken *pejoratively* – that what is at stake in the superlative-Priamel we are talking about has something to do with the δεινὰ δειμάτων ἄχη (with the terrible fearful woes) or with the κνώδαλα ἀνταῖα βροτοῖς (with the wild creatures hostile and hateful to mortals) that populate Aeschylus' choral ode. To be sure, this suggestion does not carry enough weight to settle the matter; for it is not clear whether Sophocles' Theban elders follow in the footsteps of Aeschylus' citizens of Argos in every respect. But be that as it may, it certainly adds weight to those possible meanings of δεινός that correspond to what Aeschylus' choral ode is all about. On the other hand, given the fact that Aeschylus' text presents our ὑπέρολμον φρόνημα (that which is πάντολμον – i. e., *pride* and *arrogance*, our *all-daring boldness* and *over-boldness*) as the *nec plus ultra* of δεινότης, the semantic background against which Sophocles' “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ” is set encompasses other components besides the various meanings of δεινός we have spoken of. It is, as it were, a *metonymic or synecdochic framework* that includes, among other things, this essential component of Aeschylus' superlative-Priamel: the τόλμα / πάντολμα / ὑπέρολμα-element.²⁷ Or rather the allusion to the opening lines of the first stasimon in Aeschylus' *Choephoroi* strengthens the connection between the semantic field of δεινός and the idea of *boldness* or *audacity*, which is one of the possible *connotations* of the word (one of the metonymic links of its semantic field).²⁸

²⁷ See *Choephoroi*, 594 and 597. As Stinton points out, γυναικῶν τλημόνων (596) forms part of what he terms the “intense repetition” of τόλμα-related words in the first stasimon of Aeschylus' *Choephoroi* – for in this passage τλήμων has both an “active” and a *negative* sense and belongs to the semantic field of τόλμα. Cf. T. C. W. Stinton, “The First Stasimon of Aeschylus' *Choephoroi*”, *The Classical Quarterly* 29 (1979), 252-262, in particular 252 and 256. On the “active” and derogatory sense of τλήμων as “overbold, reckless” and the like, see notably M. A. Bayfield (ed.), *The Electra of Sophocles* (London: Macmillan, 1901), on 275, F. Jacoby, “Some Athenian Epigrams from the Persian Wars”, *Hesperia* 14 (1945), 157-211, in particular 204, E. Fraenkel (ed.), *Aeschylus Agamemnon*, vol. III, Commentary on 1056-1673, Appendixes, Indexes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950, repr. 1974), on 1302, H. J. Rose, *A Commentary on the Surviving Plays of Aeschylus* (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde N. R., Deel LIV, 2) (Amsterdam: N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1957), on Choephor. 384 and 596, and on Agamemnon. 1301-6, A. F. Garvie (ed.), *Aeschylus Choephoroi* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), on 382-5, and S. Darcus Sullivan, *Aeschylus' Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New* (Montreal/Kingston/London/Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 33f., 243f. Stinton also calls our attention to the fact that in the lines we are talking about τόλμα (πάντολμα, ὑπέρολμα) conveys the idea not only of *boldness*, but also of *ruthlessness*.

²⁸ On this connection between δεινός and *audacity* see notably A. H. Sommerstein (ed.), *The Comedies of Aristophanes*, vol. 11: Wealth (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 2001), on 445. As far as *Antigone's* first stasimon is concerned, this connection is reinforced by the fact that, when speaking of the unknown breaker of Creon's edict, the first epeisodion emphasizes the idea of *audacity*. See notably 248: “Τί φής; τίς ἀνδρῶν ἦν ὁ τολμήσας τάδε;”. See also 371.

In short, in the opening lines of *Antigone*'s first stasimon there is no basis on which to decide which sense of δεινόν is at stake.

We are now in a position to understand the above-mentioned problem in all its complexity: What exactly are the Theban elders saying in the opening lines of the first stasimon? a) Are they saying that there are many fearsome, terrible, terrifying and violent things, but that we ourselves are the most fearsome, terrible, terrifying and violent thing of all? b) Are they saying that there are many dangers, ills and sufferings (many things that are hard, difficult to endure, etc.) but that we ourselves are the greatest of all? c) Are they saying that there are many tremendous, prodigious, colossal, marvellously strong or powerful things, but that we ourselves are the most tremendous, colossal, marvellously strong or powerful thing of all? d) Are they saying that there are many strange, uncanny and “unheimliche” things, but that we ourselves are the strangest, uncanniest and “unheimlichste” thing of all? e) Are they saying that there are many wondrous or marvellous – many amazing, astonishing, wonderful and admirable – things, but that we ourselves are the most wondrous, the most marvellous, the most amazing and admirable thing of all? f) Are they saying that there are many skilled, able, ingenious, clever, resourceful and inventive things, but that we ourselves are the most skilled, able, ingenious, clever, resourceful and inventive thing of all? g) Are they saying that there are many too-clever, over-clever things, but that we ourselves are the most over-clever thing of all? h) Are they saying that there are many haughty and audacious, bold and daring, reckless and ruthless beings, but that we ourselves are the haughtiest, boldest, most daring and ruthless of all?

Now, my claim is that, contrary to appearances, at the starting point – namely in the opening lines of the first stasimon – *all* these possible meanings of δεινός and *all* these possible interpretations of “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει” *are there*, for they belong to the semantic field of δεινός, and there is nothing to exclude any of them. Δεινός stands for a vast range of meanings (this vast range of meanings is there if one understands the language), and in the opening lines it is not yet clear what segments of this range are applicable or not. Put another way, in the opening lines “δεινός” (τὰ δεινὰ, δεινότερον) *does not have a clear-cut semantic value. All possible meanings* of the word are involved (all “pêle-mêle” – all *in a jumble*, as it were). And we cannot rely on the immediate context to guide us, for the immediate context does not provide any clues as to what particular meaning of the word the Theban elders have in mind. The opening lines thus remain enigmatic (or as said above: sibylline). There is something *shimmering, shifty and slippery* – allow me to use a Greek word: αἰόλον – about them. And there is no point in trying to tie them to the *Procrustean bed* of an *either/or*, of a *clear-cut* view (of a *univocal* sense), for they are all about a “*both/and*”, i.e., about *ambiguity* and *complexity*.

And pretty much the same holds good for a closely connected question,

namely: *For whom* are we something δεινόν and indeed the *nec plus ultra* of δεινόν: τὸ δεινότατον? *In whose eyes* are we τὸ δεινότατον? Are we τὸ δεινότατον *for ourselves* and *in our own eyes*? Or is it that we are δεινόν only *for other beings* and *in their eyes*? Or is this question pointless, for we are δεινόν in a sense which does not depend on the *point of view*? The answer to all these questions depends largely on the sense in which we are said to be not only something δεινόν, but τὸ δεινότατον. The two questions are closely linked to one another. But in this respect, too, the opening lines of the first stasimon say nothing at all.

So everything depends upon what the Theban elders say to substantiate their initial claim – i.e. upon *the rest of the first stasimon*. There is nothing special in the fact that the first *two* lines leave these matters open. After all, the rest of the first stasimon is anything but laconic, and it is to be expected that it provides a clear answer to all these questions and enables one to determine which sense of δεινόν is at stake when the Theban elders say “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδεν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει”. Or so it seems, for the problem is that on closer inspection it emerges that the rest of the first stasimon provides *absolutely no clue* as to what particular meaning(s) of δεινόν the Theban elders have in mind. Contrary to appearances, nothing they say narrows down the meaning of δεινόν to a *clear-cut and unequivocal semantic value*. As a matter of fact, nothing they say is enough to whittle down the semantic field of δεινόν to a *shortlist* of meanings. In this respect everything remains *unchanged* (and this means: everything remains *open*) from the beginning to the end.

To be sure, much of what the Theban elders say places some of the semantic values in question centre stage. For instance, it is pretty obvious that they are referring to the fact that mankind is a *tremendous, prodigious, colossal, strong* or *powerful* thing. It is also obvious that they present mankind as a wondrous or marvellous – as an *amazing, astonishing, wonderful* and *admirable* – thing. And it is no less obvious that in their eyes mankind is a *prodigiously skilled, able, ingenious, clever, resourceful* and *inventive* thing. But the point is that nothing they say excludes that the human race is δεινόν *in the other senses of the word*. I. e., nothing they say excludes any of the above-mentioned possible interpretations of “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδεν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει”. The fact that some possible interpretations of these words may seem more plausible than others does not eliminate the presence of the whole set of meanings we have tried to highlight. They all keep lurking in the background. And they play what might be described as a “chess-match” (with “moves and counter-moves”) with each other.

For instance, if one assumes that δεινόν is charged with *negative* associations (say, with the kind of negative associations suggested both by the connection with the first stasimon of Aeschylus’ *Choephoroi* and by the connection with the stereotype phrase “πολλὰ καὶ δεινά”), one soon comes up against the fact that the Theban elders are also speaking of δεινόν in the sense of an outs-

tanding ability – of resourcefulness, cleverness and the like.²⁹ Conversely, if

²⁹ P. Friedländer, “πολλὰ τὰ δεινά”, *op. cit.*, 58f., provides a typical example of this. He begins by stressing that δεινά stands for “ungeheuer” (“unheimlich”, “furchtbar”) and thereby suggests that this is the meaning of the word in the first stasimon: “Das Aischyleische Vorbild lehrt in der Tat, daß Sophokles den Ursinn in δεινός nicht vergessen haben kann. Noch gewisser lehrt es Sophokles selbst. Es gibt wenige Fälle bei ihm, in denen δεινός, durch Infinitiv oder Dativ oder Nomen klar bestimmt, die bekannte Sonderbedeutung des in einem bestimmten Bezirk Fähigen hat (...)” But then he qualifies his claim: “Aber von dieser Sonderverwendung abgesehen, fehlt dem δεινός bei Sophocles nie ein Zuschuß des Furchtbaren, des ‘Ungehiuren’, am allerwenigsten dem Neutrum: δεινὰ τολμᾶν, δεινὰ θεσπίσας, ἔργα δεινά, πέπονθα δεινά, τὰ δεινὰ γάρ τοι προστίθης ὄκνον πολόν, τὰ δεινὰ ἔκειν’ ἐπιπτελιημένοι und vieles.” And a few lines further down he is forced to admit that other meanings of the word play a pivotal role in the following strophes: “Auch in den beiden folgenden Strophen muß dieser Klang des Gefährlichen gehört werden, wenngleich die δεινότης im Sinn des δεινός ἄγειν, κρατεῖν, λέγειν zu überwiegen scheint”. Pretty much the same holds true for J. C. Collins, *Jebb’s Antigone* (Diss. Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, 2015), 49ff. Collins presents a survey of “δεινός in all of Sophocles” (49) and tries to show that in the majority of cases the word means *terrible*, *dreadful*, *dread*, and the like. But she finds herself forced to admit “uses of δεινός in the *Antigone* and other plays of Sophocles where something other than ‘terrible’ suits the context more” (58ff.). According to her, in most of these other cases δεινός means ‘clever’ and the like – and only in one case (O.C. 1127) does it stand for a ‘miracle’ or ‘something wonderful’. “A look at some uses Aeschylus makes of δεινός” (61ff.) and a similar attempt regarding Herodotus (63ff.) confirm that in most cases *terrible* and *strange* – “dark and negative terms” (63) – are the best translation for δεινόν and the like. But then again Collins sees herself forced to admit that in a significant number of cases δεινόν stands *inter alia* not only a) for *terrible*, *formidable*, *dangerous*, but also b) for *hard*, *harsh*, *cruel*, *severe*, and c) for *keen*, *sharp*, *clever*. All in all, Collins resorts to a *statistical* argument: she claims that the “textual evidence in Sophocles, Aeschylus and Herodotus is overwhelmingly in favour of the translation ‘terrible’ or, perhaps, ‘strange.’” (65). This claim is then reinforced by the notion that “all of Sophocles’ work supports a very gloomy view of mankind” (68) – which would be inconsistent with “οὐδὲν δεινότερον ἀνθρώπου” having anything but a dark and negative meaning. However, none of this is conclusive. On the one hand, Collins’ survey shows that δεινόν covers a *wide gamut of meanings* – and the audience *viz.* the reader has no way of knowing for sure which meaning the Theban elders have in mind when they start singing πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδεν κτλ. After all the audience and the reader will not have bothered to study Sophocles’, Aeschylus’ and Herodotus’ vocabulary. And even if they had, they would still be unable to settle this issue immediately, for they would realize a) that δεινόν has a variety of meanings, and b) that this kind of questions cannot be solved on a statistical basis. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the chorus is not just a mouthpiece for the playwright. It, too, is a kind of *character* (with its own views, its own relation to the plot, its own strategy, etc.). It, too, modifies its outlook and thinking according to the circumstances, etc. And the fact that a playwright takes a gloomy view on mankind does not imply that everyone in his or her plays takes a similar view (let alone takes a similar view *in all circumstances*).

one assumes that the first stasimon is all about ability, resourcefulness, cleverness and the like, one comes up against the fact that the *negative* nuances (the negative and ominous associations) are there *from the very beginning*.

Thus, the first stasimon has a shadow of *helpless ambiguity* about it. As far as the semantic field of δεινόν is concerned, *conjunction*, not *disjunction* – a “both/and”, not an “either/or” – is its signature. And, as we shall see, on closer inspection it emerges that this helpless ambiguity (the fact that mankind is δεινόν *in all possible meanings of the word*, and that this – precisely this – is what makes of us τὸ δεινότατον: the most δεινόν thing of all) is perhaps what the first stasimon is all about.

And pretty much the same holds for the question regarding the *point of view* from which the human race is said to be the most δεινόν thing of all. Admittedly the first stasimon does not breathe a word about this. But the point is that it raises the question. On the one hand, it seems to present mankind as seen *from outside*, from what might be termed a “witness point of view”. The Theban elders behold the whole “pageant” – the whole “adventure”, as it were – of mankind, and the effect it has on everything else. In other words, we are *seen as we usually see other things or other beings*. On the other hand, the first stasimon puts us *in the shoes of other beings* – i. e., it presents us as we are *seen by them* (or as we would be seen by them if they were able to understand things the way we do). But this is not all. At the same time these “external points of view” are *fused with our own*. And this means something altogether different from the external points of view in question. What is at stake is not only how other beings (viz. a witness point of view) see us; it is rather a question of *ourselves seeing ourselves as seen from outside*. In other words, it is a question of something which is at the same time *an inside and an outside view* of human race. Furthermore, the “inside view” we are talking about is intrinsically complex, for it encompasses both a) our usual point of view (our usual unreflective and self-centred point of view³⁰) and b) the broader view taken by the Theban elders.

All this is closely connected with the question: *for whom* is the human race δεινόν and indeed τὸ δεινότατον? The Theban elder’s words suggest that we are δεινόν and indeed τὸ δεινότατον *for other beings*, but they do not exclude (and on closer inspection it emerges that they also suggest) that we are δεινόν and indeed τὸ δεινότατον *for ourselves*. Furthermore, given the fact that they leave undecided in which sense(s) οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει, it is also possible that their claim is that the human race is the most δεινόν thing of all in some sense that does not depend upon the point of view. What we are dealing with here is thus a *kaleidoscope*, a *complex alloy of various perspectives*. In this respect, too, the first stasimon is all about *conjunction*, not *disjunction*: a “both/and” (not an “either/or”) is its signature.

³⁰ For this point of view does not vanish without a trace, but remains.

4. Παντοπόρος

Let us now turn our attention to the lines that hold the key to understanding what the Theban elders have in mind: their attempt to substantiate the claim that “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδεν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει”.

First, it should be borne in mind that their description of the human race is centred on *power*, and on what might be described as the *relations of forces between mankind and other beings*. The Theban elders speak not only of man but, in a way, of *everything around us*. The human race is measured against everything else, and the question is: who has *power* over whom? Who has *control* over whom? Who *prevails* over whom? In other words, the chorus focuses on what kind of power each of the elements has or does not have over the others. The choral ode describes – *sit venia verbo* – a “*war of being*” (the “*γίγαντομαχία*” of it all), or rather the *outcome* of this war. The human race has prevailed against other beings – and this is why the first stasimon has a ring of a *triumph song* to it.

The Theban elders’ depiction of the said “*γίγαντομαχία*” highlights the following aspects:

First, they speak of the human *triumph over distance and danger*. They stress the fact that the human race is *on the move*, and that it is not deterred by natural barriers. Man defies all natural limits, stops at nothing, and overcomes all obstacles. He is, as it were, a *creature of distance*. He travels far and wide and eventually reaches everywhere.³¹ In the eyes of the Theban elders the crossing of the seas (the fact that human beings risk storm and shipwreck) is the emblem of this essential feature: τούτο καὶ πολλοῦ πέραν / πόντου χειμερίῳ νότῳ/ χωρεῖ, περιβρυχίσιον / περῶν ὑπ’ οἴδμασιν (...) ³²

Secondly, man *subdues everything around him to his use*. And he does so on *land, sea and air*. On the one hand, he turns over the soil and vexes the earth. He rubs her away for his own purposes. To express the extraordinary extent to which he does so, the Theban elders resort to an oxymoron: however inexhaustible and untiring (or unwaning and unwearying) the earth is, mankind still manages to wear her out (θεῶν / τε τὰν ὑπερτάταν, Γᾶν / ἄφθιτον, ἀκαμάταν ἀποτρύεται, / ἰλλομένων ἀρότρων ἔτος εἰς ἔτος, / ἰππείῳ

³¹ T. C. W. Oudemans, P. M. H. Lardinois, *Tragic Ambiguity* Anthropology, Philosophy and Sophocles’ *Antigone* (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 126, incisively highlights that extreme and far reaching mobility (“expansion”, “going beyond”) serves as a *Leitmotiv* in the first stasimon: man “goes across the sea (πέραν), traversing the waves (περῶν – 337), he moves (πέλει – 333), he strides (χωρεῖ – 336), he travels towards the future (ἐπ’ [...] ἔρχεται τὸ μέλλον – 360-61)”.

³² 334-37.

γένει πολεύων).³³ On the other hand, man captures the other animals. Some of them he makes captive – he uses them for his own service, tames and trains them, making them work for him. In short, with regard to other animals, man turns the balance of power in his favour and calls all the shots. The human race *dominates* other species – it breaks them, gets a firm hold upon them and reduces them to subjection. In the eyes of the Theban elders, hunting viz. fishing *nets* and the *yoke* are the emblem of this essential com-

³³ 337-341. “Ακαμάταν ἀποτρύβεται” is pretty much the same as “ἄτρυτον ἀποτρύβεται”. M. C. Leclerc rightly emphasizes the oxymoron and translates “fatiguer l’infatigable”. Cf. M.-C. Leclerc, “La résistible ascension du progrès humain chez Eschyle et Sophocle”, *Revue des Études Grecques* 107 (1994), 68-84, in particular 78, and Eadem, “L’attelage d’Hésiode. Les difficultés d’une reconstitution”, *Dialogues d’histoire ancienne* 20 (1994), 53-84, in particular 77. On “ἀποτρύβεται” see notably *Scholia Graeca in Sophoclem* ex editione Brunckiana (Oxonii, e Tipographeo Clarendoniano, 1810), on Antig. 338, p. 236 (γεωπονεῖ, ἢ ἀποσχίζει τὴν γῆν· καθότι ἐν τῷ ἀροτριᾷν σχίζει καὶ δαμάζει τὴν γῆν), R. H. Klausen, *Theologoumena Aeschyli Tragici*, (Berlin: Reimer, 1829), 31, A. Witzschel (ed.), *Sophokles Antigone* mit kurzen deutschen Anmerkungen von G. C. W. Schneider (Leipzig: Geuther, 1844²), on 341, T. Mitchell (ed.), *The Tragedies of Sophocles* With Notes, Critical and Explanatory, vol. II (Oxford/London/Cambridge: Parker/Whittaker & Co/Deighton, 1844), on 339, F. W. Schneidewin (ed.), *Sophokles IV, Antigone* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1856³), on 338, A. Scholz, *De deorum apud Sophoclem epithetis* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1861), 9, J. Milner (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (London: J. S. Virtue, 1862), on 338, M. J. Smead (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (N.Y.: Appleton & Co, 1871), on 339, G. Wolff, L. Bellermann (ed.), *Sophokles, vol. III, Antigone* (Leipzig: Teuber, 1878³), on 339, M. L. D’Ooge (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone* (Boston: Ginn & Co, 1884), on 339, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments* III: The Antigone, *op. cit.*, on 339, M. W. Humphreys (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1891), on 339, J. C. Kamerbeek (ed.), *The Plays of Sophocles. Commentaries, II, The Trachiniae* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), on 124, F. H. M. Blydes, *Spicilegium Sophocleum* Commentarium perpetuum in septem Sophoclis fabulas continens (Halis Saxonum: in Orphanotrophei Libraria, 1903), on Antig 339, p. 58, O. Longo, *Commento linguistico alle Trachinie di Sofocle* (Padova: Antenore, 1968), on 124-5, M. Griffith (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone, op. cit.*, on 338-341, D. Susanetti (ed.), *Sofocle: Antigone, op. cit.*, on 338-341. On the oxymoron see M. Griffith (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone, op. cit.*, on 338-41, D. Susanetti (ed.), *Sofocle: Antigone, op. cit.*, on 338-41, D. L. Cairns, “From Solon to Sophocles: Intertextuality and Interpretation in Sophocles’ Antigone”, *Japan Studies in Classical Antiquity* 2 (2014), 3-30, in particular 4. It should be noted that the wording is double-edged: on the one hand, it stresses the fact that the human species manages to wear out the inexhaustible and untiring earth; on the other hand, as Campbell puts it, “the present implies that the process is never-ending”. Cf. L. Campbell (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments*, vol. I, *op. cit.*, on 339, G. F. Else, *The Madness of Antigone* (Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 1976.1) (Heidelberg: Winter, 1976), 43, J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles. Commentaries, III, The Antigone, op. cit.*, on 338-41, and A. Brown (ed.), *Sophocles: Antigone, op. cit.*, on 337-42.

ponent of man's triumph: κούφονων τε φύλον ὄρ / νίθων ἀμφιβαλὼν ἄγει /
καὶ θηρῶν ἀγρίων ἔθνη / πόντου τ'εἰναλίαν φύσιν / σπεύρασι δικτυκλώστοις
/ περιφραδῆς ἀνήρ· κρατεῖ / δὲ μηχαναῖς ἀγραύλου / θηρὸς ὄρεσσιβάτα,
λασιαύχενά θ' / ἵππον ὑπαγάγετ' ἀμφίλοφον ζυγὸν / οὔρειόν τ' ἀκμηῆτα³⁴

³⁴ Schöne's and Franz's conjecture – reinforces the role played by the yoke-emblem in the second strophe. For this verb means “to grip or bind fast”, “to get a firm hold upon something”, and in particular “to tame an animal”, “to make it obedient”, “to break a horse” (also “to harness a horse”) and the like – see *Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium vetera* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1935, repr. 1974), I 743: κυρίως δὲ ἐστὶν ὀχμάσαι τὸ ἵππον ὑπὸ χαλινὸν ἀγαγεῖν ἢ ὑπὸ ὄχημα. On Schöne's and Franz's conjecture, cf. G. Schöne, “Fortsetzung der Recension der Wexischen Ausgabe der Antigone des Sophokles”, *Allgemeine Schulzeitung* (4.10.1833), 945-952, in particular 948f., and A. Boeckh (ed.), *Des Sophokles Antigone* Griechisch und Deutsch (Berlin: Veit & Co, 1843), 233, note. See also G. Wolff, “Die neueste Antigone-literatur”, *Zeitschrift für Alterthumswissenschaft* 96 (1846), 745-751, in particular 746, J. W. Donaldson (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* in Greek and English (London: J. W. Parker, 1848), on 350, A. Meineke, *Beiträge zur philologischen Kritik der Antigone des Sophokles* (Berlin: Enslin, 1861), on 351, N. Wecklein (ed.), *Sophoclis Tragoediae recens. et explan.* E. Wunderus (Leipzig: Teubner, 1878), on 349, F. W. Schneidewin (ed.), *Sophokles IV, Antigone* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1856³), on 353, F. H. M. Blaydes, *Adversaria critica in Sophoclem* (Halis Saxonum: In orphanotrophei libraria, 1899), 167, M. A. Bayfield (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (London: Macmillan, 1901), on 349ff., A. Platt, “Sophoclea III”, *The Classical Quarterly* 4 (1910), 247-256, in particular 247, P. Joos, *ΤΥΧΗ, ΦΥΣΙΣ, ΤΕΧΝΗ*, *op. cit.*, 47, S. Benardete, “A Reading Of Sophocles' Antigone: I”, *Interpretation A Journal of Political Philosophy* 4 (1975), 148-196 = Idem, *Sacred Transgressions. A Reading of Sophocles' Antigone* (South Bend, Ind: St Augustine's Press, 1999), 41, R. D. Dawe, *Studies on the Text of Sophocles III Women of Trachis – Antigone – Philoctetes – Oedipus at Colonus* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 103, H. Lloyd-Jones, N. G. Wilson, *Sophoclea. Studies on the Text of Sophocles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 123, D. D. Dawe (ed.), *Sophoclis Antigone* (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1996), D. Susanetti (ed.), *Sofocle: Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 351. On the meaning of ὀχμάζεται, cf. N. Wecklein, *op. cit.*, on 349, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 351, M. A. Bayfield (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles*, *op. cit.*, on 349ff., F. H. M. Blaydes, *Spicilegium Sophocleum op. cit.*, on Antig. 351, p. 59, E. Bruhn (ed.), *Sophokles erklärt. v. F. W. Schneidewin u. A. Nauck*, IV Antigone (Berlin: Weidmann, 1913), on 351f., P. Groeneboom (ed.), *Aeschylus' Prometheus*, (Groningen: Wolters, 1928), on 5, J. D. Denniston (ed.), *Euripides Electra* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), on 817, G. Müller, *Sophokles Antigone*, *op. cit.*, 92, M. Griffith (ed.), *Aeschylus Prometheus Bound* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), on 4-5, C. W. Willink (ed.), *Euripides Orestes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), on 264-5, C. Utzinger, *Periphrades Aner*, *op. cit.*, 17, M. Morin, “Les monstres des armes d'Achille dans l'Électre d'Euripide (v. 452-477): une mise-en-abîme de l'action?”, *Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes* 78 (2004), 101-125, in particular 115, D. Susanetti (ed.), *Eschilo Prometeo*, (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2010), 156-157, H. M. Roisman, C. A. E. Luschnig (ed.), *Euripides Electra. A Commentary* (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), on 817 (and p. 327), N. Distilo, *Commento critico testuale all'Electra di Euripide* (Padova:

ταῦρον.³⁵

But, thirdly, all this has to do with the fact that man creates his own space, filling it with new kinds of reality that strengthen his position and help him prevail: language, reasoning and thought, housing, cities and city-life (viz. living in society, with all that this entails), medical knowledge – all sorts of innovations. The point is that the human species *changes the way things are*. Man invents means of escaping from inanimate threats, and indeed from whatever weakens him or is hard and uncomfortable. He has the ability to improve his living conditions, by turning weakness into strength, creating ever new resources and arranging everything to his convenience. Here, too, man tips the balance of power to his favour. In the eyes of the Theban elders, two *words* say it all – “παντοπόρος” and the opposite of ἄπορος (ἄπορος ἐπ’ οὐδέν). We will return to these terms later, but for now let it suffice to say that they put everything in a nutshell, generalize the claim and convey the idea of nothing less than *universal resourcefulness* – man is an *all-providing*, virtually *never wrong-footed* or *never resourceless* creature: καὶ φθέγμα καὶ ἀνεμόεν / φρόνημα καὶ ἀστυνόμους / ὄργας ἐδιδάξατο, καὶ δυσαύλων / πάγων ὑπαίθρεια καὶ / δύσομβρα φεύγειν βέλη, / παντοπόρος· ἄπορος ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ἔρχεται / τὸ μέλλον· (...) νόσων δ’ ἀμηγάνων φυγὰς / ζυμπέφρασται.³⁶

It is therefore no exaggeration to speak of the first stasimon as a “triumph of man”. It is perhaps not the whole truth, but certainly part of it. This is closely connected with the fact that the first stasimon features a *list of achievements*, namely of *our* achievements; for on closer inspection it emerges that, in fact, it is more than just a list of achievements: it is the description of a *realm* or an *empire*. And this is one of the main features of the image of man presented by the Theban elders: it describes the race of man as a *realm* or an *empire*. It does not speak of mankind just as a group of be-

S.A.R.G.O.N., 2012), on 815-818, D. Susanetti (ed.), *Sofocle: Antigone, op. cit.*, on 351, G. Avezzi, ““It is not a small thing to defeat a king”.1 The Servant/Messenger’s Tale in Euripides’ Electra”, *Skenè Journal of Theatre and Drama Studies* 2 (2016), 63-86, in particular 80, V. Zanusso, “Una dimensione dimenticata dell’ akoè: la percezione in scena e la funzione drammaturgica dei suoni non verbali”, in: L. Austa (ed.), *The Forgotten Theatre. Mythology, Dramaturgy and Tradition of Graeco-Roman Fragmentary Drama* (Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso, 2018), 167-192, in particular 180. For the yoke-image in Sophocles’ *Antigone* and its implications, see notably R. F. Goheen, *The Imagery of Sophocles’ Antigone, op. cit.*, 26ff. M.-C. Leclerc, is probably right in remarking that “l’ordre des verbes suggère également un pouvoir qui se renforce: d’abord l’homme «prend», ἄγει, les bêtes, puis il s’en «rend maître», κρατεῖ, et les met enfin sous le joug, ὑπάξεται ... ζυγόν.” Cf. M.-C. Leclerc, “La résistible ascension du progrès humain chez Eschyle et Sophocle”, *op. cit.*, 78.

³⁵ 342-352.

³⁶ 354-364.

ings among many other beings. It presents us as a *global power* – *interfering* with other beings, *prevailing* over other beings, *shaping* other beings, *changing* other beings, etc. This power to *shape things*, to *get what one wants*, to *impose one's control*, to *win* and to *subdue* – and indeed not only a certain amount of this power, but the ability to achieve this with regard to *everything around us*, including the most *difficult* and most *strong* and *powerful*, and also with regard to the *distant* – is, according to the Theban elders, the main feature of mankind.³⁷

Let us take a closer look at how the Theban elders present this view in the first stasimon. As pointed out above, the chorus reviews the triumph of man over each of his opponents, one by one. It highlights the fact that the human race prevails over the *elements of nature* (the sea, the earth, etc.). It then calls our attention to the fact that pretty much the same holds good for our relation to *other living beings*.³⁸ The point is the idea of *totality*. In other words, the point is the idea of *total triumph over everything else* – the point is that the “empire” we are talking about is nothing less than a *massive* sphere of power, extending all around us in all directions (not a scattered archipelago of little islands, but the very opposite: a *sea* of power, as it were).³⁹

³⁷ It should be noted that the Theban elders do not speak of man as an *individual*. They speak of mankind in a *collective* sense and describe its *common achievements*. The point is the relative strength of the human race in comparison with everything else – and they do not have in mind the individual human being, but rather the *whole species*. To be sure, two human beings cannot merge together: there is no such thing as a *real fusion* of selves or individuals. As Aristotle points out in his *Politica*, 1262b, referring to Aristophanes' speech in Plato's *Symposium*, it is impossible for two human beings to grow together and both become one instead of being two (συμφῦναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἓνα); for in such a union both of them, or at least one, would inevitably be destroyed (ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὸν ἓνα). The result being that, in a way, everything the Theban elders are referring to (all *collective* achievements of mankind) is the work of *individuals*. And, of course, collective achievements reflect the qualities and shortcomings of the individuals who made them possible: mankind would not have “triumphed” if individual human beings were not suitably equipped for the purpose. But, on the other hand, no single individual would be able to accomplish any of the said deeds single-handedly: the triumph evoked by the Theban elders has an intrinsically collective nature. Which, in turn, should not blind us to the fact that *each of us* (each “present-day” individual – and by this we mean both the Theban elders' or Sophocles' “present-day” and ours) is himself the product of the collective achievements of mankind (and would be very different without them).

³⁸ For a more detailed discussion of the categories of beings the Theban elders refer to, see T. C. W. Oudemans, P. M. H. Lardinois, *Tragic Ambiguity*. Anthropology, Philosophy and Sophocles' *Antigone*, *op. cit.*, 121ff.

³⁹ To be sure, it cannot be excluded that there are more things than the chorus lists, so that the totality they are talking about does not cover everything (is not the “complete

But here one should pay attention not only to what the Theban elders say, but to their *diction* or *form of expression* – and in particular to the fact that here, too, they are *alluding* to something. It goes without saying that these lines are an instance of so-called “polar expression”, namely of “polar expression” of *totality*).⁴⁰ Polar expression of totality does not require any

totality”: *all things that exist*). In particular, the gods are conspicuous by their absence – and one can ask the meaning of this. Are the Theban elders just leaving out those beings that are, as it were, the mirror of man’s ἀσθένεια? Are they assuming that there are no gods – that *it is just us* and the other beings mentioned in the ode? Or is their point that, even if there are yet other beings and the balance of forces between them and man is not favourable to us, there is a whole sphere (and indeed a very vast one) in which mankind “calls all the shots” – so that it still makes sense to celebrate the extraordinary extent of man’s power? Or is it that they are not expressing their own view, but a particular way of seeing that focuses exclusively on the sphere in which mankind “calls all the shots” – so that everything else falls out of one’s field of vision? Whatever the case, the point seems to be that there is this *massive* sphere of power: the “*sea of power*” we have spoken of.

⁴⁰ See notably M. Haupt, *Mavricii Havptii Opuscula* (Lipsiae: Impensis Salomonis Hirzelii, 1875), 263f., G. Kaibel (ed.), *Sophokles Elektra* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1896), on 303, E. Henrich, *Die sogenannte polare Ausdrucksweise im Griechischen* (Neustadt a. d. H.: Aktiendruckerei, 1899), E. Kemmer, *Die polare Ausdrucksweise in der griechischen Literatur* (Würzburg: A. Stuber’s Verlag, C. Kabitzsch, 1900), A. C. Pearson (ed.), *The Helena of Euripides* (Cambridge: University Press, 1903), on 1137, J. Vahlen, *Iohannis Vahleni Opuscula academica* (Lipsiae: Teubner, 1907), 77ff., U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (ed.), *Euripides Herakles* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1909), on 1106, F. Dornseiff, *Pindars Stil* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1921), 102, J. B. Hoffmann, “Zum Wesen der sog. polaren Ausdrucksweise”, *Glotta* 15 (1927), 45-53, W. Breitenbach, *Untersuchungen zur Sprache der euripideischen Lyrik* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1934, repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1967), 203f., F. Dornseiff, *Pindars Stil* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1921), 102, E. Fraenkel (ed.), *Aeschylus Agamemnon*, vol. II, Commentary on 1-1055 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950, repr. 1974), on 358f., H. Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*. Literarische und philosophiegeschichtliche Studien (München: Beck, 1955³, repr. 1968), 260, B. A. van Groningen, *De antithese als Griekse denkvorm*, Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren XV.1 (1953), B. van Groningen, *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque*. Procédés et réalisations (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1958), 257, J. D. Meerwaldt, *Vormaspekten* (,s-Gravenhage: A.A.M. Stols, 1958), 71-88, W. J. Verdenius, “L’association des idées comme principe de composition dans Homère, Hésiode, Théognis”, *Revue des Études Grecques* 73 (1960), 345-361, E. Bruhn, *Anhang zur Ausgabe des Sophokles von F. W. Schneidewin und A. Nauck* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1963²), §§ 221, 228, W. S. Barrett (ed.), *Euripides Hippolytos* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), on 441-2, 675-7, G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy*. Two Types of Argumentation in Greek Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), in particular 90ff., W. J. Verdenius, “Semonides über die Frauen. Ein Kommentar zu Fr. 7”, *Mnemosyne* 21 (1968), 138-138, on v. 9, 135f., D. Fehling, *Die Wiederholungsfiguren und ihr Gebrauch bei den*

explicit mention of the whole in question. Nor does it require that each and every part of it is expressly referred to. Polar expression highlights a series of contrasting and complementary elements and thereby conveys the idea of totality. In other words, it includes, as it were, a dynamic *rounding-up-procedure* or a *pars pro toto* effect. And that is exactly what the Theban elders' list of achievements is all about.

But there is more. On closer inspection it emerges that what we are dealing with here is a very particular case of polar expression: "Such polar expressions involving sea and land (see also *Choephoroi*, 585-8) go back to Hesiod (*Theogony*, 582) and the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite* (5-6): the goddess subdues 'all creatures that dry land nurtures, and all reared by the sea' (more examples in Barrett's edition of *Euripides Hippolytus*, on 1277-80)".⁴¹ In other words, it is not just another case of so-called "polar expression". Sophocles' wording is a conscious paraphrase and variation of a topos: the topos of Ἔρωξ' and Aphrodite's omnipresence and irresistible power. We find other expressions of this topos, say, in Hesiod's *Theogony*, 120ff., in *Antigone's* third stasimon⁴², in Sophocles' Fragments 684 and 941⁴³, in the fourth stasimon of Euripides' *Hippolytos*⁴⁴, and in Euripides' Fragment 433. In sum, the Theban elders let mankind play the role of the ἀνίκατος μάχαν⁴⁵ (Sophocles' words in *Antigone's* third stasimon) viz. of Euripides' πάντων δυσμαχώτατος.⁴⁶ They present what might be described as a "demytholo-

Griechen vor Gorgias (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969), 274ff, W. J. Verdenius, "Notes on the Proem of Hesiod's *Theogony*", *Mnemosyne* 25 (1972), 225-260, in particular on 32 (238f.), M. L. West (ed.), *Hesiod Works and Days* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), on 102 and 529, G. W. Bond (ed.), *Euripides Heracles* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, repr. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999), on 647f., W. J. Verdenius, "Pindar's Second Isthmian Ode: A Commentary", *Mnemosyne* 35 (1982), 1-37, on 42 (30f.), W. J. Verdenius, *Commentaries On Pindar* Vol. 1, *Olympian Odes* 3,7, 12, 14 (Leiden: Brill, 1987), on O 3, v.45, p. 38, P. J. Finglass (ed.), *Sophocles Electra* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), on 305-306, M. S. Cyrino, *Aphrodite* (London: Routledge, 2010), 31, A. Vergados (ed.), *A Commentary on the 'Homeric Hymn to Hermes'* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), on 441.

⁴¹ E. Hall (ed.), *Aeschylus Persians* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1996), on 707. Cf. W. S. Barrett (ed.), *Euripides Hippolytos* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 394, and S. Douglas Olson (ed.), *The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite and Related Texts*. Text, Translation and Commentary (Berlin/Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter, 2012), on 3-6, 3 and 4-5.

⁴² 781ff.

⁴³ A. C. Pearson (ed.), *The Fragments of Sophocles* (Cambridge: University Press, 1917), vol. II, 302f. and vol. III, 106ff.

⁴⁴ Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 439ff. and 1268ff.

⁴⁵ *Antigone*, 781.

⁴⁶ Euripides, *Fr.* 230. On the connection between the Theban elders' characterization of man and the ancient Greek description of Ἔρωξ and Κύπρις (viz. the topos of invincible

gised” version of Ἔρωσ’ universal supremacy – the main difference being that Ἔρωσ is replaced by the human race, that the gods do not intervene one way or the other, and that therefore nothing is said about the human empire prevailing over them. The fact that the topos in question originally has to do with Ἔρωσ and ἄμαχος Ἀφροδίτα⁴⁷ is not the decisive factor here. The point is that one could hardly be more emphatic in asserting the idea of *invincibility*, for the wording suggests nothing less than some kind of *godlike omnipresence* and *universal supremacy*.

But this is not all. The chorus’ characterization of mankind has a second important feature, namely what they say concerning the *origin* of this universal supremacy (*where all this power comes from*). The Theban elders do not just say that we are that powerful: they try to determine *what makes this power possible*; for it is not only a question of power, it is rather a question of a *very particular kind of power* – namely, a power that has to do with *mental capacity, intelligence, skillfulness, craftiness*. It is all a question of being περιφραδής,⁴⁸ of μηχαναί⁴⁹, of φρόνημα⁵⁰; it has all to do with the fact that man *has taught himself* (ἐδιδάξατο⁵¹, or as Jebb puts it: ἀντὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐδίδαξε⁵²) and that the human race contrives plans (ξυμπέφρασται⁵³); or, as the Theban elders also say, it has all to do with the fact that man has “this resourceful quality of inventiveness – that defines τέχνη – as something clever beyond expectation” (Griffith’s paraphrase of σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ’ ἔχων⁵⁴) – or, in Jebb’s paraphrase of this passage: “possessing, in his resourceful skill, a thing subtle beyond belief”.⁵⁵ And this – not anything else – is what makes human beings so extraordinarily powerful. In short, according to the chorus, *intelligence is power* – the *supreme kind of power*. The “human empire” is based on intelligence. And what we have termed the “*triumph of man*” turns out to be a “*triumph of intelligence*”.

Ἔρωσ), see notably R. Garner, *From Homer to Tragedy: The Art of Allusion in Greek Poetry* (London/N. Y.: Routledge, 1990), 81ff, J. Davidson, “Starting a Choral Ode: Some Sophoclean Techniques”, *Prudentia* 23 (1991), 31-44, in particular 42f., and A. Rodighiero, *Generi lirico-coralì nella produzione drammatica di Sofocle* (Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto Verlag), 2012, 164.

⁴⁷ 799f.

⁴⁸ 347

⁴⁹ 348.

⁵⁰ 355.

⁵¹ 355.

⁵² R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone, op. cit.*, on 356.

⁵³ 362.

⁵⁴ 365-366. Cf. M. Griffith (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone, op. cit.*, on 365-7.

⁵⁵ Cf. R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone op. cit.*, 365f.

But before we go any further let us take a closer look at the vocabulary used by the Theban elders to express this *cognitive* component.

First, περιφραδής is a seldom used adjective. Elsewhere the word occurs only in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* (*In Mercurium*, 464). Homer always uses the adverb περιφραδέως (*Il.* I, 466, II, 429, VII, 318, XXIV, 624, *Od.* XIV, 431, XIX, 423) in the formulaic sequence “ὤπτησάν τε περιφραδέως, ἐρύσαντο τε πάντα”. Hesiod varies this formula: “ὤπτησαν μὲν πρῶτα, περιφραδέως δ’ ἐρύσαντο”⁵⁶ – an unfortunate change, according to the Scolia: “οὐδεὶς δὲ περιφραδέως ἐξέλκει κρέα, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὄπτᾱ”.⁵⁷

It is a matter of dispute whether the verbal prefix (περι-) a) has an *intensive* value,⁵⁸ b) expresses the idea of *superiority* or *excellence* (to a greater degree than others – that is, the idea of *outstanding expertise* or *outstanding skills*) or rather c) the idea of some kind of “circumspection” (“looking around” and “looking about”), i. e. the *cautious* and *watchful* attitude of one who *takes heed* – who pays attention to all the facts, details and circumstances, viz. to all the possibilities and probable consequences, in order to determine the correct or safe course of conduct, etc.⁵⁹ But the verbal prefix may also suggest d) the possession of outstanding skills (or having this kind of attitude) *in all possible directions, in every regard* – i. e. the idea of what might be termed *all-round skills* (viz. *all-round watchfulness*) or of an extraordinary *combination of many specific abilities*. But this is not all. Last but not least, it is also possible that P. Joos is right in pointing out that e) περιφραδής can also convey the idea of “being *too clever*” (“zum ‘Überausklugen’, ja sogar – in leise mitschwingender Bedeutung – zum ‘Allzuklugen’”).⁶⁰ In other words, περιφραδής can suggest that man *outwits himself*, and that, in the final analysis, his intelligence *causes harm* either to other beings or to himself (so that he is, as it were, *too clever for his own good*). Joos does not elaborate on the subject, but this may be related to the fact that both in Lesbian and in other dialects (in particular in Attic) περι- can mean pretty much the same

⁵⁶ See R. Merkelbach (ed.), *Fragmenta Hesiodica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), Fr. 316.

⁵⁷ Cf. H. Erbse (ed.), *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem* (scholia vetera), vol. V scholia ad libros Y- Ω continens (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1977), on 24.624.

⁵⁸ See, for instance, M. W. Humphreys (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1891), on 348: “περι- intensive; φραδ- in the early sense ponder; hence very thoughtful, full of cunning.”

⁵⁹ See, for example, T. Mitchell (ed.), *The Tragedies of Sophocles With Notes, Critical and Explanatory*, vol. II (Oxford/London/Cambridge: Parker/Whittaker & Co/Deighton, 1844), on 348: “a person who turns matters over all ways in his mind”, and W. Schadewaldt (ed.), *Sophokles. Tragödien* (Zürich/Stuttgart: Artemis, 1968), 81: “(...) der alles bedenkende Mann”.

⁶⁰ P. Joos, *ΤΥΧΗ, ΦΥΣΙΣ, ΤΕΧΝΗ*, 46.

as ὑπερ-, so that περιφραδής may be as *ambivalent* as περίφρων. Due to this ambivalence, περίφρων = ὑπέρφρων, περιφρονεῖν = ὑπερφρονεῖν, etc., and the adjective can take a *negative shade of meaning*, namely “haughty, overweening” (LSJ) and the like. Cf., for example, Hesiod, *Theogonia*, 894, Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, 1426, and *Supplikes*, 757, Thucydides, I, 25. 4, perhaps also Aristophanes, *Nubes*, 225f. Now the bottom line is that the same may be the case with περιφραδής, so that this word can also convey the idea that man is f) *full of himself* (*arrogant, proud, conceited*, etc.).

In short, this relatively rare word is open to all these different interpretations; and it is thus left up to the reader to decide what the Theban elders’ περιφραδής stands for. This very fact reinforces the suggestion of an *ambiguous combination of all the above-mentioned meanings* (here again a “chord”, not a single note). But, be that as it may, the fact remains that περιφραδής conveys the idea of a high degree of sagacity viz. of outstanding intellectual and knowledge skills. The old scholiast says it all when he writes: “περιφραδής·πάντα εἰδώς”.⁶¹

⁶¹ A. Christodoulos (ed.), *Scholia in Sophoclis tragoedias vetera* (Lipsiae: Teubner, 1888), *ad loc.* On the use and meaning of περιφραδής and related words, see notably F. Ellendt, *Lexicon Sophocleum adhibitis veterum interpretum explicationibus, grammaticorum notationibus, recentiorum doctorum commentariis* (Regismonti Prussorum: Bornträger, 1835), vol. 2, 559, and vol. 1, 228, T. Mitchell (ed.), *The Tragedies of Sophocles*, vol. II, *op. cit.*, on 348, L. Doederlein, *Homerisches Glossarium*, vol. I, (Erlangen: Enke, 1850, 313f., M. J. Smead (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (N.Y.: Appleton & Co, 1871), on 347, L. Campbell (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments*, vol. I, *op. cit.*, on 348, G. Dindorf, *Lexicon Sophocleum* (Lipsiae: Teubner, 1870), 399, H. Ebeling, *Lexicon Homericum* (Leipzig/London/Paris: Teubner/Williams & Norgate/Klincksieck, 1880), 173f., D. B. Monro, *A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1882, repr. Philadelphia: William H. Allen, 1992), 172ff., C. Capelle, E. E. Seiler, *Vollständiges Wörterbuch über die Gedichte des Homeros und der Homeriden* (Leipzig: Hahn, 1889²), 471f., M. W. Humphreys (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1891), on 348, T. W. Allen, W. R. Halliday, E. E. Sikes (ed.), *The Homeric Hymns* (London: Macmillan, 1904, Oxford/Amsterdam: Oxford University Press/Hakkert, 1963²), 337, K. von Garnier, *Die Präposition als sinnverstärkendes Präfix im Rigueta*, in den Homerischen Gedichten und in den Lustspielen des Plautus und Terenz (Leipzig: Roth & Schunke, 1906), 36, W. J. M. Starkie (ed.), *The Clouds of Aristophanes* (London: Macmillan, 1911), on 226, A. C. Pearson (ed.), *The Fragments of Sophocles* (Cambridge: University Press, 1917), on 737, vol. III, 4, J. Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen über Syntax mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Griechisch, Lateinisch und Deutsch*, vol. II (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1920, 1957), 159, V. Magnien, “Quelques mots du vocabulaire grec exprimant des opérations ou des états de l’âme”, *Revue des études grecques* 40 (1927), 117-141, in particular 135, E. Schwyzer, A. Debrunner, *Griechische Grammatik*, II Syntax und syntaktische Stilistik (München: Beck, 1950, 1988⁵), 500, J. C. F. Nuchelmans, *Die Nomina des sophokleischen Wortschatzes*. Vorarbeiten zu einer sprachlichen und stilistischen Analyse (Nijmegen: Centrale Drukkerij,

The second key word is μηχανή. This is hardly the place to discuss in any detail the semantic field of μηχανή (μηχανός, μηχανάομαι and the like). So let it suffice to say this much: a) this family of words denotes the idea of “means”, “expedient”, “contrivance” and “remedy” – of knowing how to *help oneself*, and providing either a *device for escaping a difficulty* or a *means of achieving an end* (or, as LSJ puts it: “any artificial means or contrivance for doing a thing”; b) μηχανή (μηχανός, μηχανάομαι and the like) denotes both the idea of something *clever, ingenious, crafty, resourceful or artful* (of some kind of *intellectual breakthrough*) and the ability to *implement* – that is, both *planning* and *successful execution* of a plan; in other words, this family of words

1949), 86, M. Leumann, *Homerische Wörter* (Basel: Reinhardt, 1950, repr. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993), 111, R. F. Goheen, *The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone. A Study of Poetic Language and Structure* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), 93, J. Humbert, *Syntaxe grecque*, 2^e édition, revue et augmentée (Paris: Klincksieck, 1954), § 603, O. Zumbach, *Neuerungen in der Sprache der Homerischen Hymnen* (Winterthur: Keller, 1955), 40, H. Thesleff, *Studies on Intensification in Early Classical Greek* (Societas Scientiarum Fennica, Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum XXI, 1) (Helsingfors: Centraltryckeriet, 1955), 154f., M. Treu, *Von Homer zur Lyrik. Wandlungen des griechischen Welbildes im Spiegel der Sprache* (München: Beck, 1955), 15, 45, 275, P. Joos, *ΤΥΧΗ, ΦΥΣΙΣ, ΤΕΧΝΗ*, *op. cit.*, 46, H. J. Rose, *A Commentary on the Surviving Plays of Aeschylus*, *op. cit.*, on Agamemn. 1426-7, J. Verdenius, “Semonides über die Frauen. Ein Kommentar zu Fr. 7”, *Mnemosyne* 21 (1968), 132-158, on 93, G. Müller, *Sophocles Antigone*, *op. cit.*, 91, P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots*, vol. IV-2 Φ-Ω (Paris: Klincksieck, 1974), 1223f., J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles Commentaries III The Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 344-47, M. Hofinger, *Lexicon Hesiodicum cum indice inverso*, III: Λ-Π (Leiden: Brill, 1977), *sub voce*, B. Snell, *Der Weg zum Denken und zur Wahrheit. Studien zur frühgriechischen Sprache* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 72, M. P. Bologna, “Per un’analisi descrittiva dei composti aggettivali omerici con primo elemento περι-”, *Studi e Saggi Linguistici* 20 (1980), 163-182, T. C. W. Oudemans, P. M. H. Lardinois, *Tragic Ambiguity. Anthropology, Philosophy and Sophocles' Antigone*, *op. cit.*, 128, M. Coray, *Wissen und Erkennen bei Sophokles*, *op. cit.*, 98, 132f., V. J. Mathews, *Antimachus of Colophon*, Text and Commentary (Leiden/N.Y./Köln: Brill, 1996), 120, S. Darcus Sullivan, *Sophocles' Use of Psychological Terminology: Old and New* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1999), 271, M. Griffith (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 347, C. Utzinger, *Periphrases Aner*, *op. cit.*, 23, 25, 29, 34, J. Barnouw, *Odysseus, Hero of Practical Intelligence: Deliberation and Signs in Homer's Odyssee* (Lanham/Boulder/NY/Toronto/Oxford: University Press of America, 2004), 271, R. Stefanelli, *La temperatura dell'anima: parole omeriche per l'interiorità* (Padova: Unipress, 2010), 84f., M. Ndoye, *Groupes sociaux et idéologie du travail dans les mondes homérique et hésiodique* (Besançon: Presses Universitaires de France-Comté, 2010), 44, and A. Vergados, *A Commentary on the 'Homeric Hymn to Hermes'* (Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, 2013), on 464.

On the connection between περί and ὑπέρ viz. on the pejorative sense of περίφρων, see Appendix I.

stands both for the *intellectual process* as such (for the *intellectual and cognitive breakthrough*) and for the *ability to execute according to a plan* (i.e. to the intellectual or cognitive breakthrough); the emphasis can change, so that in some cases μηχανή means something like a “bright idea”, while in other cases the word stands for “clever” or “crafty” “actions” and even for the “implements”, “instruments” or “engines” devised to achieve a certain goal; c) this family of words can convey the idea not only of “device” (of “expedient” and “remedy”, etc.), but also of “ruse”, of something “shrewd” “or sly” – i.e., of *cunning*: of *stratagems* and the like; d) the semantic field of μηχανή suggests a particular kind of *power*, which has to do with *creative inventiveness* – it is, as it were, the “*power of the powerless*” (or the particular kind of way the powerless manage to acquire power); e) μηχανή (εὐμηχανός, εὐμηχανία, ἀμηχανία) are closely associated with πόρος (εὐπορος, εὐπορία, ἀπορία), and indeed in such a way that *these terms can be used as synonyms*; and last but not least, f) this family of words can have both *positive* (or at any rate *neutral*) and not only negative, but utterly *negative* connotations, so that μηχανή, μηχανάομαι, etc., can be words “of dubious moral significance” and convey the idea of “machination”, “plot” or “deception”, and even of “criminal plotting”, of “evil devices” and the like.⁶²

⁶² On the meaning of μηχανή (μηχος, μηχανάομαι and the like) see notably J. Schweighäuser, *Lexicon Heodoteum, op. cit., sub vocibus*, G. Curtius, *Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1873⁴), 335, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments V: The Trachiniae, op. cit., on 772ff.*, A.-E. Chaignet, *Les héroes et les héroïnes d'Homère* (Paris: Hachette, 1894), 194, W. J. M. Starkie (ed.), *The Clouds of Aristophanes* (London: Macmillan, 1911), on 479, B. Snell, *Aischylos und das Handeln im Drama* (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1928), 27, W. Schmid, *Untersuchungen zum gefesselten Prometheus* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1929), 95, R. Pfeiffer, “Gottheit und Individuum in der frühgriechischen Lyrik”, *Philologus* 84 (1929), 137-152 = Idem, *Ausgewählte Schriften. Aufsätze und Vorträge zur griechischen Dichtung und zum Humanismus* (München: Beck, 1960), 42-54, K. Orinsky, “μηχανή“, in: A. Pauly, G. Wissowa (ed.), *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Band XV, Halbband 29, Mazaios-Mesyros (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1931), 10-14, F. Solmsen, “Zur Gestaltung des Intriguenmotivs in den Tragödien des Sophokles und Euripides”, *Philologus* 87 (1932) 1-17, repr. E. Schwinge (ed.), *Euripides (Wege der Forschung)* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), 326-344, W. Schmidt, O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*. 1. Teil: Die Klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur, II. Band: Die griechische Literatur in der Zeit der attischen Hegemonie vor dem Eingreifen der Sophistik (München: Beck, 1934), 218, 473, 576, O. Becker, *Das Bild des Weges und verwandte Vorstellungen im frühgriechischen Denken* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1937), 76ff., 127f., R. Pfeiffer, *Die Netzfischer des Aischylos und der Inachos des Sophokles. Zwei Satyr-Spiel-Funde* (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil. hist. Abt., Jahrgang 1938, Heft 2.) (München: Beck, 1938), 45, W. Schmidt, O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*. 1. Teil: Die Klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur, III. Band: Die griechische

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parti des femmes”, *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 17 (1984), 111-136, in particular 115, A. Corcella, “Erodoto VII, 239: Una “interpolazione d’autore”?”, *Annali della Scuola normale superiore di Pisa* (Classe di lettere e filosofia) 15 (1985, 313-491, in particular 425, A. Harder, *Euripides’ Kresphontes and Archelaos*. Introduction, Text and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 121, C. Calame, “Les figures grecques du gigantesque”, *Communications* 42 (1985), 147-172, in particular 150, 156, and 159, W. J. Verdenius, *A Commentary on Hesiod. Works and Days, vv. 1-382* (Leiden: Brill, 1985), on 49, 241, R. Bourgne, “Mechane-mechanasthai chez Platon”, *Documents pour l’histoire du vocabulaire scientifique* 8 (1986), 9-31, T. Buchheim, *Die Sophistik als Avantgarde normalen Lebens* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), 8f., 15, 60, 78f., 118f., N. Nikolau, “Hérodote VIII 6: le piège des Perses”, *Mètis. Anthropologie des mondes grecs anciens* 1 (1986), 29-36, in particular 30f., E. L. Wheeler, *Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 23f., 28f., H. Schneider, *Das griechische Technikverständnis. Von den Epen Homers bis zu den Anfängen der technologischen Fachliteratur* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), 217ff., A. Sommerstein (ed.), *Aeschylus Eumenides* (Cambridge/N.Y./Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1989), on 82, 381 and 646, B. E. Goff, *The Noose of Words. Readings of Desire & Language in Euripides’ Hippolytos* (Cambridge/N.Y./Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 65f., J. Bollack, *L’Oedipe roi de Sophocle. Le texte et ses interprétations. Commentaire. Première Partie* (Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1990), on 387-389, S. Byl, “Le stéréotype de la femme athénienne dans Lysistrata”, *Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire* 69 (1991), 33-43, in particular 41f., B. Marzullo, *I sofismi di Prometeo* (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1993), 223ff., 334ff., 351ff., M. Coray, *Wissen und Erkennen bei Sophokles, op. cit.*, 98ff., A. Kélessidou, “L’homme «sans industrie et sans art» (Politique 274c): l’idée platonicienne de la sôtèrias méchanè: préprométhéisme et humanisme philosophique selon Platon”, *Revue de philosophie ancienne* 11 (1993), 79-87, P. Judet de la Colombe, Antigone 361-364, in: A. Machin, L. Pernée (ed.), *Sophocle. Le texte et les personnages* (Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l’Université de Provence, 1993), 133-140, in particular 134f., R. Bees, *Zur Datierung des Prometheus Desmotes* (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1993), 98ff., M. Meulder, “La métis du tyran ou l’aporie d’un pouvoir malin (Platon, Rép., VIII, 565 d - 579 e)”, *L’antiquité classique* 63 (1994), 45-63, in particular 47, B. Marzullo, “Sofisti o matematici?”, in: R. M. Aguilar, M. López Salvá, I. Rodríguez Alfageme (ed.), *ΧΑΡΙΣ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑΣ. Studia in honorem Ludovici Aegidii* (Madrid: Ed. de la Universidad Complutense, 1994), 519-527, N. Dunbar (ed.), *Aristophanes Birds* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), on 363, S. Douglas Olson (ed.), *Aristophanes Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), on 306-8, 621-2, 788-91, S. R. Slings (ed.), *Plato Clitophon* (Cambridge: University Press, 1999), 89, M. Griffith (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone, op. cit.*, on 365-7, I. Pimouguet-Pedarras, “L’apparition des premiers engins balistiques dans le monde grec et hellénisé: un état de la question”, *Revue des Études Anciennes* 102 (2000), 5-26, in particular 16, M. L. Gatti, “Lo specchio e la Sfinge: l’«espediente» («mechané») che «fa avanzare molto» nell’indagine sui nomi, senza «cercare troppo l’esattezza» in Cratilo, 414B-415A, e nella strategia comunicativa del «Cratilo» di Platone”, *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 94 (2002), 3-44, S. Douglas Olson (ed.), *Aristophanes Acharnians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), on 391-2, D. J. Mastronarde (ed.), *Euripides Medea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2002, 14, C. Austin, S. Douglas Olson

The third key word is φρόνημα.⁶³ It should be borne in mind that φρόνημα suggests more than the idea of *cognitive* or *intellectual* activity (or its “*products*”). On the one hand, this word can mean both “one’s mind” (“disposition of spirit”, “mentality” and the like) and the result of the working of one’s mind (“thought”, “purpose”, “counsel”, etc). On the other hand, φρόνημα can be used a) in a *neutral* sense, but it can also be used either b) with a *positive* connotation (“resolution”, “spirit”, “resolve”), or c) in a *pejorative* sense (“presumption”, “pride”, “arrogance”, “proud or arrogant thought”, “presumptuous imagination”, etc.). Given the context, it is probable that the Theban elders are speaking of “far-reaching thoughts” and the like. But it is also very likely that they are suggesting the idea of *resolve*, *ambition*, etc. But it is hard to tell whether they want the word to be understood in a neutral, in a positive or in a pejorative sense.⁶⁴

(ed.), *Aristophanes Thesmophoriazusae* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), on 87 and 1130-32, A. Hollmann, *The Master of Signs: Signs and the Interpretation of Signs in Herodotus’ Histories* (Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2011), 211ff., A. Vergados (ed.), *A Commentary on the ‘Homeric Hymn to Hermes’* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), on 319 and 436.

⁶³ 355.

⁶⁴ On the meaning of this word (and its use in the *Antigone*), see notably T. Mitchell (ed.), *The Tragedies of Sophocles with Notes, Critical and Explanatory*, vol. II, *op. cit.*, on 355, J. W. Donaldson (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (London: Parker, 1848), on 352f., M. J. Smead, *The Antigone of Sophocles*, *op. cit.*, on 352, J. H. H. Schmidt, *Synonymik der Griechischen Sprache*, III (Leipzig: Teubner, 1879), 638, L. Campbell (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments*, vol. I, *op. cit.*, on Antig. 354, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 167ff., 176, T. G. Tucker (ed.), *The ‘Supplices’ of Aeschylus* (London: Macmillan, 1889), on 87-90 and 897, A. W. Verrall (ed.), *The ‘Agamemnon’ of Aeschylus* (London: Macmillan, 1889), on 739 and 821, M. W. Humphreys (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1891), on 353f., A. W. Verrall (ed.), *The ‘Eumenides’ of Aeschylus* (London: Macmillan, 1908), on 480-482, E. Bruhn (ed.), *Sophokles erkl.* v. F. W. Schneidewin u. A. Nauck, IV *Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 353, C. Knapp, “A Point in the Interpretation of the Antigone”, *American Journal of Philology* 37 (1916) 300-1, A. Schuurisma, *De Poetica Vocabulorum Abusione apud Aeschylum* (Amsterdam, H. J. Paris, 1932), 63, 119f., E. Fraenkel (ed.), *Aeschylus Agamemnon*, vol. II, *Commentary on 1-1055* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950, repr. 1957), on 739, J. D. Denniston, D. Page (ed.), *Aeschylus Agamemnon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), on 739-40, C. P. Segal, “Sophocles’ Praise of Man and the Conflicts of the ‘Antigone’”, *Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics* 3 (1964), 46-66, in particular 53, 55, = *Idem, Sacred Transgressions. A Reading of Sophocles’ Antigone* (South Bend, Ind: St Augustine’s Press, 1999), 17, 23, 25, G. Müller, *Sophokles Antigone*, *op. cit.*, 65, 121, A. A. Long, *Language and Thought in Sophocles. A Study of Abstract Nouns and Poetic Technique* (London: The Athlone Press, 1968), 38, 53, 83, 91, 108, P. Huart, *Le vocabulaire de l’analyse psychologique dans l’oeuvre de Thucydide*, *op. cit.*, 469, P. Huart, *ΓΝΩΜΗ chez Thucydide et ses contemporains* (Sophocle. Euripide. Antiphon. Andocide.

However, we must not forget the *epithet* – for the Theban elders speak of an ἀνεμόεν φρόνημα. In their eyes the thought they are referring to is “windy” or “windlike”. But the problem is that the epithet is anything but unequivocal. Does it really mean “windy” or “windlike”? Or is it rather that the chorus is stressing the similarity between thought and *air* viz. between thought and *breath*?⁶⁵ And if *wind* is really what the Theban elders have in mind, what wind-related meaning of ἀνεμόεις is at stake here? This adjective can be used either in an *active* sense⁶⁶ or *passively*.⁶⁷ But since the literal sense is excluded, what is the *tertium comparationis*? The most plausible candidate seems to be *quickness* or *swiftness*: the speed of thought (the fact that thought is wind-swift).⁶⁸ In other words, the Theban elders seem to be

Aristophane) (Paris: Klincksieck, 1973), 20, 35, 39, 49, 92, 94, 98f., 109, 117, 133, 138, 144, 146, J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles Commentaries* III The Antigone, *op. cit.*, on 176, 207-8, 458-60, H. Friis Johansen, E. W. Whittle (ed.), *Aeschylus The Suppliants*, vol. II, 1980, on 101, vol. III, 1980, on 911, G. R. Bonadeo, “Il primo stasimo dell’Antigone: La struttura, il lessico”, *op. cit.*, 41, A. F. Garvie (ed.), *Aeschylus Choephoroi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), on 324-6, 594-5, E. L. Wheeler, *Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery*, *op. cit.*, 36, A. H. Sommerstein (ed.), *Eumenides* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), on 476-9, R. Padel, *In and Out of the Mind. Greek Images of the Tragic Self* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 110, M. Coray, *Wissen und Erkennen bei Sophokles*, *op. cit.*, 197f., 273, 279, 423, and S. Darcus Sullivan, *Sophocles’ Use of Psychological Terminology: Old and New*, *op. cit.*, 165, 268, S. Darcus Sullivan, *Aeschylus’ Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New* (Montreal & Kingston/London/Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997), 91, 224, M. Griffith, (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 353-4 and 458-60, S. Douglas Olson (ed.), *Aristophanes Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), on 25-6, C. Utzinger, *Periphrades Aner*, *op. cit.*, 33f., 64, 229, D. Susannetti (ed.), *Sofocle: Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 175-177, 322, and D. Cairns, *Sophocles: Antigone*, *op. cit.*, 60f.

⁶⁵ Cf. M. J. Smead (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles*, *op. cit.*, on 352, A. Boeckh (ed.), *Des Sophokles Antigone* Griechisch und Deutsch (Berlin: Veit & Co, 1843), 236 and K. Reinhardt (ed.), *Sophokles Antigone* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 19826), 43 (“der Gedanken luftigen Hauch”).

⁶⁶ “Windlike” i. e. in some way “behaving like the wind”.

⁶⁷ I. e., “exposed to the winds”, “hit by the wind”, “windswept”, “windblown”. See, for example, Homer, *Ilias*, 3.305, 8.499, 12.115, 13.724, 18.174, 23.64 and 297, *Odyseea*, 9.400, 16.365, 19.432, *Hymn. Homer. In Venerem*, 291, *Fragmenta Hymni in Bacchum*, 1, Antimachus Eleg. – B. Wyss (ed.), *Antimachi Colophonii reliquiae* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1936), Fr. 2.

⁶⁸ Cf. C. G. A. Erfurdt (ed.), *Sophoclis Tragoediae Septem ac desperditarum fragmenta*, Vol. IV, Antigona (Lipsiae: Fleischer 1806), on 352 (“ἀνεμόεν φρόνημα non sublimem rerum scientiam, sed celeritatem consilii significare videtur”), T. F. Benedict, *Observationes in Sophoclis septem tragoediis* (Lipsiae: In Libraria Weidmann, 1820), 115 (“de mentis eiusque consiliorum celeritate”), A. Witzschel (ed.), *Sophokles Antigone* mit kurzen teutschen Anmerkungen von G. C. W. Schneider (Leipzig: Geuther, 1844²), on 354,

resorting to the time-honoured *topos of wind-swift thought* – viz. of wind-swift *vóoc, νόημα* and the like. This *topos* is as old as Homer.⁶⁹ And as a matter of fact, the comparison *goes both ways*: thought is compared with wind and *vice versa*. The most common version of this *topos* emphasizes the idea of *thought-like speed*. The Theban elders go the other way around and seem to speak of *wind-like thought*. But there is another very plausible candidate for the *tertium comparationis*, namely *strength, impetuosity, strenuousness, fierceness*.⁷⁰ For winds are the very paragon of all this. And

(“windschnell”), L. Campbell (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments*, vol. I, *op. cit.*, on 354, M. L. D’Ooge (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone* (Boston: Ginn & Co, 1884), on 354, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone*, *op. cit.*, 354, M. A. Bayfield (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophokles*, *op. cit.*, on 354ff., E. Bruhn (ed.), *Sophokles erkl. v. F. W. Schneidewin u. A. Nauck*, IV Antigone, *op. cit.*, on 353 (“windschnell”), G. Wolff, L. Bellermann (ed.), *Sophokles, vol. III, Antigone* (Leipzig: Teuber, 1878³), on 354, W. Schadewaldt (ed.), *Sophokles. Tragödien*, *op. cit.*, 81, G. Müller, *Sophokles Antigone*, *op. cit.*, 93, M. Griffith, (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 353-4, A. Brown (ed.), *Sophocles: Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 354, G. A. Staley, “The Literary Ancestry of Sophocles’ ‘Ode to Man’”, *The Classical World* 78 (1985), 561-570, in particular 567, T. C. W. Oudemans, P. M. H. Lardinois, *Tragic Ambiguity*, *op. cit.*, 120, 128, S. Darcus Sullivan, *Sophocles’ Use of Psychological Terminology: Old and New* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press 1999), 268, C. Utzinger, *Periphrades Aner*, *op. cit.*, 24, D. Susanetti (ed.), *Sofocle: Antigone*, *op. cit.*, 83, D. Cairns, *Sophocles: Antigone*, *op. cit.*, 60.

⁶⁹ Cf. notably Homer, *Ilias* 15.80-83, *Odyssea* 7.36, *Hymn. Homer. in Appolinem*, 186, 448, *Hymn. Homer. in Mercurium* 43f., Hesiod, *Scutum*, 222, Theognis, *Elegiae*, 985. See also A. Hoppe, *De comparationum et metaphorarum apud tragicos Graecos usu* (Berlin: Jahncke, 1859), 9ff., in particular 20, T. Hudson-Williams (ed.), *The Elegies of Theognis* (London: Bell & Sons, 1910), on 985, T. W. Allen, W. R. Halliday, E. E. Sikes (ed.), *The Homeric Hymns* (Oxford/Amsterdam: Oxford University Press/Hakkert, 1963²), on in *Mercurium* 43, B. A. van Groningen (ed.), *Theognis*, Le premier livre édité avec un commentaire (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1966), on 985, O. Longo, *Commento linguistico alle Trachinie di Sofocle* (Padova: Antenore, 1968), on 953-5, R. Kassel, “Zum euripideischen Kyklops”, *Maia* 25 (1973) 99-106, in particular 100, R. Seaford (ed.), *Euripides, Cyclops* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), on 44, M. Davies (ed.), *Sophocles Trachiniae* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), on 953, R. Padel, *In and Out of the Mind. Greek Images of the Tragic Self* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 96, and A. Vergados (ed.), *A Commentary on the ‘Homeric Hymn to Hermes’* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), on 43.

⁷⁰ Cf. R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments II: The Oedipus Coloneus* (Cambridge: University Press, 1885), on 1081, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments V: The Trachiniae* (Cambridge: University Press, 1892), on 953f., J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles. Commentaries*, VII, The Oedipus Coloneus (Leiden: Brill, 1984), on 1081-1084, P. E. Easterling (ed.), *Sophocles Trachiniae* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), on 953-5, E. van Nes Ditmars, *Sophocles’ Antigone: Lyric Shape and Meaning* (Pisa: Giardini Editori, 1992), 58.

the power of thought (and for that matter, of pride, etc.) might be described as very *strong, gusty, impetuous, fierce* – as *sweeping all resistance before it*, etc., just like a stormy wind. In short, it is by no means unlikely that the Theban elders are speaking of the “hurricane” of thought (viz. of the “hurricane” of pride, ambition and haughtiness, etc.). Finally, it is also possible that the comparison takes into account the *nimbleness* of thought viz. the fact that it is *free* (as free as the wind: that it “goes its own ways”, etc.)⁷¹

It cannot be excluded, however, that *ἀνεμόεν* stands for the idea of something *very high*, either in the literal⁷² or in the figurative sense.⁷³ Jebb claims that the word can be said only of high places (in the literal sense).⁷⁴ But Müller has a point when he contends that nothing prevented Sophocles from using it to express a “moral” (or “psychological”) quality.⁷⁵ If this is true, *ἀνεμόεν* might express a) “the heights to which man’s intelligence reaches”⁷⁶ or b) the heights to which human “pride, ambition and haughtiness” reach – in which case it means something like “lofty”, “high-flying”, “high-flown”, “high-soaring”.

Another important aspect is the fact that most of these possible shades of meaning can have either a *positive* or a *negative* connotation. What is more,

⁷¹ Cf. M. W. Humphreys (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles, op. cit.*, on 353f., L. Campbell (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments*, vol. I, *op. cit.*, on 354 and F. H. Bos, *Studia sophoclea* (Lugduni Batavorum: van Nifterik, 1898), 52: “Cogitationis celeritatem poeta indicare voluisse videtur *et facultatem qua mentem inter cogitandum ad varias res convertimus*” (emphasis added).

⁷² Cf. J. W. Donaldson (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles in Greek and English* (London: J. W. Parker, 1848), on 352: “up in the air”

⁷³ See, for example, T. F. Benedict, *Observationes in Sophoclis septem tragoediis* (Lipsiae: Weidmann, 1820), 115f., A. Hoppe, *De comparationum et metaphorarum apud tragicos Graecos usu, op. cit.*, 20 (“sublimia cogitandi facultas” – “ita tamen ut in regionem quamdam a natura sibi non permissam se attollere dicantur homines”) and F. H. M. Blydes, *Spicilegium Sophocleum Commentarium perpetuum in septem Sophoclis fabulas continens* (Halis Saxonum: in Orphanotrophei Libraria, 1903), on Antig. 354, pp. 59-60 (“sublime”).

⁷⁴ R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone, op. cit.*, on

⁷⁵ G. Müller, *Sophokles Antigone, op. cit.*, 95. The use of *ἀνεμόεν* in Pindar’s *Pythica* 1, 91 (ἐξίει δ’ ὄσπερ κυβερνήταξ ἀνήρ ἰστίον ἀνεμόεν) may have played a role in this regard. Pindar speaks of one’s sail filled or inflated with wind. And it is only a small step from the idea of “having the wind in one’s sail” to the idea of self-confident and arrogant ambition (of “being full of oneself”, “thinking highly of oneself” and the like). Cf. K. H. Kaiser, *Das Bild des Steuermannes in der antiken Literatur* (Diss. Erlangen, 1954), 34f. and J. Péron, *Les images maritimes de Pindare* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1974), 51.

⁷⁶ G. A. Staley, “The Literary Ancestry of Sophocles’ ‘Ode to Man’”, *The Classical World* 78 (1985), 561-570, in particular 567. Cf. M. L. D’Ooge (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone* (Boston, Ginn & Co, 1884), on 354.

there is a possible connection between the semantic ambiguity of *ἀνεμόεν* and the above-mentioned ambivalence of *φρόνημα*.⁷⁷ The *negative* sense of the former could be related to the *negative sense* of the latter. However, it should be borne in mind that what we are dealing with here is not necessarily an “either/or”: either this or that shade of meaning, either a) *positive φρόνημα* + *positive ἀνεμόεν*, or b) *negative φρόνημα* + *negative ἀνεμόεν*. In this case, too, there is room for *conjunction* viz. for a *conflation of various meanings*: *φρόνημα*/thought can be at the same time swift and lofty (viz. high-soaring), etc.; and *φρόνημα*/pride can be at the same time swift and lofty (viz. high-soaring), etc. In short, we can mimic Sophocles’ compressed form of expression and say: “thought/pride can be swift/lofty (viz. high-soaring), etc.”.

Last but not least, it should be noted that *ἀνεμόεν* might also express the fact that *φρόνημα* (man’s thought – but also man’s pride and arrogance) is something rather *unsubstantial*,⁷⁸ both in a pejorative sense (it is unstable, changeable, fleeting, etc.) and in the sense that it is *intangible* and *invisible* (with stress on the fact that, as Brown puts it, *φρόνημα* is “very powerful though invisible”).⁷⁹

The fourth key word is *ἐδίδαξατο*.⁸⁰ As mentioned before, Jebb claims that it is equivalent to *ἑαυτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐδίδαξε*.⁸¹ The translation should therefore be: “he taught himself”. As a matter of fact, this line of interpretation – and the paraphrase “*αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐδίδαξε*” – can already be found in the *Prodromus* of Korais’ *Greek Library*,⁸² which is already cited by Erfurdt.⁸³ Dindorf translates “*se docuit i.e. suoapte ingenio didicit*”.⁸⁴ Schneidewin fol-

⁷⁷ Incidentally both *φρόνημα* and *ἀνεμόεν* have their counterpart in the the first stasimon of Aeschylus’ *Choephoroi* (591 and 594-5), where both words are rather *negatively* connotated.

⁷⁸ D. Cairns, *Sophocles: Antigone, op. cit.*, 60.

⁷⁹ A. Brown (ed.), *Sophocles: Antigone, op. cit.*, on 354. Hoppe, *loc. cit.*, highlights the connection between the different shades of meaning. And he hits the mark when he writes: “*Aptissimum vero ἀνεμόεν diximus, nam si epitheton cogitationi apponendum poeta quaerebat, unde, cum e rerum natura similitudinem desumere vellet, aptius potuit, quam ab auris, quibus nec levius nec mobilius nec subtilius quidquam homines noverint?*”

⁸⁰ 356.

⁸¹ R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone, op. cit.*, on 356.

⁸² A. Κοραΐς, *Πρόδρομος Ελληνικής Βιβλιοθήκης* (Εν Παρισίσις: Εκ της Τυπογραφίας Φ. Διδότου, 1805), 36.

⁸³ C. G. A. Erfurdt (ed.), *Sophoclis Tragoediae Septem ac desperditarum fragmenta*, Vol. IV, *Antigona* (Lipsiae: Fleischer 1806), on 354.

⁸⁴ C. W. Dindorf, *Ad Sophoclis tragœdias annotationes* (Oxonii: Typogr. Academicum, 1836), on 356.

lows in his footsteps and translates: “suopte sibi ingenio didicit”.⁸⁵ Campbell offers a similar translation: “he taught himself”⁸⁶ – and so do Bruhn (“er lehrte sich dies”),⁸⁷ Mette (“gewann er sich ab”),⁸⁸ Schadewaldt (“bracht er sich bei”),⁸⁹ Kamerbeek,⁹⁰ Moorhouse,⁹¹ Segal and Griffith (“he taught himself ‘or ‘they taught one another’”), Jouanna and Leclerc (“s’est enseigné à lui-même”)⁹², Susanetti (“ha insegnato a sé stesso”)⁹³ – to name but a few. There is, of course, a grammatical problem with this line of interpretation. Jebb admits a) that he can find “no parallel for the use of the aor. midd. here” and also b) that “it is rare for any midd. form, without a reflexive pron., to denote that the subject acts *on* (and not for) himself”.⁹⁴ The problem is the so-called *directly reflexive* medium – or to be more precise the transitive use of the directly reflexive medium *without a reflexive pronomen*. This kind of construction is not absolutely unheard of. But it is very rare – and even more so given the fact that the verb in question here (namely διδάσκειν) is neither a verb of bodily activity (of “natural and habitual actions”)⁹⁵ nor a *verbum affectuum* – in which case the construction would be relatively more common.⁹⁶ Campbell offers a list of instances of a “pointedly reflexive” middle

⁸⁵ F. W. Schneidewin (ed.), *Sophokles IV, Antigone* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1856³), on 355.

⁸⁶ L. Campbell (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments*, vol. I, on Antig. 356.

⁸⁷ E. Bruhn (ed.), *Sophokles* erkl. v. F. W. Schneidewin u. A. Nauck, IV Antigone, *op. cit.*, on 354.

⁸⁸ H. J. Mette, “Die Antigone des Sophokles”, *Hermes* 84 (1956), 129-134 = Idem, *Kleine Schriften*, ed. A. Mette, B. Seidensticker (Frankfurt a. M.: Athenäum, 1988), 111-134, in particular 133.

⁸⁹ W. Schadewaldt (ed.), *Sophokles. Tragödien* (Zürich/Stuttgart: Artemis, 1968), 81. Cf. K. Reinhardt (ed.), *Sophokles Antigone* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982⁶), 43.

⁹⁰ J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles Commentaries III The Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 354-60. Cf. H. Gundert, “Größe und Gefährdung des Menschen”, 11 and 25.

⁹¹ A. C. Moorhouse, *The Syntax of Sophocles* (Leiden: Brill, 1982), 178

⁹² J. Jouanna, *Hippocrate* (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 336 and M.-C. Leclerc, “La résistible ascension du progrès humain chez Eschyle et Sophocle”, *Revue des études grecques* 107 (1994), 68-84, in particular 78.

⁹³ D. Susanetti (ed.), *Sofocle: Antigone*, *op. cit.*, 83, and on 355-356 (“ha apreso da sé stesso”, “ha imparato per sé”).

⁹⁴ R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone*, on 356.

⁹⁵ A so-called verb of “grooming or body care”.

⁹⁶ Cf. F. E. Thompson, *A Syntax of Attic Greek* (London: Rivington, 1873), 124ff., B. L. Gildersleeve, *Syntax of Classical Greek. From Homer to Demosthenes* (N.Y.: American Book Co., 1900), §146, and also W. W. Goodwin, *A Greek Grammar* (London: Macmillan, 1879), 267, J. M. Stahl, *Kritisch-historische Syntax des griechischen Verbums* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1907), 48ff., H. W. Smyth, *A Greek Grammar for Colleges* (N.Y./Cincinnati/Chicago/Boston/Atlanta: American Book Co., 1920), 390f., O. Riemann, C. Cucuel, *Règles fondamentales de la syntaxe grecque d’après l’ouvrage de Albert von Bamberg* (Paris:

voice.⁹⁷ But the problem remains. On the one hand, “he taught himself” seems to be the only possible understanding of ἐδιδάξατο. On the other hand, there is no ultimate clarity on the grammatical issues so far. Are the parallel passages conclusive? If they are not, is ἐδιδάξατο to be understood as a further case of “poetic license” in choral lyric? Are the grammatical rules on the so-called direct reflexive middle too rigid and sweeping?⁹⁸ Or are there other ways of understanding Sophocles’ syntax?⁹⁹

Klincksieck, 1948⁵), 99ff., E. Schwyzer, A. Debrunner, *Griechische Grammatik*, II Syntax und syntaktische Stilistik (München: Beck, 1950, 1988⁵), 228f., A. C. Moorhouse, *op. cit.*, 178., A. Rijksbaron, *The Syntax and Semantics of the Verb in Classical Greek*. An Introduction (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1984, repr. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002³), 144ff., S. Kemmer, *The Middle Voice* (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: J. Benjamins Publ. Co., 1993), 16ff., R. J. Allan, *The Middle Voice in Ancient Greek*. A Study in Polysemy (Diss. Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2002), 64ff.

⁹⁷ See his “Introductory Essay on the Language of Sophocles,” § 31, 52f., and also Moorhouse, 178.

⁹⁸ See for instance J. Humbert, *Syntaxe grecque* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1954²), §§ 165ff. For the discussion of the grammatical question concerning the use of the middle as reflexive (and how it should be interpreted), in addition to the studies mentioned in note 95 see G. Bernhardt, *Wissenschaftliche Syntax der griechischen Sprache* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1829), 344ff., T. Mitchell (ed.), *The Tragedies of Sophocles with Notes, Critical and Explanatory*, vol. II, *op. cit.*, on 356, F. H. M. Blaydes, *Sophocles with English Notes*, Vol. 1 (London: Whittaker&Co./G. Bell, 1859), on Antig. 360, L. Campbell (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments*, vol. I, *op. cit.*, 52, M. W. Humphreys (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1891), on 355ff., R. C. Jebb (ed.), *loc. cit.*, M. A. Bayfield, *The Antigone of Sophocles* (London: Macmillan, 1901), on 354ff., G. Müller, *Sophocles Antigone*, *op. cit.*, P. Joos, *ΤΥΧΗ, ΦΥΣΙΣ, ΤΕΧΝΗ*, *op. cit.*, 48, H. W. Smyth, G. M. Messing, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), §§ 1717f., P. J. Schrijvers, “La pensée de Lucrèce sur l’origine du langage”, *Mnemosyne* 27 (1974), 337-364, in particular 358-359, J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles Commentaries III The Antigone*, on 354-60, A. C. Moorhouse, *The Syntax of Sophocles*, *op. cit.*, 178, M.-C. Leclerc, “La résistible ascension du progrès humain chez Eschyle et Sophocle”, *Revue des études grecques* 107 (1994), 68-84, in particular 78, M. Griffith (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone*, on 355, D. L. Gera, *Ancient Greek Ideas on Speech, Language and Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 146, R. J. Allan, *The Middle Voice in Ancient Greek: A Study in Polysemy* (Amsterdam: Gieben, 2003), 90ff., 115f., C. Utzinger, *Periphrases Aner*, 24, R. Allan, “Sophocles’ Voice. Active, Middle, and Passive in the Plays of Sophocles”, in: I. J. F. de Jong, A. Rijksbaron (ed.), *Sophocles and the Greek Language: Aspects of Diction, Syntax and Pragmatics* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2006), 111-126, in particular 120ff.

⁹⁹ Matthiä, for instance, takes ἐδιδάξατο to be a case of *middle for passive*: “Soph. Antig. 354 καὶ φθέγμα καὶ ἠνεμόεν φρόνημα καὶ ἀστυνόμους ὀργὰς ἐδιδάξατο, wo nach dem gewöhnlichen Sprachgebrauche ἐδιδάχθη stehen sollte. Aber ἐδιδάχθη heißt, er lernte von anderen passive, ἐδιδάξατο, er lernte durch eigene Thätigkeit.” Cf. A. Matthiä,

As for the meaning of ἐδιδάξατο, the point seems to be that man taught himself – or, as Mitchel puts it, that he “*learned by his own agency*”.¹⁰⁰ For some interpreters Sophocles’ words have a mainly *collective* and *reciprocal* meaning: “mankind have taught one another”.¹⁰¹ In principle, there is nothing wrong with this. But this collective and reciprocal shade of meaning should not make us forget something else, namely that ἐδιδάξατο also refers to the *origin* of the “cognitive conquests” in question. The point does not seem to be just the *transmission* of cognitive skills (that human beings “teach one another”), but also the *original acquisition* of the said skills (how they were *initially* acquired) – and the fact that man is the sole author of his own cognitive performance. In other words, the Theban elders highlight the fact that the cognitive skills in question were learned “by man’s own agency” in the sense that they are entirely *self-taught*: he learned them *all by himself*. This seems to be the main point. We can also express this by saying that the human race was at the same time *the teacher and the pupil*. And this holds true for *each and every* cognitive skill: in each case, somewhere along the line someone must have been *his own pupil-teacher*. And hence the ancient scholiasts were not far from the truth when they interpreted ἐδιδάξατο as “discovered or invented” (ἐφεῦρεν).¹⁰²

The fifth key word is *ξυμπέφρασται*.¹⁰³ Two preliminary remarks should be made. First, as Matthiä, R. Major and Jebb observe, the verb is used as a

Ausführliche Griechische Grammatik, II.Theil (Leipzig: Vogel, 1827²), § 496.8, p. 936.

¹⁰⁰ T. Mitchell (ed.), *The Tragedies of Sophocles*. With Notes, Critical and Explanatory, vol. II (Oxford/London/Cambridge: Parker/Whittaker & Co/Deighton, 1844), on 356.

¹⁰¹ M. J. Smead (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (N.Y.: Appleton & Co, 1871), on 355. Cf. G. Wolff, L. Bellermand (ed.), *Sophokles, vol. III, Antigone*, (Leipzig: Teuber, 1878³), on 356 (“lehrte unter sich d. h. jeder lehrte den andern, durch gegenseitige Einwirkung und Lehre ward die bezeichnete geistige Höhe erreicht”) and W. Schmid, “Probleme der sophokleischen Antigone”, *Philologus* 62 (1903), 1-34, in particular 14f.: “In dem Medium ἐδιδάξατο liegt eben dann derselbe Begriff wie in der Präposition von *ξυμπέφρασται* v.364 (vgl. *συνθηρᾶσθαι* = *viribus cunctis venari* v. 432) – der Begriff der Reciprocität, der gemeinsamen Arbeit am Kulturfortschritt – einer lehrt den andern, alle sinnen gemeinsam nach.” E. Bruhn (ed.), *Sophokles erkl. v. F. W. Schneidewin u. A. Nauck*, IV Antigone (Berlin: Weidmann, 1913), on 354, writes: “ἐδιδάξατο wird direktes Medium sein müssen: er lehrte sich dies. Der Erfinder und der Lernende sind ja beide Angehörige der Gattung Mensch.”

¹⁰² See notably *Scholia Graeca in Sophoclem ex editione Brunckiana* (Oxonii: e Tipographæo Clarendoniano, 1810), on Antig. 360, p. 236, and on Antig. 362, p. 417-418: “(...) νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐφεῦρε καὶ ἐδίδαξε κείται”. Cf. A. Boeckh (ed.), *Des Sophokles Antigone* Griechisch und Deutsch (Berlin: Veit & Co, 1843), 235: “Und der Mensch *erfand sich* die Sprache (...)”, emphasis added.

¹⁰³ 364.

perfect middle.¹⁰⁴ Secondly, it is important to bear in mind that the verb is in the *perfect tense*. As Kamerbeek points out, “the perfect emphasizes the fact that such remedies” – the object of *ξυμπέφρασται* – *exist*”.¹⁰⁵ In this passage *συμφράζομαι* means something like “to contrive” (Jebb’s and Brown’s translation) or “to devise”.¹⁰⁶ And Campbell translates: “he hath gathered to him by his thought (...)”. As for the verbal prefix (*συν-*), Kamerbeek takes the

¹⁰⁴ Cf. J. R. Major (ed.), *The Hecuba of Euripides* (London: Longmann, Orme, Brown, Green & Longmans, 1840), on 544, A. Matthiä, *Ausführliche Griechische Grammatik, op. cit.*, § 493, and R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone*, on 363f. See also T. Mitchell (ed.), *The Tragedies of Sophocles*, vol. II, on 363, and M. J. Smead (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles*, on 364.

¹⁰⁵ See J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles Commentaries III The Antigone*, on 361-364.

¹⁰⁶ German translators resort to verbs like “überdenken” (Hölderlin), “ersinnen” (Bruhn) or “bedenken” and “erwägen” (“hat er bei sich bedacht, erwogen” – Schneider). On the meaning of the verb, see notably P. Elmsley (ed.), *Scholia in Sophoclis tragoedias: e codice ms. laurentiano*, Vol. I (Lipsiae: Hartmann, 1826), 89 (“ἐπινηνόηκεν καὶ γινώσκει”), G. C. W. Schneider, *Sophokles Tragödien*, vol. VII: *Antigone* (Leipzig: Geuther, 1844), on 363, F. Ellendt, *Lexicon Sophocleum*, vol. 2, 192, G. Dindorf, *Lexicon Sophocleum*, 457, A. Fulda, *Untersuchungen über die Sprache der Homerischen Gedichte*, 1: *Der pleonastische Gebrauch von ΘΥΜΟΣ, ΦΡΗΝ und ähnlichen Wörtern* (Duisburg: Falk & Volmer, 1865), 127ff., 313, H. Ebeling, *Lexicon Homericum, op. cit.*, 302f., 445f., C. Capelle, E. E. Seiler, *Vollständiges Wörterbuch über die Gedichte des Homeros und der Homeriden* (Leipzig: Hahn, 1889²), 527, 582f., M. W. Humphreys (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1891), on 364, M. Bréal, “Les verbes signifiant «parler»”, *Revue des Études Grecques* 14 (1901), 113-121, in particular 118f., E. Bruhn (ed.), *Sophokles erkl. v. F. W. Schneidewin u. A. Nauck*, IV *Antigone* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1913), on 363, V. Magnien, “Quelques mots du vocabulaire grec exprimant des opérations ou des états de l’âme”, *Revue des Études Grecques* 40 (1927), 117-141, in particular 135, J.-P. Vernant, M. Détienne, “La mêtis d’Antiloque”, *Revue des Études Grecques* 80 (1967), 68-83, in particular 69, 76, M. Hofinger, *Lexicon Hesiodicum cum indice inverso*, IV: P–Ω (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 605, A. Cheyns, “Le θυμός et la conception de l’homme dans l’épopée homérique”, *Revue belge de Philologie et d’Histoire* 61 (1983), 20-86, in particular 32, S. Darcus Sullivan, *Psychological Activity in Homer. A Study of Phren* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988), 91, S. Darcus Sullivan, *Sophocles’ Use of Psychological Terminology: Old and New*, 269, J. Svenbro, *Phrasikleia. An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 13ff., D. T. Steiner, *The Tyrant’s Writ. Myths and Images of Writing in Ancient Greece* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 116ff., R. B. Cebrán, *Die Verben des Denkens bei Homer* (Innsbruck: Verlag des Instituts für Sprachwissenschaft, 1996), 109ff., J. Barnouw, *Odysseus, Hero of Practical Intelligence: Deliberation and Signs in Homer’s Odyssey* (Lanham/Boulder/NY/Toronto/Oxford: University Press of America, 2004), 271, and R. Stefanelli, *La temperatura dell’anima: parole omeriche per l’interiorità* (Padova: Unipress, 2010), 78f., 81ff., 85ff., 89ff., 93ff.

view that it is “a case of συν- in the function of con- in e. g. conficio (...)”.¹⁰⁷ His point seems to be that, as Ernout and Meillet put it, the prefix “con-“ (and in this case “συν-“) denotes “l’aspect déterminé: achever”, so that it has a “perfective” meaning.¹⁰⁸ Bruhn takes a similar line: “σύν bezeichnet die Vollendung wie in συννοεῖν.”¹⁰⁹ G. Müller emphasizes the fact that the preverb may suggest either “consultation with others” (*Beratung mit anderen*) or a consultation or conversation with one’s Thumos (*Beratung mit dem eigenen Thumos*), i. e., a “consultation with oneself” (some kind of “thinking to oneself” process).¹¹⁰

The sixth key word or rather expression is σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ’ ἔχων.¹¹¹

Bayfield renders these lines as follows: “Possessed of his gift of ingenious skill, cunning beyond imagination (...) Lit[erally], having this inventiveness (inventive quality) of his skill as a gift (τι, a something) cunning beyond expectation”¹¹² L. Campbell translates: “His power of artful contriv-

¹⁰⁷ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁸ Cf. A. Ernout, A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la Langue Latine*. Histoire des mots (Paris: Klincksieck, 1985⁴), 211, J. H. H. Schmidt, *Handbuch der Lateinischen und Griechischen Synonymik*, 413, K. von Garnier, *Die Präposition als sinnverstärkendes Präfix*, 41ff., as well as M. Leumann, *Homerische Wörter* (Basel: Reinhardt, 1950, repr. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993), 74f.

¹⁰⁹ E. Bruhn (ed.), *Sophokles erkl. v. F. W. Schneidewin u. A. Nauck*, IV Antigone, on 363.

¹¹⁰ Cf. G. Müller, *Sophokles Antigone*, 95 – and, for the idea of the “consultation with oneself”, for example J. de Romily, « *Patience, mon Coeur!* » L’essor de la psychologie dans la littérature grecque classique (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1991), and H. Pellicia, *Mind, Body and Speech in Homer and Pindar* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), in particular 115ff. See also M. L. West (ed.), *Hesiod Theogony* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966, repr. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), on 900. Pretty much the same view is already found in the *Glossae* to Hesiod’s *Theogonia* – cf. H. FLACH (ed.), *Glossen und Scholien zur hesiodischen Theogonie mit Prolegomena* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1876), on 471, p. 191 (συμφράσασθαι συμβουλευσαι. μητιν συμφράσασθαι βουλήν συμβουλευσαι) – and, for example, in A. C. M[einecke] (ed.), *Sophoclis Antigone*. Ex recensione Brunckii cum ejusdem et Camerarii notis selectis (Göttingae: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1788), 151 (“consultare simul et deliberare, excogitare”) and F. Parow, *Handwörterbuch der Griechischen Sprache*, II.2 (Leipzig: Vogel, 1831⁴), *sub voce* (“sich berathen od. berathschlagen mit einem, (...) zusammen einen Rath ersinnen (...) dah. sich bedenken, nachdenken, bemerken, wahrnehmen, erkennen”). G. Authenrieth, *Wörterbuch zu den Homerischen Gedichten* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1873), 255, mentions two main lines of meaning: a) *secum* (θυμῶ) *meditari*, and b) *τινί* (βουλᾶς) *cum aliquo consilia inire*.

¹¹¹ 365-366.

¹¹² M. A. Bayfield (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophokles*, on 365ff.

ance is a miracle of unimaginable skill (...)”.¹¹³ Jebb’s translation runs thus: “Possessing, in his resourceful skill, a thing subtle beyond belief”¹¹⁴ Kamerbeek speaks of the “resourcefulness of his technical skill” “as a thing subtle beyond expectation (i.e more subtle or more ingenious than may be expected in mortal Man)”.¹¹⁵ According to Burton, “Sophocles’ words (...) mean that his [man’s] technical ingenuity is skilful or clever beyond belief.”¹¹⁶ Schmid translates almost word for word: “an den Hilfsmitteln der Technē (τὸ μηχανόνεν τέχνας, prosaisch ausgedrückt: τὴν ἐκ τῆς τέχνης εὐμηχανίαν) eine Art von (τι) über blosse Hoffnungen erhebender σοφία besitzend”.¹¹⁷ Schadewaldt writes: “In dem Erfinderischen der Kunst eine nie erhoffte Gewalt besitzend”.¹¹⁸ Gundert renders the two lines thus: “als etwas Gescheites die Erfindungskraft der Kunst über Erwarten besitzend”.¹¹⁹ Griffith gives the following literal translation: “Having this resourceful <quality>of invention <as> something clever beyond expectation (...)”.¹²⁰ And Jouanna’s French translation runs as follows: “Tout en possédant dans cette invention des arts une science au-dessus de toute attente (...)”.¹²¹

First of all, it should be kept in mind that the syntax of these lines is ambiguous and puzzling. What we are dealing with here is rather sibylline, and it is no exaggeration to speak of *grammatical looseness*: the connection between the words is more *paratactic* than syntactic, and the paratactic dots can be connected in different ways. Kitzinger hits the mark when she speaks of a “disjointed” and “semantically ambiguous syntax”¹²² and criticizes translations for attempting “to naturalize or erase the strangeness of the wording and syntax here.”¹²³

¹¹³ Cf. L. Campbell (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments*, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879²), on 364.

¹¹⁴ R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone*, on 365f.

¹¹⁵ J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles Commentaries III The Antigone*, 85, on 365-67.

¹¹⁶ R. W. B. Burton, *The Chorus in Sophocles’ Tragedies*, 101.

¹¹⁷ W. Schmid, “Probleme der sophokleischen Antigone”, *Philologus* 62 (1903), 1-34, 17

¹¹⁸ W. Schadewaldt (ed.), *Sophokles. Tragödien*, 81.

¹¹⁹ H. Gundert, “Größe und Gefährdung des Menschen”, 26.

¹²⁰ M. Griffith (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone*, on 365-7.

¹²¹ J. Jouanna, “Le lyrisme et le drame: Le chœur dans l’Antigone de Sophocle”, in: J. Leclant, J. Jouanna (ed.), *Le théâtre grec antique: la tragédie* (Paris: Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, 1998), 101-128, in particular 123.

¹²² M. R. Kitzinger, *The Choruses of Sophocles’ Antigone and Philoktetes. A Dance of Words* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008), 26.

¹²³ Cf. M. R. Kitzinger, 24f. See also G. Ronnet, “Sur le premier stasimon d’Antigone”, *Revue des Études Grecques* 80 (1967), 100-105, in particular 101, and W. Hering, “The Ode on Man, Sophokles Antigone 332-383”, *Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debreceniensis* 21 (1985), 25-41, in particular 36.

This is hardly the place to discuss these matters in detail. We will therefore make just a few remarks here.

Τὸ μηχανόεν τέχνας underscores the fact that the μηχαναί the Theban elders are talking about (i. e. human expediency and resourcefulness: man's ability to turn things to his advantage) are rooted a) in *knowledge*, and indeed b) in a very *particular* kind of knowledge, namely *τέχνη-knowledge* – not the common, trivial, everyday knowledge, immediately available to all. The Theban elders are clearly referring to *outstanding, exceptional* knowledge: to *extraordinary cognitive skills*. For that is what τέχνη is all about. And this idea is reinforced by σοφόν τι (σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν τέχνας). For σοφόν suggests the idea of something *subtle, sophisticated, inventive, ingenious* – viz. of something “*with limited access*” and that requires unusual intellectual abilities (so that it is *available only for a few*).

In other words, the point is that man is capable of expanding his “cognitive territory” beyond its “natural” boundaries (and indeed beyond the result of previous expansions). To put it in a nutshell, it is all about what might be termed “*prosthetic (artificial) knowledge*” viz. “*prosthetic (artificial) cognitive skills*”, as opposed to “*natural knowledge*” viz. to “*natural cognitive skills*”.

Finally, this idea is further reinforced by ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ'. It is not only a question of man being endowed with *some degree* of cognitive expansion. The point is that man is endowed with an *undreamed-of, absolutely incredible and amazing* amount of it. The Theban elders do not elaborate on how this is so. But their previous remarks strongly suggest both a) cognitive expansion *in many different directions* and b) *successive waves* of cognitive expansion. And that is what σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχων is all about: an “*explosion*” of *resourcefulness* beyond all bounds caused by an “*explosion*” of *cognitive expansion beyond all bounds*.¹²⁴

To these we should add a *seventh* word, namely ἐπάξεται. Strictly speaking, it is not a cognitive term. And it could also be objected that it does not

¹²⁴ Here we do not take into account the fact that ἐλπίδ' is ambivalent. As Oudemans and Lardinois put it (*Tragic Ambiguity*, 129, see also 137), “this not only means ‘beyond expectation’, but also ‘beyond hope’: it exceeds the limits that could be wished for. The fundamental ambiguity of hope will be abundantly underscored in the other stasima. Here Sophocles has confined himself to a dark undertone.” The ambivalence of ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ' is yet another aspect of what Kitzinger termed the “ironic undermining by Sophocles of the chorus’ point of view”. As a matter of fact, it is no exaggeration to say that this “ironic undermining” is an almost constant feature of the first stasimon. See M. R. Kitzinger, *The Choruses of Sophocles’ Antigone and Philoktetes*, 23, and cf. G. Müller, *Sophocles Antigone*, 83, R. Coleman, “The Role of the Chorus in Sophocles’ Antigone”, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 18 (1972), 4-27, in particular 9f., and T. C. W. Oudemans, P. M. H. Lardinois, *Tragic Ambiguity*, 120ff.

stand for a defining feature of human beings: it is rather used to describe what the human race is (and will always be) *unable to achieve*. But both objections prove to be too hasty and indeed ill-founded. For, on the one hand, even if it is not a cognitive term *sensu strictiore*, this verb is used to describe what human “cognitive abilities” (or at least the kind of “cognitive abilities” the Theban elders are referring to) are all about. And, on the other hand, precisely because they say that man is incapable of ἐπάγεσθαι in one single case, their claim is that ἐπάγεσθαι is the very thing man manages to achieve (or will eventually manage to achieve) *in all other cases*. In short, according to the Theban elders ἐπάγεσθαι is “the rule” – the *typical activity* of human race and indeed one of its main defining features.

Having said that, let us take a closer look at the word itself.

First, it should be noted that some commentators have questioned the reading and taken the view that this word should be emended. But on closer inspection it emerges that it is perfectly sound and, as Lloyd-Jones and Wilson put it, “makes excellent sense”.¹²⁵ For the most part, the two parties do not quarrel over the basic meaning of ἐπάγεσθαι in this line.¹²⁶ Wecklein paraphrases “ab aliquo loco adducere.”¹²⁷ Donaldson speaks of “the common sense of calling in succours (Thuc I.3); with which is coupled the notion of getting aid of any kind”.¹²⁸ Bayfield recalls “the common use of ἐπάγεσθαι

¹²⁵ H. Lloyd-Jones, N. G. Wilson, *Sophoclea*. Studies on the Text of Sophocles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 124. Cf. C. Schambach, *Sophocles qua ratione vocabulorum significationes mutet atque variet* (Gottingae: E. A. Huth, 1867), 23, L. Campbell (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments*, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879²), on 362, R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone*, on 361f., P. Joos, *ΤΥΧΗ, ΦΥΣΙΣ, ΤΕΧΝΗ*, 50, J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles Commentaries III The Antigone*, on 361-364, M. Griffith (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone, op.cit.*, 360.

¹²⁶ The most notable exception is G. Vollgraff, “Ad Sophoclis Antigonam (Continued)”, *Mnemosyne* 48 (1920), 366-387, in particular 367. Vollgraff alters the text. He reads: “Αἰδᾶ μόνῳ (sive adverbialiter μόνον) φεῦξιν οὐκ ἐπάξεται”. In his view, what we are dealing with here is a well-known construction, namely “ἐπάγειν sive τιμὴν δίκην, κίνδυνον, νόσον, πῆμα, πόλεμον, δουλείαν”, πλήγην, and the like. In other words, according to him ἐπάγεσθαι means “to lay on”, “to apply something to something” – and in this case φεῦξιν ἐπάγεσθαι τιμὴν stands for φουγὴν ἐπιβάλλειν τιμὴν (i.e. for “fugare”, “in fugam dare”, “abigere” and the like). See also W. M. A. van de Wijnperse, *De Terminologie van het jachtwezen bij Sophocles* (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1929), 33., C. J. Classen, *Untersuchungen zu Platons Jagdbildern* (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft, 25) (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1960), 24, and W. S. Barrett (ed.), *Euripides Hippolytos* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), on 1194-7.

¹²⁷ N. Wecklein (ed.), *Sophoclis Tragoediae recens. et explan.* E. Wunderus (Leipzig: Teubner, 1878), on 359f.

¹²⁸ J. W. Donaldson (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles in Greek and English* (London: J. W. Parker, 1848), on 360.

(ἐπακτός) of bringing in foreign troops to one's assistance; and Thuc. 1.81 ἐκ θαλάσσης ὧν δεόνται ἐπάξονται ('will import').¹²⁹ Schneidewin speaks of "sich zur Stelle schaffen",¹³⁰ and Bruhn of "sich heranholen".¹³¹ Humphreys paraphrases: "will achieve or procure; the lit. sense is import, bring in (to one's aid)".¹³² And Jebb writes: "'to bring into one's own country'; usually said of calling in allies to help one; or of importing foreign products. (...) Then often fig., of calling in anything to one's aid".¹³³

This is not the place to discuss these matters in detail. However, there is another important point that should not be overlooked. In all the above-mentioned cases, ἐπάγεσθαι denotes the idea of "getting", "fetching", "procuring", "obtaining", "calling in", or "introducing" something *already known*. This holds true both a) in the case of "importing foreign products", b) in the case of "calling in allies to help one", and c) in the general case of "bringing in anything to one's aid". In all these cases ἐπάγεσθαι is all about "cognitively available things": it seems intrinsically related to the *realm of the already known*. It is only a question of *getting hold* of the cognitively available things in question. But the Theban elders speak of a very particular way of "importing", "bringing in one's aid", or "introducing" (of a very particular kind of "foreign exchange") – namely an essentially *cognition-related ἐπάγεσθαι*. It is all about importing (bringing in to one's aid) *from the realm of the unknown*. That is, it is all about crossing the border between the realm of the *known* and the realm of the *unknown*; it is all about *expanding the former and diminishing the latter*.

In other words: on the one hand, the *knowledge* the Theban elders refer to is *essentially related to "getting things done"* (attaining what one needs or wants, etc.) – and that is what ἐπάγεσθαι is all about; but on the other hand, the "getting things done", etc., the Theban elders are talking about is *essentially knowledge-related. Knowledge is the key to getting things done*. To sum up: a peculiar kind of ἐπάγεσθαι – *cognitive ἐπάγεσθαι* – is the key

¹²⁹ M. A. Bayfield (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophokles*, on 360f.

¹³⁰ F. W. Schneidewin (ed.), *Sophokles IV, Antigone* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1856³), on 362

¹³¹ E. Bruhn (ed.), *Sophokles erkl. v. F. W. Schneidewin u. A. Nauck*, IV Antigone, on 361f.

¹³² M. W. Humphreys (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles* (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1891), on 362. D'Ooge refers to two passages (Thucydides 6.6.2 and Demosthenes, *De falsa legatione* 259) and writes: "will not procure for himself" – cf. M. L. D'Ooge (ed.), *Sophocles Antigone* (Boston: Ginn & Co, 1884), on 361.

¹³³ R. C. Jebb (ed.), *Sophocles The Plays and Fragments III: The Antigone*, on 361f. He quotes from Thucydides, 1.81, 4.64, Plato, *Leges*, 823a, *Gorgias* 492b, and Menander, Ὑδρία Fr. 2. Cf. C. Bailly, *Dictionnaire Grec-Français* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1935), *sub voce*, who speaks of "amener à soi", "faire venir", "gagner".

to ἐπάγεσθαι in general (viz. the specifically human kind of ἐπάγεσθαι).¹³⁴

This brief overview of their “cognitive” vocabulary can help us better understand the first three strophes and what they are all about.

Let us now return to the main thread of our remarks.

As mentioned before, the point is that the Theban elders are talking of a *very particular kind of power* – for in the case of man, power has to do with *mental capacity, intelligence, skillfulness, craftiness*. This – not anything else – is what makes human beings so extraordinarily powerful. In short, according to the chorus, *intelligence is power* – the *supreme kind of power*. The “human empire” is based on intelligence. And what we have termed the “*triumph of man*” turns out to be a “*triumph of intelligence*”.

Here it is important to bear in mind that in this respect too what the chorus says makes reference to something outside the play.

As a matter of fact, their words evoke characteristic traits of a whole set of well-known views that were “in the air”, so to speak, in the 5th century B.C. To be sure, the first stasimon has nothing to do with a detailed and comprehensive presentation of these views. The point is that it was bound to remind the ancient audience of them; the result being that the views in question (or at least some hazy recollection of them) function as a backdrop against which the Theban elders present their description of the human race.

We are referring to what might be termed the ancient “*anthropology of discovery or invention*” (εὐρέσις), according to which human beings are a very particular kind of reality – for a) they define themselves by the fact that *they give rise to εὐρέσεις*, b) in the final analysis, their mode of being is *based on εὐρέσεις*, c) they *change everything around them through εὐρέσεις*, d) they become *themselves a product of εὐρέσεις* (an *invented – self-invented and self-inventing – animal*, as it were) and e) they bring about a *whole world of intrinsically εὐρέσεις-related beings*.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ And this is one of the reasons why some interpreters find it difficult to accept and take the view that this word should be emended. The Theban elders use the verb to express a very specific kind of “acquisition” – and the context shows that, if the reading is right, “discovery”/“invention” viz. a cognitively related kind of “acquisition” is what they have in mind. However, there is no direct connection between and “discovery”/“invention”. As Seyffert puts it in his attempt to refute those who claim that ἐπάγεσθαι makes perfect sense: “non vident inveniendi vim a verbo ἐπάγειν alienam esse” – cf. M. Seyffert, *Sophoclis Antígona* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1865), on 361. But the point is that the use of ἐπάγεσθαι in this context highlights both a) that there is an ἐπάγεσθαι-component in every discovery or invention and b) that this “cognitive ἐπάγεσθαι” is essential to virtually all human ἐπάγεσθαι.

¹³⁵ In this regard, two aspects deserve specific attention. First, strictly speaking, εὐρέσις denotes both *discovery* and *invention*. It can mean *both* – and indeed something *halfway between them*: the general idea of “cognitive expansion” (so that the contrast between discovery and invention remains unstressed). Secondly, in Ancient Greece what

This is not the place to discuss this matter in any detail. Such a discussion would have to a) substantiate the claim that the first stasimon alludes to these views, b) analyse their content c) determine how they developed, d) discuss whether there is a thread of continuity between them, e) discuss who played a role in their development, and f) clarify their connection with the develop-

we have termed the “anthropology of discovery or invention” takes various shapes. This is not the place to discuss this subject in any detail. But it should be kept in mind that not all of them develop the idea that we ourselves are the discoverers or the inventors. The common denominator between all the varieties of this particular kind of anthropology is an acute sensitivity to the fact that most of what shapes our usual life is εὐρεσις-related: it results from εὐρέσεις and would not have been possible without εὔρεσις. In other words, the common denominator is an acute sensitivity to the fact that most of what shapes our usual life must have been *discovered* or *invented* – that it was not there from the beginning and would not be there if the gap between ignorance and knowledge had not been bridged. In some cases, this acute sense of discontinuity between ignorance and knowledge expresses itself in the idea that the εὐρέσεις were a gift of the gods (or demigods) – that they are the product of some kind of divine “revelation”. This is often linked with the idea of a *composite* gift, encompassing a variety of cognitive skills, so that this variety of skills is acquired at the same time. But in some cases, the emphasis is different. On the one hand, the human race has discovered and invented *by itself*. We are on our own, and mankind is the result of a complex process of “self-education”: it has had to *work its way up, turning its weakness into strength*. In short, we are *the product of ourselves* (viz. of the work done by our ancestors). On the other hand, this “self-education” *takes time*. It is a *long series of gradual and minute steps*, and ἀνάγκη – χρεῖώ, χρεία, ἔνδεια, πενία and the like – can be described as the essential catalyst for this gradual development. In yet other cases, the two models (the idea of “divine revelation” and the idea of what we have termed “self-education”) are combined. To be sure, Sophocles’ Theban elders do not breathe a word about this. And one would think that they do not take sides on the issue. But, on the other hand, as pointed out above, in the first stasimon the gods are conspicuous by their absence. The choral ode is all about mankind, the natural elements and other animals. And everything seems to suggest the idea of “autonomous skills”, and that the focus is on what human beings are capable of doing *by themselves*. This is, of course, a matter of interpretation. But if we are not mistaken what the Theban elders say tends clearly in this direction. See, for example, B. Knox, *Word and Action*. Essays on the Ancient Theatre, (Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 171: “In fact, what distinguishes this particular Kulturgeschichte from its fellows is precisely its secular tone: man “taught himself” – no Prometheus or Zeus was needed – and the list of what he taught himself does not include, as other accounts do, sacrifice and divination.” And Riemer basically says it all when he speaks of a “dezenete Anonymität göttlichen Wirkens” – cf. P. Riemer, “Nichts gewaltiger als der Mensch? Zu Sophokles’ Kritik an der zeitgenössischen Kulturentstehungslehre”, *Gymnasium* 114, 2007, 305-315, in particular 313. See also Idem, *Sophokles, Antigone – Götterwille und menschliche Freiheit* (Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 1991, 12.) (Mainz/Stuttgart: Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur/Franz Steiner, 1991).

ment of ancient Greek views on τέχνη. It need scarcely be said that all this goes far beyond the scope of this paper. So let it suffice to say that the views in question have to do with the topos of the πρώτος εὐρητής and the so called εὐρήματα-catalogues, and that the Homeric Hymn *in Vulcanum*¹³⁶, The *Phoronis* (Fr. 2)¹³⁷, Hesiod,¹³⁸ Democritus,¹³⁹ Xenophanes,¹⁴⁰ The *Anonymus Iamblichi*,¹⁴¹ the *De antiqua medicina*¹⁴² and the *De arte*,¹⁴³ Aeschylus' *Palamedes Fragment*,¹⁴⁴ the *Prometheus Vincitus*,¹⁴⁵ Sophocles' Fragments Fr. 432 and 479¹⁴⁶, Moschion¹⁴⁷, Anaxagoras,¹⁴⁸ Archelaos,¹⁴⁹ Protagoras,¹⁵⁰ Euripides,¹⁵¹ the *Sisyphus* fragment,¹⁵² Gorgias,¹⁵³ Isocrates¹⁵⁴ and Plato¹⁵⁵ are among the sources for their study.¹⁵⁶

In addition, let us take a closer look at a few key aspects.

¹³⁶ T. W. Allen, W. R. Halliday, E. E. Sikes (ed.), *The Homeric Hymns*, 84.

¹³⁷ M. Davies (ed.), *Epicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 154.

¹³⁸ *Opera*, 42ff.

¹³⁹ DK 68 B5, B16, B 33, B 144, B 148, B154.

¹⁴⁰ In particular DK 21, A 52, B 18.

¹⁴¹ DK 89, B 6.

¹⁴² In particular 1.2, 2.1, 3.1-3.4, 5.3, 7, 14.3.

¹⁴³ The *De arte* does not focus specifically on what we have termed the “anthropology of discovery or invention”, but it is one of the main sources for the ancient Greek idea of εὐρησις. See in particular 1.3-4, 1.6-7, 1.8, 1.9, 5.18-19, 6.11-12, 9.11-12, 11.32-34, 12.4-5, 12.9-11, and 12.19-20.

¹⁴⁴ Fr. 181aR, Adesp Fr. 470 Nauck2. Fr 438 Nauck (=479 Radt).

¹⁴⁵ 436ff.

¹⁴⁶ A. C. Pearson (ed.), *The Fragments of Sophocles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917).

¹⁴⁷ Fr. 7 (Nauck). TGF Snell 6.

¹⁴⁸ DK 59, A 15, A 102, B4, B21b.

¹⁴⁹ DK 60, A 1, A 4.

¹⁵⁰ DK 80, A a, B 8. As a matter of fact, none of the extant fragments of Protagoras provides any detailed insight into his views on these questions. But it seems safe to assume that his *Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως* dealt with these matters and played a major role in the development of what we have termed the ancient “anthropology of discovery or invention”. The crucial, but controversial source for reconstructing his doctrine is Plato's *Protagoras*.

¹⁵¹ Notably *Supplices*, 195ff.

¹⁵² Cf. DK 88 B 25, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* 43F 19 Snell.

¹⁵³ DK 82, B 11 A.

¹⁵⁴ In particular *Panegyricus*, 28ff., *Antidosis*, 253-4, and *Nicocles* (Oratio III), 6.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. notably Plato, *Protagoras* 319a8ff. But see also, for example, *Apologia* 41b, *Respublica* 522, *Philebus* 17 and *Leges* 667.

¹⁵⁶ For a general overview of studies on these matters see Appendix II.

First, the starting point of every εὔρεσις is *cognitive ἀμηχανία* or *ἀπορία* (and indeed any kind of ἀμηχανία or ἀπορία, since every ἀμηχανία or ἀπορία has to do with *cognitive ἀμηχανία* or *ἀπορία* viz. with the fact that one does not *know* how to overcome the ἀμηχανία or ἀπορία in question). And εὔρεσις stands for a *cognitive breakthrough*: the particular kind of change owing to which one manages to *acquire* knowledge, insight, understanding (understanding of *how things are* and of *how things can be done*¹⁵⁷). In other words, εὔρεσις stands for the fact that human knowledge is *dynamic*, changing through mechanisms of creativity and innovativeness. What was *beyond reach* becomes *within reach*, the unknown finds its way into our store of knowledge. Εὔρεσις thus stands for the extraordinary fact that we somehow manage to *bridge the discontinuity* between what we know and what we do not know (viz. what we understand and what we do not understand). It is the *genesis of new insight(s)* – the amazing miracle Jonathan Swift calls our attention to in one of his *Thoughts on Various Subjects*: “Vision is the art of seeing things invisible”.¹⁵⁸

As Swift points out, *vision emerges out of blindness*: there is no vision prior to vision, and vision *must invent itself in a medium of blindness*. In other words, vision is always, as it were, *sightlessness that has taught itself to see*. But what holds good for vision in the literal sense also applies to *knowledge* and *insight* – to the mysterious *dawning of intelligence* the Greek word “εὔρεσις” stands for: *insight emerging from the lack of it*. Here, too, we are dealing with some kind of *self-invention* or *self-positing* of knowledge in the middle of its absence. Here, too, “*sightlessness*” *teaches itself to “see”*. And mankind is where this process (namely the extraordinary process by means of which *sightlessness gives way to insight* and *transforms itself into insight*) is constantly taking place. The *human race is, as it were, the epicentre of this*.

Secondly, the particular kind of *cognitive change* – of “eruption of knowledge” – human beings are capable of paves the way for a *second kind of change*: the change of ἀμηχανία or ἀπορία into their opposite: *μηχανή* and *εὐπορία*. Cognitive change, i. e. the acquisition of knowledge, insight or understanding (grasping how things are and how things can be done) – all this can be used *for getting things done* (i. e., for *getting things changed*). That is, it can be used in improving the human environment, in inventing technical skills, etc. In short, *acquired knowledge* – *acquired insight* – generates *power and might*. Pushing forward the boundaries of knowledge thus brings about considerable *changes in the relation of forces* or rather an *inversion of the balance of power* between man and other beings. The weaker becomes

¹⁵⁷ Viz. of how things can be *changed*.

¹⁵⁸ J. Swift, *The Prose Works*, vol. IV, ed. H. Davies & L. Landa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), 252.

the stronger and vice versa. And this is how man prevails over everything else around him. The ancients never ceased to marvel at the fact that the *tiniest* and *subtlest* of all things (such a seemingly *weak* thing as intelligence or knowledge: the most *immaterial*, the most *intangible*, the most *unsubstantial*, the most “*unmusclcd*” thing of all) should be such an extraordinary source of strength and power (of a radically new kind of overwhelming strength and power).¹⁵⁹ This inversion in the balance of power is what the first stasimon is all about.

Thirdly, the change in the relation of forces – or rather the inversion in the balance of power we are referring to – is not brought about by *one* single insight or a *few scattered* insights. It requires much more, namely nothing less than an extraordinary *multiplication and accumulation* of εὑρέσεις and μηχαναί, a *flood* of εὑρέσεις and μηχαναί, a *flood* of inventions and discoveries and a *massive field* of εὑρεσις-related powers, and εὑρεσις-related beings, all of them made possible only by discoveries and inventions. This is what

¹⁵⁹ For this *inversion in the balance of power*, see notably Euripides, *Aiolos* Fr. 27 N: ἡ βραχὺ τοι / σθένος ἀνέρος· ἀλλὰ ποικιλία / πραπίδων δεινὰ μὲν φύλα πόντου / χθονίων τ' ἀερίων τε δάμναται/ παιδεύματα. Cf. A. Nauck (ed.), *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1889 repr. Hildesheim, Olms, 1964). See also Sophocles, Fr. 939 (“γνώμαι πλέον κρατοῦσιν ἢ σθένος χερῶν”), Euripides, Fr. 200, 3-4 (“(...) σοφὸν γὰρ ἔν βούλευμα τὰς πολλὰς χέρας νικᾷ, σὺν ὄχλῳ δ' ἀμαθία πλεῖστον κακόν”), Agathon, Fr. 27 (“γνώμη δὲ κρείσσον ἐστὶν ἢ ῥώμη χερῶν”) and Thucydides 7.63.4: “(...) καὶ δεῖξατε ὅτι καὶ μετ' ἀσθενείας καὶ συμφορῶν ἢ ὑμετέρα ἐπιστήμη κρείσσον ἐστὶν ἑτέρας εὐτυχούσης ῥώμης”. Antiphon Tragicus expresses this by saying: “τέχνη κρατοῦμεν ὧν φύσει νικώμεθα” – “thanks to τέχνη we conquer (prevail, gain mastery over) those things in which we are beaten (vanquished, defeated, inferior) by φύσις” – in short: “τέχνη makes us prevail where φύσις defeats us”. Cf. B. Snell (ed.), *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta*, vol. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 55 Fr. 4. And the opening lines of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Mechanica* make the following remarks on Antiphon's saying: “(...) τοιαῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν οἷς τὰ τε ἐλάττονα κρατεῖ τῶν μειζόνων, καὶ τὰ ῥοπήν ἔχοντα μικρὰν κινεῖ βάρη μεγάλα (...)”. These ideas combine two topoi: the sophistic topos of *inversion of forces* (the weak and apparently insignificant eventually prevails upon the strong) and the “scientific” notion that small impulses can overturn great bodies (viz. that small causes can have very large effects). Cf. for example, Sophocles, *Antigone*, 477-8, *Electra* 415-16, *Ajax* 1078, 1148, 1253, Aristophanes, *Nubes* 112f., 1445, and see notably W. Schmidt, O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*. 1. Teil: Die Klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur, II. Band: Die griechische Literatur in der Zeit der attischen Hegemonie vor dem Eingreifen der Sophistik (München: Beck, 1934), 316, B. M. W. Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press/Oxford University Press, 1957), 143, 247, W. B. Stanford (ed.), *Sophocles Ajax* (London: Macmillan, 1963, repr. London: Bristol Classical Press, 1994), on 1077-78, 1148-49, 1253-4, B. Marzullo, *I sofismi di Prometeo* (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1993), 370f., and M. J. Schiefsky (ed.), *Hippocrates on Ancient Medicine* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 170f.

mankind is really made of: gradual acquisition and accumulation of insights, “generations” and “generations” of insights, a whole realm of *transformed reality* – or, to be more precise, a *vast* and a *thick* realm (a “sea”, not a scattered archipelago) of *transformed reality*, so that most of what surrounds us is either simply the product of what might be described as a “cognitive conquest” or something radically changed by “cognitive conquest”. This is what the Theban elders are talking about: the *result of an extraordinary burst of insights*, mankind as an “empire of insights”, as it were, viz. an “empire” *made of insights*.¹⁶⁰

And this brings us to one of the key words in the first stasimon: παντοπόρος. The Theban elders say: παντοπόρος· ἄπορος ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ἔρχεται τὸ μέλλον¹⁶¹; in Jebb’s translation: “yea, he has resource for all; without

¹⁶⁰ That is, on the one hand, through εὔρεσις (τέχνη, etc.) *survival* becomes “viable” for the “unviable” being: man. But this is not all. On the other hand, εὔρεσις (τέχνη, etc.) sets the bar much higher: it opens the way for nothing less than an *empire*, in the truest sense of the word.

¹⁶¹ 360f. The paratactic maze of 360-361 leaves room for an almost Escher-like tangle of possible interpretations. This is not the place to discuss them. But the following should be borne in mind:

1) Everything depends on the punctuation – and in particular on whether τὸ μέλλον belongs to ἄπορος ἔρχεται ἐπ’ οὐδὲν or to what follows (Αἶδα μόνον φεῦξιν οὐκ ἐπάξεται).

2) On the one hand, ἐπί can be taken with ἔρχεται – in which case what we are dealing with here is either a) ἔρχεται + ἐπί or b) ἐπέρχεται used in *imesis* (the view held by van de Wijnpersse – this line is one more instance of the use of ἐπιέναι as a hunting metaphor: “niets wat hij najaagt, is voor hem onbereikbaar”). But ἐπί can also be connected with ἄπορος (ἄπορος ἐπ’ οὐδὲν + ἔρχεται τὸ μέλλον). Schneidewin among others, follows this line of interpretation: “Doch ist vielleicht richtiger zu verbinden: ἄπορος ἐπ’ οὐδὲν (O. R. 665 ἄπορος ἐπὶ φρόνιμα), keiner Sache gegenüber rathlos, ἔρχεται τὸ μέλλον, tritt er an die Zukunft, an das, was seiner harzt, heran”.

3) On the other hand, ἐπί can be connected either with οὐδὲν τὸ μέλλον or just with οὐδὲν, in which case τὸ μέλλον plays an *adverbial* role (analogous to τὸ πρὶν, τὸ νῦν, etc.) or functions as an *accusative of relation*. Donaldson doubts “whether the Greek syntax would bear such a construction as ἐπ’ οὐδὲν τὸ μέλλον”. He takes τὸ μέλλον adverbially: “in regard to the future, he comes to nothing without resources”. Ceschi takes a similar approach. In his view τὸ μέλλον is an accusative of relation: “quanto al futuro, (l’uomo) non è impreparato di fronte a nulla.”

4) Be that as it may, if ἐπ’ οὐδὲν and τὸ μέλλον do belong together, G. Hermann’s observation should not be forgotten: “Haec postrema vero non recte scholiastes explicat, ἐπ’ οὐδὲν τῶν μελλόντων. Aliud est enim ἐπ’ οὐδὲν μέλλον, *ad nullam rem futuram* infinite dictum, quam finite, *ad eorum, quae futura sunt, nihil*. Quorum alterum est: *ad nihil, si quid futurum est*; alterum: *ad nihil, quod est futurum*.”

5) Hence, “ἄπορος ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ἔρχεται τὸ μέλλον” can be given an *ominous reading* – so that there is a touch of *tragic irony*, and what the Theban elders say suggests that “man comes to nothing – to the ‘nothing’ that is his future”. This line of reading is

resource he meets nothing that must come (or nothing that will rise)¹⁶² – or, in Andrew Brown’s translation: “resourceful in all and resourceless he goes to meet nothing that is to come”.¹⁶³ As Jebb points out, παντοπόρος is “at once a comment on the achievements already enumerated (...) and a general expression absolving the poet from further detail: ‘yes, there is nothing that he cannot provide’”.¹⁶⁴ Jebb is absolutely right in this respect; his description

followed by Heidegger, Müller and Oudemans/Lardinois, to name but a few. Knox argues against this kind of interpretation. He points out that “although syntactically speaking the words ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ... τὸ μέλλον may be read ambiguously, in context they may not, for the simple reason that unless they are read” as referring to mankind’s indefinitely continued progress, “the following μόνον (...) makes no conceivable kind of sense”. It surely must be admitted that Knox has a point here. But the fact remains that, even if the Theban elders are unequivocally referring to man’s unstoppable achievements (that is, even if they are saying the exact opposite of the ominous interpretation), their wording leaves room for *involuntary double-entendre* viz. for hearing or reading ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ἔρχεται τὸ μέλλον in the said ominous way. See C. G. A. Erfurdt (ed.) *Sophoclis Tragoediae* ad optimorum librorum fidei recensuit, vol. I., *Antigona*, editio tertia cum adnotationibus G. Hermannii (Lipsiae: Fleischer, 1830), on 355 (pp. 82f.), F. W. Schneidewin (ed.), *Sophokles IV, Antigone*, *op. cit.*, on 360, J. W. Donaldson (ed.), *loc. cit.*, M. A. van de Wijnperse, *De Terminologie van het jachtwezen bij Sophocles* (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1929), 30ff., M. Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 115ff., Idem, *Hölderlins Hymne „Der Ister“*, 72ff., 82, 90, 92f., 94, 104, G. Müller, *Sophokles Antigone*, 95, B. Knox, *Word and Action. Essays on the Ancient Theatre*, (Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 170, T. C. W. Oudemans, P. M. H. Lardinois, *Tragic Ambiguity*, 127, G. Ceschi, *Il vocabolario medico di Sofocle. Analisi dei contatti con il Corpus Hippocraticum nel lessico anatomo-fisiologico, patologico e terapeutico* (Venezia: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2009), 160.

¹⁶² J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles Commentaries* III *The Antigone*, on 360. Cf. G. A. Christodoulos (ed.), *Scholia in Sophoclis tragoedias vetera* (Lipsiae: Teubner 1888), on *Ant.* 359: “παντοπόρος· εἰς πάντας μηχανάς ἐξευρίσκων καὶ ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ἄπορος τῶν μελλόντων (...)”. C. Schindler, *De Sophocle verborum inventore*. Particula 1: de nominum compositione (Vratislaviae: Typis F. W. Jungferi, 1877), 70, sees two ways of interpreting παντοπόρος: either a) *providing all remedies* or b) *providing remedies for everything*: “παντοπόρος omnia remedia possidens, nisi praestat priore vocabuli membro substantive sumpto interpretari: omnium (malorum) remedium (confugium) habens vel sibi parans”. But it would be hair-splitting to press this point, for at the end of the day a) and b) amount to the same thing.

¹⁶³ A. Brown’s translation. Cf. A. Brown (ed.), *Sophocles: Antigone*, 51.

¹⁶⁴ R. C. Jebb (ed.), on 360. This line of interpretation is already adumbrated in Gottfried Hermann’s notes on the *Antigone*, on 355: “Refertur illud παντοπόρος ad omnia, quae ante commemorata erant.” See also E. Wunder (ed.), *Sophoclis Antigone* (Gothae: Hennings, 1856⁴), on 357, and N. Wecklein (ed.), *Sophoclis Tragoediae* recens. et explan. E. Wunderus, on 357: “Referendum hoc ad ea, quae ante commemorata sunt, similiterque adiectum atque v. 347 περιφραδῆς ἀνὴρ positum est”. Cf. F. W.

could not be more apt. But the reason why he is absolutely right is because παντοπόρος sums up everything the Theban elders are talking about. Their point is that the human race is *all-inventive*, that its ability to discover and invent *knows no limits*, and that this in turn means nothing less than *unlimited resourcefulness*. In short, the point is the *all-embracing* character of human inventiveness and human resourcefulness – the fact that it develops *in all directions* and seems to be unstoppable.

However, this does not necessarily mean that mankind has already exhausted all possible εὑρέσεις, that there is nothing left to discover or to invent (that it has conquered everything, so that there is nothing left to conquer) – in short, that nothing remains to be achieved. This does not seem to be what the Theban elders actually have in mind. The point is rather that, if there is still work to be done, human beings will not sit back and relax. No, they are bound to do something about it; they will not rest until they have solved the problem. And *sooner or later they will work something out*; they will *discover* or *invent* something and thereby achieve success.

In other words, παντοπόρος should be understood in a *dynamic* sense. The Theban elders' words are all about a *dynamic realm*. The “human empire” is an empire *in expansion*. And even if there is no mention of this in the first stasimon (and, what is more, even if everything seems to suggest that the views the Theban elders are alluding to assume that most εὑρέσεις lie *behind* us, not *before* us), the kind of model we are dealing with here leaves room for

Schneidewin (ed.), *Sophokles IV, Antigone*, on 347 (“περιφραδῆς ἀνὴρ fast schliesslich das Einzelne, das zur Bewunderung der Menschennatur veranlasst, zusammen und dient als Abschluss der *Bewältigung* der Thiere, indem der Chor nun zur Zählung übergeht”), E. Bruhn (ed.), *Sophokles erkl. v. F. W. Schneidewin u. A. Nauck, IV Antigone*, on 360 (“παντοπόρος drückt wie περιφραδῆς ἀνὴρ, 348, das aus der Betrachtung der einzelnen Erfindungen entspringende Staunen aus”), M. J. Smead (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles*, on 360, M. W. Humphreys (ed.), *The Antigone of Sophocles*, on 359, G. Ronnet, “Sur le premier stasimon d’Antigone”, *Revue des Études Grecques* 80 (1967), 100-105, in particular 101. Other interpreters take a different view. See, for instance, A. Boeckh (ed.), *Des Sophokles Antigone Griechisch und Deutsch* (Berlin: Veit & Co, 1843), 236. But the fact is that Wecklein and those who follow his line of approach have a point; for παντοπόρος plays a role similar to περιφραδῆς in line 347: a) it *sums up* what precedes (i.e., man’s accomplishments) and b) it involves some amount of *generalization* – with the difference that παντοπόρος is, as it were, περιφραδῆς *raised to the second or third power*. But this does not mean that there is no strong connection between παντοπόρος and what follows. The opposite is true: on the one hand, there is high tension between παντοπόρος and ἄπορος, for the juxtaposition of these two words suggests an *oxymoron* (cf. T. C. W. Oudemans, P. M. H. Lardinois, *Tragic Ambiguity* 127); and on the other hand, παντοπόρος and ἄπορος ἐπ’οὐδὲν ἔρχεται τὸ μέλλον are closely connected in the sense that one of the possible senses of the latter explains what the former is all about.

the possibility that the expansion (the *cognitive* expansion and the expansion *of power*) turns out to be *continuous, ceaseless and endless*.

To sum up: mankind is παντοπόρος because it is *always able to find a way out* or because man *always has his way*. The word does not describe something *already achieved* or something *already accomplished*. It is rather the description of a *mode of being*. The human race is constituted in such a way that for it to *be* = to be *procuring the means to achieve something (finding, inventing, discovering μηχαναί)*. Or, to paraphrase Pessoa's famous line: man is of such a nature, that "weaving the meshes of an empire" or "weaving the meshes the empire weaves"¹⁶⁵ is what human life is all about.

However, it should be borne in mind that the above does not do full justice to the *multilayered* structure of what *Antigone's* first stasimon is all about. On closer inspection it emerges that it is *not* only a question of *εὐρέσεις* and the *power* they give us. The first stasimon also draws attention to something else: even if there were no *εὐρέσεις* and they gave us no power (i.e. even if we had to carry the burden of life in complete ἀμηχανία and with extreme vulnerability), we would still be the *failed project of the kind of empire* (viz. of the kind of *triumph*) *the first stasimon is all about. Each and every one of us is somehow the project of this: of supremacy of some kind and of absolute control over a dominion of some sort. And the story of our lives could read "ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν" (in the beginning was) this very project, without which the εὐρέσεις and the power they give us would be pointless. Hence, this is the first layer: the παντοπόρος in spe, so to speak.*¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Or, to paraphrase Keith Bosley's translation: *knotting "the nets the empire knots"*. Cf. F. Pessoa, "O menino de sua mãe", in: F. Pessoa, *Poesias* (Lisboa: Ática, 1942), 1995¹⁵, 217, and "His Mother's Little Boy", In: F. Pessoa, *A Centenary Pessoa*, ed. by E. Lisboa and L. C. Taylor (Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1997), 36.

¹⁶⁶ Let us insist on this point. From the very beginning man is a *project of power* – of complete gratification of all his needs and desires. That is, from the very beginning man is all about "triumph" and "empire" – not *in re* (not *really*, not *fully* and *in point of fact*), but just *in desire* or *in spe*. In short, man is the παντοπόρος *in spe*. And being a παντοπόρος *in spe* means: having the desire of being παντοπόρος not just *in spe*, but *in re* (not just *in desire*, but also *in fact*). Put another way: man has a *natural vocation to become* παντοπόρος. He is the *would-be* παντοπόρος: someone who would become παντοπόρος if he only could. And this "natural vocation" to become παντοπόρος is the *fons et origo* of it all. Now, this means that the link between "man" and "παντοπόρος" does not depend on whether man manages to achieve his aim (or whether he *almost* achieves it – and becomes in any case "*almost* παντοπόρος"). The point is that "παντοπόρος" (what this word stands for) defines mankind because it is, as it were, *man's measure*: the natural "yardstick" for measuring oneself, one's life, etc. And this is why man is παντοπόρος *by his very nature, regardless* of whether he really manages to make his παντοπόρος-dream come true. For this very reason, if a human being/mankind fails to achieve this aim, being a *failed* παντοπόρος becomes one of its main defining features.

But the fact that human beings are constituted in such a way that something in them “dreams” of this is only part of the complex nature of man. Among other things, all this is closely connected with τόλμα viz. with the *all-daring* (with the *ὑπέρολμος* and *πάντολμος*) element in human nature. To be sure, there is only one mention of τόλμα in the whole stasimon¹⁶⁷. But the idea of τόλμα looms in the background, not least because of the above-mentioned connection with the first stasimon of Aeschylus’ *Choephoroi*. And on closer inspection it emerges that τόλμα plays a major role in the “empire” the Theban elders are talking about. On the one hand, the project itself (the project of supremacy) is intrinsically τόλμα-related. On the other hand, man could dream of supremacy – and have all the *knowledge* and all the *power* needed to achieve it (i. e. what might be described as a *second* and a *third* layer of what constitutes the “human empire”) – and still lack *the nerve*. But the point is that human kind *does not lack the nerve*.¹⁶⁸

In short, this is the complete “formula” for the “human empire”, as the Theban elders describe it (the complete “composition” of the παντοπόρος): a) a *project of supremacy and domination*, b) the *knowledge* (εὐρέσεις and

¹⁶⁷ 371.

¹⁶⁸ This is an important point. But G. Ronnet seems to go too far when she writes: “(...) l’idée dominante est bien celle d’audace et de bravade, non celle d’habileté: l’expression περιφραδῆς ἀνὴρ n’apparaît qu’au v. 347, amenée par l’évocation des fillets qui servent à la capture des bêtes; l’ingéniosité n’est que le moyen par lequel l’homme a pu faire triompher son audace, affirmer sa domination”. Cf. G. Ronnet, “Sur le premier stasimon d’Antigone”, *Revue des Études Grecques* 80 (1967), 100-105, in particular 103. First, Ronnet overlooks the fact that, as mentioned before, περιφραδῆς *summarizes* everything the Theban elders have said. As F. W. Schneidewin (ed.), *Sophokles IV, Antigone*, on 347, puts it: “περιφραδῆς ἀνὴρ fasst schliesslich das Einzelne, das zur Bewunderung der Menschennatur veranlasst, zusammen (...)“. Secondly, and most importantly, the idea of what Ronnet calls “habileté” and “ingéniosité” is there from the very moment the Theban elders start to list man’s accomplishments. From the very beginning, the first stasimon is all about man’s *skills* – and none of what the Theban elders say would make any sense (none of man’s accomplishments could have taken place) if human beings were audacious (and indeed very audacious) but lacked the necessary *skills* (and this means: the *cognitive* expertise) to triumph. Here, of course, it can be argued that τόλμα is also key to developing man’s cognitive skills. This is true – but it does not change the fact that τόλμα alone does not produce cognitive skills (let alone the extraordinary cognitive proficiency in question). In other words, both if human beings a) had the cognitive skills but lacked the nerve and b) had the nerve but lacked the cognitive skills, they would not be δεινόν in the sense the Theban elders are talking about. In short, these two aspects (what Ronnet’s “audace” stands for and what she terms “habileté” or “ingéniosité”) *go hand in hand*. It is a mistake to separate them. For the Theban elders (and indeed *in re*) what characterizes mankind is a particular *combination of these two factors* – not one of them without the other.

μηχαναί) needed to implement it, c) the *power* given by the latter, and d) the *τόλμα* without which nothing of this is translated into action (the *τόλμα* without which there would be nothing of the amazing *cognitive expansion* and of the amazing *expansion of power* man is all about). And that is why this single word – “παντοπόρος” – seems tailor-made for capturing man’s nature (or at least one of its most essential features).

Now, if we are not mistaken, this is what the Theban elders are talking about –this is their “image of man”. And this is what they claim to be not only δεινόν, but indeed the *most δεινόν thing of all*. And, if we are not mistaken, their point is that this “human empire” is δεινόν *in all possible senses of the word*. Not just one meaning (not just one segment of the semantic range: not a single “note”), but *all meanings at once* (the whole semantic range of δεινόν – that is, as it were, a “chord”) are apt to characterize the “human empire”. We can also express this by saying that the chorus’ claim that οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει holds good not only in the sense that nothing is more δεινόν than the “human empire”, but also in the sense that *the “human empire” is the thing that best fits all possible meanings of δεινόν*. Put another way, the point is also that the semantic complexity and ambivalence of the one finds a perfect match in the complexity and ambivalence of the other – so that δεινόν is the word that best characterizes human beings viz. the human empire.

Consequently, if we are not mistaken, the Theban elders are saying *uno tenore* all the following: that the “human empire” they are talking about a) is the most fearsome, terrible, terrifying and violent thing of all, b) is the greatest danger, ill and source of sufferings of all, c) is the most tremendous, colossal, marvellously strong or powerful thing of all, d) is the most strange, uncanny and “unheimlich” thing of all, e) is the most wondrous, the most marvellous, the most amazing and admirable thing of all, f) is the most skilled, able, ingenious, clever, resourceful and inventive thing of all, g) is the most over-clever thing of all, and h) is the haughtiest, boldest, most daring and ruthless thing of all.

5. Triumph of the παντοπόρος?

But this is not all. An important aspect of the complex image of man we are dealing with has to do with what the Theban elders highlight in the second strophe, namely the fact that the παντοπόρος they are talking about – the “human empire” – is *not entirely παντοπόρος* or *fails to be παντοπόρος* in the strictest sense of the word.

Let us take a closer look at this.

According to the chorus, the only thing that the human race will not achieve is to escape death (Ἄιδα μόνον φεῦξιν οὐκ ἐπάξεται¹⁶⁹). What they say in this regard is something of a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it represents a superlative expression of the “all-embracing” character of the “empire” they are talking about: nothing escapes human power (i. e., nothing escapes our inventiveness and our ability to discover), except *one* single thing. In other words, they turn their eye to mankind’s future prospects and predict that it is only a matter of time until the human race finds a way of achieving *everything* (N.B. everything) it needs or wants, with one single exception. And this means that virtually *everything* (I insist: everything), with one single exception, will be discovered or invented by human intelligence, ingenuity and inventiveness.¹⁷⁰ But on the other hand, it should be borne in mind that this sole exception – namely the unavoidability of death – carries much weight; for, in a way, it *counterbalances everything else*: it *undermines* and *jeopardizes* everything else, it *thwarts* everything else. The result being that there is *something seriously wrong* with this “empire”, the human race.

To be sure the Theban elders seem to qualify their statement by admitting that the human race has devised escapes from intractable diseases (νόσων δ’ ἀμηχάνων φυγὰς ξυμπέφρασται).¹⁷¹ And this idea is given a very pointed expression, for they emphasize that the human race finds φυγὰς (i. e. μηχανάς) even for the ἀμήχανον. Sophocles’ wording echoes jingles like πόροι ἐξ ἀπόρων, etc., which were (or at any rate were becoming) relatively

¹⁶⁹ 361f.

¹⁷⁰ Sophocles’ Theban elders are far from being the only ones who speak of this subject. The idea that sooner or later every search is rewarded (and that εὔρεςις eventually triumphs and achieves all the desired results) was “in the air” and on the way to becoming a “topos”. See notably Creon’s lines in Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus* 110-111 (“τὸ δὲ ζητούμενον / ἀλωτόν, ἐκφεύγει τὰμελούμενον”), *De prisca medicina* 2. 1 (“Ἱητρικὴ δὲ πάντα πάλαι ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁδὸς εὐρημένη, καθ’ ἣν καὶ τὰ εὐρημένα πολλὰ τε καὶ καλῶς ἔχοντα εὕρηται ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ εὔρεθήσεται, ἣν τις ἱκανὸς τε ἐὼν καὶ τὰ εὐρημένα εἰδὼς, ἐκ τούτων ὁρμωμένος ζητήη.”) and Archytas DK 47 B 3, 8-9 (“ἐξευρεῖν δὲ μὴ ζητοῦντα ἄπορον καὶ σπάνιον, ζητοῦντα δὲ εὐπορον καὶ ράδιον”). See also Chaeremon, Fr 21 (“Οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὅτι οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ ζητοῦσι ἐξευρίσκειται”), Tr. Fr. Adespot 526 = Menander, Fr. 935 = *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* (Kock), 1264 (“ἅπανθ’ ὁ τοῦ ζητοῦντος εὕρισκει πόνος”), Philemon Fr. 37 (“πάνθ’ ἔστιν ἐξευρεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν πόνον φεύγη τις, ὃς πρόσσεσι τοῖς ζητούμενοις”) and Alexis, Fr. 31 Arnott, 30 Kock (“ὅτι πάντα τὰ ζητούμενα ἐξευρίσκειται ἂν μὴ προαποστής, μηδὲ τὸν πόνον φεύγης.”). Arnott writes on Alexis, Fr. 31 (30 K): “The theme of the fr., that ‘Nothing’s so hard, but search will find it out’, is a comic cliché”. Cf. W. G. Arnott, *Alexis: The Fragments. A Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 129f.

¹⁷¹ 362f.

common.¹⁷² The fact that there is something of an *oxymoron* emphasizes the extraordinary skills the Theban elders are talking about – and that, in a way, man’s outstanding skills manage to do wonders even with death. But it goes without saying that in the final analysis this does not change the main fact, namely a) that death remains *inevitable* (that it can only be *postponed* for some time, *not eliminated*) and b) that this alone is more than enough to show that the human race is anything but really παντοπόρος.

Having said this, it must be borne in mind that, if death is unavoidable, the *ability to postpone it* makes all the difference. It is, as it were, *the second best* – and even more so if it manages to find μηχαναί even for ἀμήχανοι νόσοι. In the final analysis, man’s life revolves around this *second best* (and, once again, what we are dealing with here is what we have termed the superlative-Priamel structure). But the main point is that even in this regard

¹⁷² For this kind of jingle, see notably Gorgias, *Palamedes*, 30, DK 82 B11a (“τίς γὰρ ἄλλος ἐποίησε τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον πόριμον ἐξ ἀπόρου;”), Aeschylus (viz. Ps.-Aeschylus), *Prometheus Vincetus*, 59 (“δαινὸς γὰρ εὐρεῖν κἀξ ἀμηχάνων πόρον”) and 905 (ἄπορα πόριμος), Euripides, Fr. 430 (“ἔχω δὲ τόλμης καὶ θράσους διδάσκαλον / ἐν τοῖς ἀμηχάνοισιν ἐμπορώτατον, / Ἐρωτα, πάντων δυσμαχώτατον θεόν.”), Aristarchus Tragicus, apud B. Snell (ed.), *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), Fr. 2, (“οὗτος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὸν ἀσθενῆ σθένειν τίθησι καὶ τὸν ἄπορον εὐρίσκειν πόρον”), and Aristophanes, *Equites* 758f. (“Ποικίλος γὰρ ἀνὴρ / ἀμηχάνων πόρους εὐμήχανος πορίζειν”). See also Aristophanes, *Ranae*, 1429, and *Ecclesiazusae*, 236. Cf. C. J. Blomfield (ed.), *Aeschyli Prometheus vincetus* ad fidem manuscriptorum emendavit notas et glossarium adiecit C. J. B. (Cambridge: Typis Academicis, 1812²), on 59, G. Hermann (ed.), *Aeschyli Tragoediae*, vol. II (Berlin: Weidmann, 1859²), on P. V. 59, W. Ribbeck (ed.), *Die Ritter des Aristophanes*, Griechisch und Deutsch mit kritischen und erklärenden Anmerkungen (Berlin: Guttentag, 1867), on 759, J. van Leeuwen (ed.), *Aristophanis Equites cum prolegomenis et commentariis* (Lugduni Batavorum: A. W. Sijthoff, 1900), on 759, R. A. Neil (ed.), *The Knights of Aristophanes* (Cambridge: University Press, 1909), on 759, P. Groeneboom (ed.), *Aeschylus’ Prometheus* (Groningen: Wolters, 1928), on 904-06, G. Thomson (ed.), *Aeschylus The Prometheus Bound* (Cambridge: University Press, 1932), on 59, M. Griffith (ed.), *Aeschylus Prometheus Bound* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), on 59, 904-05, R. Kassel, C. Austin (ed.), *Poetae comici Graeci*, vol. II: Agathenor – Aristonymus (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991), on Alexis, Traumatias Fr. 236b, W. G. Arnott, *Alexis: The Fragments. A Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), on 236 (234 K), p. 667, and M. J. de Carvalho, “Do Belo como constituinte do Humano segundo Sócrates/Diotima”, *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 38 (2010), 369-468, in particular 404f. and 458. It is perhaps no coincidence that almost all of these passages have to do with Ἐρωσ – see pp. 31f., above. Incidentally, the passages we are talking about seem to suggest that both a) the idea of this power to transform ἀπορία into πόρος (ἀμηχανία into μηχανή, etc.) and b) the association of such extraordinary power with Ἐρωσ predate Plato’s well-known views on this subject, so that the latter are not the *origin* of this topos, but rather a very important and original *development* in its history.

human intelligence endlessly gives rise to new resources and celebrates great triumphs.¹⁷³

This is why, after all, the third stanza ends on a largely positive note. And Friedländer hits the mark when he writes: „Am Ende dieser Strophe erhebt sich mit dem schweren Ἄϊδα die Macht des Todes als einziges Hindernis—Aber das ist nur die äußerste Grenze, auf die der Blick gelenkt wird, ohne an ihr haften zu bleiben. So schließt denn die Strophe nicht damit, sondern mit dem Ungeheuren der Heilkunst (...) und mit dem menschlichen Ersinnen (ξυμπέφρασται). Es ist nicht dies, daß Sophokles den Tod nicht unbedingt genug sieht, wenn er ihn nicht ans Ende stellt: μόνον zeigt das Gegenteil. Aber er konnte diese Grenze der Menschheit nicht Ende der Strophe sein lassen, ohne die Richtung des Ganzen zu gefährden“¹⁷⁴. As a matter of fact, Friedländer hits the mark for two reasons. On the one hand, the third stanza seems designed to ensure that death does not have the last word. To be sure, the chorus’ mention of our inability to defeat death marks an unmistakable change in tone. But Friedländer is right: everything seems to suggest that Sophocles did not want the third stanza to end on a flat and discouraging note. On the other hand, one of the reasons why the Theban elders make their unsuccessful attempt to attenuate the shattering effect of man’s powerlessness in the face of death – and end the third stanza on a “semi-triumphant” note – is because, paradoxically enough, for them the big “but” lies not in death but in what the *last* stanza is all about.

But before tackling this question let us briefly review the tangled mix of positive and negative features (of positive and negative “notes”) that characterizes the third strophe.

¹⁷³ As a matter of fact, the last words of the third stanza unmistakably evoke the *self-confident* and *triumphant* tone (and even the wording) of Hippocratic passages like *De morbo sacro* 18, 6-7 (φύσιν δὲ ἕκαστον [νόσημα] ἔχει καὶ δύναμιν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄπορόν ἐστιν οὐδ’ ἀμήχανον) or *De flatibus*, 2, in Jouanna’s edition (Οἱ δὲ νοσέοντες ἀποτρέπονται διὰ τὴν τέχνην τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν, νούσων, λύπης, πόνων, θανάτου· πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοισιν ἀντικρυς ἢ ἰητρική.) – in Littré’s edition 1, 9-10 (Οἱ δὲ νοσέοντες ἀπαλλάττονται τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν διὰ τὴν τέχνην, νούσων, πόνων, λύπης, θανάτου· πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοισιν ἀντικρυς ἰητρική εὐρίσκεται ἀκεστορίς). Cf. É. Littré (ed.), *Œuvres complètes d’Hippocrate*, vol. VI (Paris: Baillière, 1849), 90, 394, J. Jouanna (ed.), *Hippocrate, Tome V.1. Des vents De l’art* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1988), 103, A. Martínez-Fernández, “El pensamiento médico de Sófocles”, *Tabona Revista de Prehistoria y de Arqueología* 5 (1984), 257-283, in particular 283, A. Guardasole, *Tragedia e medicina nell’Atene del V secolo A.C.* (Napoli: M. D’Auria, 2000), 64, and G. Ceschi, *Il vocabolario medico di Sofocle*. Analisi dei contatti con il Corpus Hippocraticum nel lessico anatomico-fisiologico, patologico e terapeutico (Venezia: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2009), 162f.

¹⁷⁴ P. Friedländer, “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ», 60.

All in all, man is defined both by being *παντοπόρος in spe* and by *failing to be παντοπόρος*. Now, for the *unsuccessful παντοπόρος in spe*, it is at the same time *small consolation* and *absolutely vital* that death can be postponed. Thus, the Theban elders' "argument" seems to be *intentionally* flimsy. It is not so much a matter of sound logic as of describing "life as it is". In other words, their "argument" gives concise, almost paratactic expression to the complex structure of human life as a set of *movements and countermovements*, namely a) the *παντοπόρος in spe* and man's *almost* complete triumph over everything else, b) man's powerlessness in the face of death (giving checkmate, as it were, to a)), and c) the fact that death itself can be *postponed* – the point being that a) is countered by b), while b) in turn is countered by c) – so that *the checkmate is postponed*.

The Theban elders do not dwell on this; but then again, they do not need to, for what they say speaks volumes. There is *this tremendous restriction*, this *extraordinary adversative component*, this *crushing "but": death*. And thus, the utmost triumph, the almost godlike universal supremacy we have spoken of is inextricably linked to the *utmost defeat*. The *παντοπόρος* turns out to be *powerless* and helplessly *stuck* in nothing less than the *supreme άπορία*.

One can, of course, say that the "race" – not the individual – triumphs (that the "race" – not the individual – is *παντοπόρος*), and that death affects individuals, not the "race". And in a way this is true. But, on the other hand, the "race" is made of individuals. And in the end death triumphs over them (N. B.: over *each and every one of them*) – so that, for each and every one of us, *everything achieved is sooner or later lost*. Hence, when all is said and done, what characterizes mankind is this bewildering *mix of supreme triumph* (being *παντοπόρος*) and *supreme defeat* (supreme *άπορία*).

There is no doubt that this *powerlessness* and *supreme άπορία* element is a defining-characteristic of human nature. And in the final analysis it cannot be excluded that this, too, is an essential component of what makes the "human empire" not only *δεινόν*, but indeed *τὸ δεινότατον*. The Theban elders do not say it explicitly, but the sibylline character of their words leaves it up to us to decide whether it is so or not. And we would venture to say that the answer must be «yes»; for if there is one thing that makes the "human empire" *δεινόν* (in more than one sense of the word), it is *death* and its paradoxical relation to everything the "empire" is all about.

But here we reach a critical point. Is this all? Is this the only limitation imposed on the „human empire“, or is there something else as well? If this is the only limitation, then the only problem – the only *flaw* – lies in the fact that the human race fails to be completely *παντοπόρος*; there is still something missing – a central *εὔρεσις*, a central *μηχανή*. And, what is more, according to the Theban elders, the human race will *never* manage to escape death: this

central εὔρεσις, this central μηχανή is *forever* excluded. But be that as it may, the point is that in either case human life is, after all, a question of

εὔρεσις, a question of μηχανή in the above-mentioned sense – that is, a question of achieving or failing to achieve one sole aim: namely, being the perfect παντοπόρος.

6. An equivocal final stanza

However, this does not seem to be all the Theban elders have to say about man, for in the final stanza they apparently suggest that there are *more things in human life than what the “human empire” is all about* – that there is something above and beyond the “empire”, something somehow more important than the “empire” itself. They say that the εὔρεσις and the μηχαναί now bring man to something κακόν, now to something ἐσθλόν (and the way they express themselves suggests that the difference they have in mind has nothing to do with the opposition between *success* and *failure*)¹⁷⁵; they speak of νόμοι, of δίκη, and of τὸ καλόν.

Let us take a closer look at this. The point is:

- a) that the other things the Theban elders refer to in the last stanza (τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, and δίκη) are opposed not only to what turns out to be a “limited” παντοπόρος (namely, the “human empire” and all the “nets the human empire knots”) but also to the perfect παντοπόρος the human race can only dream of. In other words, the Theban elders seem to be referring to something completely foreign to the “human empire” and everything it is all about,
and

¹⁷⁵ Cf. 365-367: “σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν / τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ’ ἔχων / τότε μὲν κακόν, ἄλλοτ’ ἐπ’ ἐσθλὸν ἔρπει.” The syntax of these lines gives the chorus’ claim an *additional touch of ambiguity*; for, as Kamerbeek points out, “there may be some concessive-adversative force in the participle” (ἔχων). Or, as Kitzinger puts it: “In fact we cannot be sure whether the chorus means that man ‘progresses’ towards good and evil *because of* having, or *in spite of* having, this τέχνη which is also σοφόν τι.” (emphasis added). Cf. J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles Commentaries* III The Antigone, on 365-67, and M. R. Kitzinger, *The Choruses of Sophocles’ Antigone and Philoktetes*, 25. In other words, are the Theban elders saying that our inventiveness and the possession of τέχνη *do not change the fact that man τότε μὲν κακόν, ἄλλοτ’ ἐπ’ ἐσθλὸν ἔρπει?* Or is their claim that man’s extraordinary skills play an important role in leading human beings both in the way to κακόν and in the way to ἐσθλόν? There is no straightforward answer to this question.

- b) that, on the other hand, this other realm they are referring to is supposed to be *far more important* than everything the “empire” and the struggle for supremacy stands for, so that, according to them, the empire (supremacy, being παντοπόρος) is by no means what one should strive for: this role is reserved for τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, δίκη and the like.

This is what one might call the *surprise ending* of the first stasimon: when all is said and done, the Theban elders seem to *relegate* the role and importance of the “human empire”. Thus, what at first seemed to be a triumph of the almost godlike “empire” turns out to be the very opposite – or at least something far more *nuanced* and *ambivalent*. What is more, even if his synopsis of the first three stanzas is somewhat flat and simplistic, Paul Joos is perhaps not far from the truth when he writes: “Die drei ersten Strophen bilden, in der Metaphorik der Grammatik gesprochen, den Vorderteil einer adversativen Periode: „... zwar ist der Mensch auf einem besonderen Kultur-Höhepunkt angelangt...“ Dazu gibt die letzte Antistrophos den Nachsatz, der den eigentlich zentralen Gedanken – und wir werden auch sagen dürfen: das Hauptanliegen des Dichters – ausdrückt (...).”¹⁷⁶ The same idea is expressed by Ivan Linforth: “The song of man’s triumph is, in effect, a long concessive clause.”¹⁷⁷ This line of interpretation goes back to Bruhn: “Jetzt erst kommt der Gedanke, der für den Dichter der wichtigste ist und zu dem alles Vorhergehende in einem konzessiven Verhältnis steht”.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ P. Joos, *TYXH, ΦΥΣΙΣ, ΤΕΧΝΗ*, 40.

¹⁷⁷ I. M. Linforth, “Antigone and Creon”, *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 15 (1961), 183-260, in particular 199.

¹⁷⁸ E. Bruhn (ed.), *Sophokles* erkl. v. F. W. Schneidewin u. A. Nauck, IV, on 365ff. Cf. K. Strobel, *Zur Komposition der sophokleischen Antigone* (Mainz: O. Schneider, 1925), 18. See also J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles Commentaries* III The Antigone, on 365-67: “(...) there may be some concessive-adversative force in the participle” [namely ἔχων]. P. Friedländer, “πολλὰ τὰ δεινά», 60, speaks against this line of approach: “Die Deutung, die man nachspricht, alles Vorhergehende stehe zu diesen Versen in konzessivem Gegensatz, und jetzt erst komme der für den Dichter wichtigste Gedanke führt auch von der grammatisch-logischen Formulierung abgesehen in die Irre.” Friedländer does not elaborate his claim. But his objection poses three different questions 1) whether ἔχων can have, as Kamerbeek puts it, a concessive-adversative force, 2) whether 365-367 marks a *turning point in the whole stasimon*, and 3) whether this turning point has to do with something like an adversative-concessive connection between 332-365 and 366-375. Now, if we are not mistaken, the first two questions should be answered in the affirmative. To be sure, ἔχων does not have an unequivocally concessive-adversative force: the latter is just one possible way of connecting the paratactic dots. But there is an unmistakable suggestion of this possibility: it simply cannot be dismissed. And the answer to the second

The key question is, of course: what are the Theban elders referring to in the final stanza of the first stasimon? What do they mean by τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, and δίκη? What do they have in mind when they suggest that the latter – not supremacy, the “human empire” viz. being παντοπόρος – is the most important thing of all? And why is τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, and δίκη the most important thing of all? In short, if “the song of man’s triumph is a long concessive clause”, what is the content of the “main sentence” in *Antigone*’s first stasimon?

It should be borne in mind that here, too, there may be hints not only at ancient Greek views on τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, δίκη and the like, but indeed at something closely connected to the content of the “concessive clause”. For it is possible that the contrast between the first three stanzas and the second antistrophe alludes to the *two-stage model* Protagoras’ myth in Plato’s *Protagoras* is an expression of.¹⁷⁹

In other words, it is possible that the said contrast alludes to those versions of the so-called *Kulturentstehungslehre* that make a sharp contrast between other εὐρέσεις (namely the kind of εὐρέσεις the three first stanzas of the first stasimon are all about) and those which have to do with δίκη, αἰδώς

question must also be affirmative. To be sure, in this case, too, the Theban elder’s words are not entirely free from ambiguity. But it cannot be denied that the beginning of the last stanza marks a turning point. Up to 366 the first stasimon is all about power, knowledge and expertise. There are, of course, some ominous undertones – but they are precisely that: just undertones. And they do not change the fact that everything revolves around some kind of greatness. At the beginning of the last stanza a new line of thinking comes into the picture. The Theban elders’ words are no longer just about greatness, power, knowledge and expertise. They are about something else. Greatness, knowledge and power (the extraordinary greatness, knowledge and power they have just described) are still there. But there is a new focus. The whole thing resembles a Rubin picture: greatness and power are no longer the “form” – they fade, as it were, into the the “background”. Which leads us to the third question. When one speaks of everything between 332 and 366 as a “long concessive clause”, this means that the last lines (from 366 to 375) form, as it were, the *main clause* – while everything else in the first stasimon plays the role of a *subordinate clause*. This is by no means the only possible way of assessing the relation of forces between 332-366 and 367-375 and construing the “sentence” (the “complete sentence” of the first stasimon). At the end of the day, it is all a matter of interpretation. If Bruhn, Strobel, Joos, and Linforth are right, the Theban elders’ main claim is what they say in the last stanza – the last lines have, as it were, “the last word”. But it cannot be excluded a) that it is the other way around: 332-366 is the main clause and 367-375 the subordinate clause, b) that the Theban elders have in mind some other kind of connection (for instance, a causal connection, etc.) and c) that 332-366 and 367-375 are like *coordinate clauses* and offer just a “cubist” juxtaposition of contrasting facets. Cf. H. Gundert, “Größe und Gefährdung des Menschen”, 25, 27, 29.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), 84f.

and the like.¹⁸⁰ In this version of the *Kulturentstehungslehre* the εὐπορία τοῦ βίου¹⁸¹ (viz. the περὶ τὸν βίον σοφία¹⁸²) is not sufficient for assuring the σωτηρία – let alone the *supremacy* – of the human race. On the one hand, what might be termed the *first layer* (or the first “wave”) of εὐρέσεις (εὐπορία τοῦ βίου-related εὐρέσεις) must be supplemented by a *second layer* (viz. by a second “wave” of εὐρέσεις). “Social life” – the πόλις and the like – is as much a key to survival (to σωτηρία) as the other μηχαναί which are mentioned in the first three stanzas – and indeed so much so that without “social life” all other skills would be to no avail. On the other hand, “social life” – the πόλις and the like – requires *its own kind of insight* (and in this sense *its own kind of εὐρέσεις*). It, too, must be invented. Finally, this “second layer” of εὐρέσεις has a very different nature from the first (in Protagoras’ myth this different nature is also reflected in the fact that, contrary to what happens with most εὐπορία τοῦ βίου-related εὐρέσεις, every human being partakes of this second kind of insight or σοφία and has an equal share in it).¹⁸³

But here again none of this means that the Theban elders are saying *exactly the same thing* as the contemporary views they may be alluding to. Once again, the point is that the final lines of Antigone’s first stasimon are a *variation on contemporary ideas* – and *variation* (not repetition) is the word to keep in mind.

In other words, even if there is some resemblance between the Theban elders’ final lines and contemporary ideas, none of this is enough to make

¹⁸⁰ See notably Plato, *Protagoras*, 320c-323c.

¹⁸¹ Cf. Plato, *Protagoras*, 321e3-322a1.

¹⁸² I.e., the kind of *inventiveness* and *resourcefulness* we have previously alluded to. Cf. Plato, *Protagoras*, 321d4.

¹⁸³ Some authors have suggested that the two-stage view we are talking about is present not only in Plato’s *Protagoras* but indeed in the *Prometheus vincetus* – or rather in the set of plays to which the *Prometheus vincetus* belonged. According to these authors, there is a similar omission of the “civic τέχνη” in Prometheus’ description of his activity in favour of mankind. In this case, too, Prometheus’ gift is incomplete, for it leaves out the “civic τέχνη” without which mankind cannot survive. In a concluding drama the “civic τέχνη” (and in particular δίκη) are given to mankind, not by Prometheus, but by Zeus – who reveals himself as the real benefactor of mankind. See notably H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley/LA/London: University of California Press, 1971), 97ff., D. J. Conacher, “Prometheus as Founder of the Arts”, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 18 (1977), 189-206, D. J. Conacher, *Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound. A Literary Commentary* (Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 92ff. and S. des Bouvrie, “Aiskhylos, Prometheus. An Anthropological Approach”, *Mètis. Anthropologies des mondes grecs anciens* 8 (1993), 187-216, in particular 197f. and 206. See also S. White, “Io’s World: Intimations of Theodicy in Prometheus Bound”, *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 121 (2001), 107-140.

the meaning of their words determinate. And on closer inspection it emerges that in this respect, too, what they say is sibylline. Is their point that the πόλις – and whatever is needed for the sake of the πόλις – is the *be all and end all* of human life, so that, given the fact that the πόλις cannot survive without τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, δίκη and the like, the latter are an indispensable condition not only for real supremacy, but indeed for σωτηρία? But, if this is the case, what they are saying is still all about *power, success and effectiveness* – they are just correcting a wrong view of how man can become παντοπόρος. In other words, if this is their point, they are not presenting τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, δίκη and the like as something *opposed* to power, success and effectiveness. They are just pointing out that τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, δίκη and the like are an essential *condition for success and effectiveness*. Or is it something else they have in mind, namely that τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, δίκη and the like are important (and indeed the most important thing of all) *in their own right*, even if they are *in collision* with success and effectiveness,¹⁸⁴ with the πόλις, and with survival itself? If this is so, what is at stake in the final stanza is not the πόλις – neither *success* (viz. *supremacy*) nor *survival* – but something *beyond the πόλις, beyond success and survival* and all our struggle for them. But if this is the case, what exactly are τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, δίκη and the like – and why on earth are they more important than supremacy, success and even survival? This becomes the key question. However, this is precisely where the chorus leaves things open. Their words are rather vague and ambiguous.

That this is so is clearly evidenced by the fact that, depending on how they are interpreted, the chorus' words can be invoked both in favor of Creon and in favor of the breaker of his edict, namely Antigone (and indeed in favor of what different interpreters believe Creon and Antigone to stand for). But, once again, it should be borne in mind that what we are dealing with here is not necessarily *clear-cut* and not necessarily an *either/or* issue. It is also possible that the question is more complex than this; for there may be yet other possibilities beyond the either/or between Creon and Antigone. Just to name one, it is perfectly possible that the Theban elders are expressing a *general and rather inaccurate* view on τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, δίκη and the like¹⁸⁵ – the point being that such a view is not aware of what the conflict between Antigone and Creon is all about and proves incapable of settling the dispute between Creon and the breaker of his edict.

Let us take a closer look at this issue.

¹⁸⁴ I. e., with everything “παντοπόρος” stands for.

¹⁸⁵ What might be termed *an only-up-to-a-certain-point-understanding* of these issues.

The Theban elders seem perfectly aware that there may be a serious conflict between everything παντοπόρος stands for, on the one hand, and the νόμοι χθονός viz. the θεῶν ἔνορκος δίκη (i.e. the “city” and the “gods”), on the other. Prima facie, it appears that they mention both a) the “laws of the land”¹⁸⁶ and b) the “justice of the gods”. It therefore seems that they make some kind of distinction between both¹⁸⁷. But then again, they seem to assume that there is no conflict whatsoever between the two – that both are, as it were, “on the same side of the fence”. Or, as Griffith puts it, the Theban elders seem to assume that “the (human) ‘laws of the land’ and the ‘justice of the gods’ go hand in hand”.¹⁸⁸ But this is not all, for the wording

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Cf. J. Triantaphyllopoulos, *Das Rechtsdenken der Griechen* (München: Beck, 1985), 113. For ancient Greek legislation forbidding the burial of traitors, state enemies and the like see, for example, a) Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.7, 22, Pseudo-Plutarch, *Vita Antiphontis* 23-24 (833a), Plato, *Leges* 873b-874b, 960b, and b) D. A. Hester, “Sophocles the Unphilosophical: A Study in the ‘Antigone’”, *Mnemosyne* 24 (1971), 11-59, in particular 20, B. Jordan, “Miracles in the Antigone of Sophocles”, in: Idem, *Servants of the Gods: a Study in the Religion, History and Literature of Fifth-century Athens* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 85-102, R. C. T. Parker, *Miasma*. Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 43ff., V. J. Rosivach, “On Creon, Antigone and not Burying the Dead”, *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 126 (1983), 193-211, J. E. G. Whitehorne, “The Background to Polyneices’ Disinterment and Reburial”, *Greece & Rome* 30 (1983), 129-142, in particular 135ff., P. Holt, “Polis and Tragedy in the Antigone”, *Mnemosyne* 52 (1999), 658-690, in particular 663ff., A. Lindenlauf, “Thrown Away Like Rubbish – Disposal of the Dead in Ancient Greece”, *Papers from the Institute of Archaeology* 12 (2001), 86-99, in particular 89, C. B. Patterson (ed.), *Antigone’s Answer*. Essays on Death and Burial, Family and State in Classical Athens (Lubbock: Texas Tech Univ. Press, 2006), E. M. Harris, “Antigone the Lawyer or the Ambiguities of Nomos”, in: E. M. Harris, L. Rubinstein (ed.), *Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens*. Essays on Law, Society, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 19-56, V. Liapis, “Creon the Labdacid: Political Confrontation and the Doomed oikos in Sophocles’ Antigone”, in: D. Cairns (ed.) *Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought* (Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales, 2013), 81-118, in particular 89f., D. Cairns, *Sophocles: Antigone*, 37ff., J. Etxabe, *The Experience of Tragic Judgment* (Abingdon, NY: GlasHouse Books Routledge, 2013), 51f.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. notably B. Alexanderson, “Die Stellung des Chors in der Antigone”, *Eranos* 64 (1966), 85-105, in particular 89, R. Coleman, “The Role of the Chorus in Sophocles’ Antigone”, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 18 (1972), 4-27, in particular 9f., and T. C. W. Oudemans, P. M. H. Lardinois, *Tragic Ambiguity*, 128.

¹⁸⁸ See M. Griffith, *Sophocles Antigone*, on 368-71. Cf. A. Hester, “Sophocles the Unphilosophical: A Study in the ‘Antigone’”, *Mnemosyne* 24 (1971), 11-59, in particular 27, R. Coleman, “The Role of the Chorus in Sophocles’ Antigone”, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 18 (1972), 4-27, in particular 9, T. C. W. Oudemans, P. M. H. Lardinois, *loc. cit.*, and M. R. Kitzinger, *The Choruses of Sophocles’ Antigone and Philoktetes*, 28.

is ambivalent: at the end of the day, it is even possible that “νόμους χθονός (...) θεῶν τ’ ἔνορκον δίκην” is a “hendiadyoin” – so that the Theban elders are not making any real distinction between the two and in fact assume that they amount to pretty much the same thing. Kaibel takes this view: “chorus dum duo dicere videtur, νόμους πόλεως et θεῶν ἔνορκον δίκην (i.e. ius deis iuratis sancitum), unum dicit: nam quod lege sancitum est, idem ius iustum est, τὸ μὴ καλὸν ἰ. q. τὸ μὴ δίκαιον, τὸ παράνομον. Saepissime δίκη et νόμος vocabula consociata reperiuntur, etiam *Antig.* 23 (...)”¹⁸⁹

The above means that the Theban elders’ view is too undifferentiated. They lump different things together and fail to realize that this may prove to be too simple an approach. If this interpretation is correct, they have no idea that there may be a conflict between the “city” and the “gods”. In other words, the kind of conflict that arises between Creon and Antigone is, as it were, a *blind spot* for their “one-size-fits-all” approach. The result being that their words are *ambivalent* – for they can be construed as directed both at those who transgress the laws of the city and at those who transgress the “laws of the gods”. Hence, even if the Theban elders have in mind the unknown breaker of Creon’s edict, and only him, it nevertheless remains true that their twofold statement *also applies to Creon*. And those who claim that their words are meant only against the burier of Polyneices miss the (possibly unintentional) ambivalence of the Theban elders’ remarks and the fact that Sophocles makes them *say more than they mean*.¹⁹⁰

But this is not all. The wording seems to be ambiguous in yet another way; for it leaves open the possibility that “νόμοι χθονός” stands for the prevention of μιάσμα, for the γέρας θανόντων viz. for the *burial duty* and *the care of the dead* (and not for Creon’s edict).¹⁹¹ In other words, it could be that, as Ehren-

¹⁸⁹ G. Kaibel, *De Sophoclis Antigona* (Gottingae: Officina academica Diechterichiana W. F. Kaestner, s.d.), 27.

¹⁹⁰ See notably M. Pohlenz, “Das Rechtsbewußtsein der Antigone”, *Aus Unterricht und Forschung* 2 (1930), 97-104 = Idem, *Griechische Studien*. Untersuchungen zur Religion, Dichtung und Philosophie der Griechen (Stuttgart: Hannsmann, 1948, repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1968), 186-194, in particular 189f.

¹⁹¹ On the burial rights and duties, the γέρας θανόντων, etc., see notably a) Sophocles, *Ajax* 1125ff., 1342ff., Euripides, *Supplices* 18f., 311, 526, 538, 561ff., 561f., *Helena* 1277, Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 55, *Panathenaicus* 169, and b) A. Mau: “Bestattung”, in: G. Wissowa (ed.) *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaften*, 5. Halbband Barbarus bis Campanus (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1897), col. 331-359, L. Koep, E. Stommel, J. Kollwitz, “Bestattung”, in: T. Klauser (ed.), *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, vol. 2: Bauer-Christus (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1954), col. 194-219, A. Schnauffer, *Frühgriechischer Totenglaube*. Untersuchungen zum Totenglauben der mykenischen und homerischen Zeit (Hildesheim: Olms, 1970), 160, C. Segal, *The Theme of the Mutilation of the Corpse in the Iliad* (Leiden: Brill, 1971), C. Collard (ed.), *Euripides Supplices*

berg puts it, “the νόμοι χθονός are to be closely connected with δίκη, the whole being a kind of hendiadyoin with the meaning of the ‘unwritten laws’.”¹⁹² Ehrenberg has a good point.¹⁹³ For “it is at least a possible interpretation to take the νόμοι χθονός as the laws of the soil in which the dead were buried. Creon’s decree violated the oldest laws of soil and country. The chorus, resenting the decree though too feeble to disobey (21ff.) and deeply impressed by the apparently miraculous burial of the body (278f.), opposes Creon in general terms (...)”.¹⁹⁴ In which case, what we are dealing with here is not *Sophocles’* intentional ambiguity, but rather *the Theban elders’*: they are not just saying more than they mean – they *mean more than they say*.¹⁹⁵

(Groningen: Bouma’s Boekhuis, 1975), vol. 2, on 18-19, 308-312a, 524-7, 558-563, H. Häusle, *Einfache und frühe Formen des griechischen Epigramms* (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1979), 123ff., C. Sourvinou-Inwood, “To Die and Enter the House of Hades: Homer, Before and After”, in: J. Whaley (ed.), *Mirrors of Mortality. Studies in the Social History of Death* (London: Europa, 1981), 15-39, L. Cerchiai, “Geras thanonton. Note sul concetto di «belle mort»”, *Aion* (Arch.) 6 (1984), 39-69, R. Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985), 8, 101ff., 134, 164f., R. S. J. Garland, “Γέρας θανόντων: An Investigation into the Claims of the Homeric Dead”, *Ancient Society* 15/17 (1984-1986), 5-22, G. Cerri, “Lo statuto del guerriero morto nel diritto della guerra omerica e la novità del Libro 24. dell’Iliade: teoria dell’oralità e storia del testo”, in: Idem (ed.), *Scrivere e recitare: modelli di trasmissione del testo poetico nell’antichità e nel medioevo* (Roma: Ed. dell’Ateneo, 1986), 1-53, R. Garland, “The Well-Ordered Corpse: An Investigation into the Motives Behind Greek Funerary Legislation”, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* (1989), 1-15, K.-W. Welwei, “Heroenkult und Gefallenenehrung im antiken Griechenland”, in: G. Binder, B. Effer (ed.), *Tod und Jenseits im Altertum* (Trier:WVT, 1991), 50-87, C. Sourvinou-Inwood, *Reading Greek Death To the End of the Classical Period* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 129f., A. Schmitt, “Bemerkungen zu Charakter und Schicksal der tragischen Hauptpersonen in der „Antigone“”, *Antike und Abendland* 34 (1998), 1-16, F. Frisone, *Leggi e regolamenti funerari nel mondo Greco. 1 Fonte epigrafiche* (Galatina, Lecce: Congedo, 2000), H. Böhme, “Götter, Gräber und Menschen in der „Antigone“ des Sophokles”, in: G. Greve (ed.) *Sophokles. Antigone* (Tübingen: Ed. Diskord, 2002), 93-124, J. Jouanna, *Sophocle* (Paris: Fayard, 2007), 450ff., P. Gagliardi, “Il tema del cadavere nei lamenti funebri omerici”, *Gaia. Revue interdisciplinaire sur la Grèce ancienne* 13 (2010), 107-136, E. Walter-Karydi, *Die Athener und ihre Gräber (1000-300 v. Chr.)* (Berlin/ München: De Gruyter, 2015), 20ff.

¹⁹² V. Ehrenberg, *Sophocles and Pericles* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1954), 62f.

¹⁹³ Save for the fact that the written or unwritten character of the laws is not necessarily the decisive factor.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ See, for example, M. Pohlenz, “Das Rechtsbewußtsein der Antigone”, 189f., W. Jens, “Antigone-Interpretationen”, in H. Diller (ed.) *Sophokles Wege der Forschung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967), 295-310, in particular 300, E. R. Schwinge, “Die Rolle des Chors in der Sophokleischen Antigone”, *Gymnasium* 78 (1971), 294-321, in particular 306.

Now, the ambiguity we are talking about cannot be eliminated: the Theban elders' words are too sibylline.¹⁹⁶ And what we are dealing with here is a cluster of three closely connected components: 1) the said *ambiguity* or *equivocity*, 2) the fact that either the Theban elders, or Creon or the audience viz. the reader *fail to detect it*, and 3) the *blurred and inaccurate understanding* (the *only-up-to-a-certain-point-understanding*) of δίκη, νόμος and the like that makes the latter possible. This ambiguity or equivocity – viz. the said *threefold cluster* – is perhaps what this last stanza is all about. In other words, the point may be precisely to highlight the possibility of such *general* and *rather inaccurate* views and the fact that a) one may be guided by such vague and inaccurate views (in the belief that they are clear and accurate) and b) such views prove insufficient to settle matters one way or the other, for c) they are *blind or short-sighted*, as it were,¹⁹⁷ and indeed so much so that they fail to see major questions *concerning their own meaning* – so that, when the “moment of truth” comes, it turns out that people who advocate and follow them are at a loss as to what to do, for they never really knew (they lacked a thorough understanding of) what they were talking about in the first place.¹⁹⁸

But it is time to conclude, and we must leave these questions unanswered. Instead, we will focus on one aspect. This last aspect has to do with the above-mentioned question concerning the sense in which the human race is said to be δεινόν viz. τὸ δεινότατον. If Bruhn, Strobel, Joos and Linforth are right and the “song of man’s triumph is, in effect, a long concessive clause”, do the opening lines (πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδεν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει) belong to the concessive clause alone (so that they have nothing to do with the final stanza), or is it that they stand for the *whole* stasimon – for the whole “equation”, as it were (i.e., both for the “concessive clause” and the “main sentence” in the final stanza)? Is the human race δεινόν (are we δεινόν) solely on account of the “human empire” the “concessive clause” is all about, or is humankind also δεινόν and indeed τὸ δεινότατον because of how it relates to τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, δίκη and the like?

¹⁹⁶ See notably J. Rode, “Das Chorlied”, in: W. Jens (ed.), *Die Bauformen der griechischen Tragödie* (München: Fink, 1971), 85-115, in particular 105f.

¹⁹⁷ Even if they seem to be perfectly clear.

¹⁹⁸ It should be borne in mind that none of this prevents the final lines of the first stasimon from being able to take on a *new meaning* (viz. *new meanings*) in the light of what happens in the rest of the play. I.e., it cannot be excluded that, even if what the Theban elders have in mind is rather vague and “shortsighted”, their words are fit to express other ways of understanding things and can appear in an entirely different light when read in the context of the whole play. In short, the last words of the first stasimon do not necessarily have “the last word” on their own meaning viz. on what they really say.

First, it should be borne in mind that the “human empire” we have spoken of (i. e., the *struggle for control and supremacy*, the kind of *cares and concerns* it has to do with, etc.) tends to play a leading role in our lives and to *push everything else into the background*. It monopolizes our attention, and indeed so much so that more often than not it appears to be “the only thing on stage”: the only thing life is about. The Theban elders do not address this point explicitly. But if you read between the lines, it turns out that this “protagonism” plays an important role in the first stasimon. The very structure of the choral ode bears witness to this: three stanzas in which the “human empire” is given full attention, and then a few distancing remarks in the second antistrophe. This does not mean that for the Theban elders the claims they make in the last stanza are not particularly important. In point of fact, they are what seems to matter most to them (and indeed the “conclusion” around which, as it turns out, everything else – the whole stasimon – revolves). But our point is that what we are dealing with here is a main feature of the very structure of human existence: it tends to concentrate on the struggle for supremacy and leave everything else out of the equation; the result being that everything else that *can* – and perhaps *should* – play a significant role in our lives has to struggle for our attention and comes into play only as “second thoughts” and, as it were, in an “adversative” position.

Secondly, both a) the fact that there are – and, if the Theban elders are right, there *should be* – more things in our lives than are dreamt of in the “human empire” (viz. in our struggle for supremacy) and b) the fact that we *can* – and in a way *tend to* – *leave these other things out of the equation* are perhaps part and parcel of what makes the human race δεινόν and indeed τὸ δεινότατον. It might be thought that δεινόν is used to characterize what we have termed the “human empire” – and this is true as far as the first three stanzas are concerned. But is it not δεινόν (and indeed δεινόν in more than one sense) that on top of everything else there may be this conflict between the “human empire” and something radically opposed to it? And, if these other things the final stanza of Antigone’s first stasimon refers to are as important as the chorus suggests (if they are important *in their own right* and *even more important* than the “empire” itself), is it not δεινόν (and indeed δεινόν *in more than one sense*) that human beings *tend to leave them out of the equation*? I, for one, would say that it is a rather distinctive feature of the whole thing and one of the main reasons why we humans are δεινόν and indeed τὸ δεινότατον.

Thirdly, if these other things the final stanza of *Antigone*’s first stasimon refers to are as important as the chorus seems to suggest (and if they are important *in their own right* and *even more important* than the “empire” itself), is it not δεινόν (and indeed δεινόν *in more than one sense*) that, even if one tries to comply with them, they prove to be so *equivocal* and *open to misun-*

derstanding? In other words, is it not δεινόν that, of all things, τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, δίκη and the like turn out to be so *elusive* and *difficult to grasp* (so that one is subject to *optical illusions* – and can easily be fooled – as regards them)?

In other words, one of the reasons why the last lines change the whole meaning of the first stasimon is because they shed a new light on why we human beings are δεινόν and indeed nothing less than τὸ δεινότατον. They provide, as it were, another *point of view* from which man can be said to be δεινόν. This is closely connected with what we have termed the “point of view question”. The final lines of the choral ode consider mankind from what seems to be a *new perspective* (from the perspective of whatever τὸ ἐσθλόν, τὸ καλόν, νόμοι, δίκη and the like stand for). But they do not confine themselves to adding a *further point of view* from which mankind can be found to be δεινόν (and indeed τὸ δεινότατον). They remind us a) that there is *more than one way* of seeing *what we are* (what we *should be*, etc) – and indeed that the views on this matter can differ very considerably, b) that these divergent views can lead to the kind of conflict, loss and destruction Sophocles’ Theban plays are all about, so that c) in the final analysis the very fact that there is no clear and reliable view on what we are and should be – the very fact that our identity is elusive (and that, whether we are aware of it or not, we have perhaps insoluble identity issues) – is not the least reason why we can be said to be δεινόν (and indeed τὸ δεινότατον), not least for ourselves.

Appendix I (to note 60)

On the connection between περί and ὑπέρ viz. on the pejorative sense of περίφρων, see notably O. Langwitz Smith (ed.), *Scholia Graeca in Aeschylum quae exstant omnia*, P. 1, Scholia in Agamemnonem, Choephoros, Eumenides, Supplices continens (Leipzig: Teubner, 1976), on *Supplices* 757 (“περίφρονες ἀντὶ ὑπέρφρονες”), H. L. Ahrens, “Conjekturen zu Alcaeus, Sappho, Corinna, Alcman”, *Rheinisches Museum* 6 (1838), 226-239, in particular 236, H. L. Ahrens, *De graecae Linguae Dialectis I De dialectis aeolicis et pseudaeolicis* (Gottingae: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1839), 151, F. A. Paley (ed.), *The Epics of Hesiod* (London: Whittaker & Co/G. Bell & Sons, 1883), on 894, F. W. Schneidewin (ed.), *Aeschylos Agamemnon* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1856), on 1387ff., T. G. Tucker (ed.), *The Supplices of Aeschylus* (London: Macmillan & Co, 1889, repr. N.Y./London, Garland, 1987), on 736, J. Van Leeuwen (ed.), *Aristophanes Nubes cum prolegomenis et commentariis* (Lugduni Batavorum: Sijthoff, 1898), on 225, U. de Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (ed.), *Aeschyli Tragoediae* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1914), on *Suppl.* 757, F. Bechtel, *Griechische Dialekte* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1923), 110f., A. Schuurmsma, *De Poetica Vocabulorum Abusione apud Aeschylum* (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1932), 18, 40 and 135f., P. T. Stevens, “Aristotle and the Koine-Notes on the Prepositions”, *Classical Quarterly* 30 (1936), 204-217, in particular 208f., W. Schulze, *Kleine Schriften*: zum

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Appendix II (to note 155)

P. Eichholtz, *De scriptoribus $\Pi\epsilon\pi\iota$ $EYPHMA\tau\Omega N$* (Halle: Ploetz, 1867), H. E. Graf, *Ad aureae aetatis fabulam symbola* (Lipsiae: Typis J. B. Hirschfeldi, 1884), F. Dümmler, *Akademika: Beiträge zur Litteraturgeschichte der sokratischen Schulen* (Gießen: Ricker, 1889, repr. Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1987), 216-247, M. Kremmer, *De catalogis heurematum* (Leipzig: Fromann, 1890), E. Wendling, "Zu Posidonius und Varro", *Hermes* 28 (1893), 335-353, esp. 341ff., E. Norden, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie III: Philosophische Ansichten über die Entstehung des Menschengeschlechts, seine kulturelle Entwicklung und das goldne Zeitalter", *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie* Suppl. 19 (1893), 411-428, T. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, I, (Leipzig: Veit, 1896), 132ff., C. B. Gulick, "The Attic Prometheus", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 10 (1899), 103-114, O. Apelt, "Die Ansichten der griechischen Philosophen über den Anfang der Cultur", *Jahres-Bericht über das Carl Friedrichs-Gymnasium zu Eisenach* (1900/01), 5-16, G. Billeter, *Griechische Anschauungen über die Ursprünge der Kultur* (Zürich: Zürcher & Furrer, 1901), W. Nestle, *Euripides Der Dichter der griechischen Aufklärung* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1901), 64ff., H. Lewy, "Palamedes", in: W. H. Roscher (ed.), *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, vol. 3.1: Nabaiotes-Pasicharea (Leipzig: Teubner, 1902), col. 1264-1273, in particular 1268ff., M. Pohlenz, "Kritias. Eine Studie", *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 11 (1903), 81-107 and 178-199, = Idem, *Griechische Studien. Untersuchungen zur Religion, Dichtung und Philosophie der Griechen* (Stuttgart: Hansmann, 1948, repr. Aalen, Scientia, 1968), 253-320, in particular 274ff., E. E. Sikes, "Four-Footed Man. A Note on Greek Anthropology", *Folklore* 20 (1909), 421-431, S. O. Dickermann, *De argumentis quibusdam apud Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obvisis e structura hominis et animalium petitis* (Halis Saxonum: Typis Wischani et Burkhardti, 1909), W. Nestle, "Sophokles und die Sophistik", *Classical Philology* 5 (1910), 129-157 = Idem, *Griechische Studien. op. cit.* 195-225, W. Nes-

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