Russell, Wittgenstein e a ideia de uma "linguagem logicamente perfeita"

Abstract

Title: Russell, Wiltgenstein and lhe idea of a "logically perfect language ". Russell's idea of a logically perfect language has been traditionally interpreted, after Wittgenstein's criticisms, as if it was simply an artificial and symbolic one (like that, apparently, of the Principa Mathematica), whose purpose would be to eliminate the vagueness of ordinary language and to introduce in it "precision" and "exactness". The author, following his own research on the subject, holds provocatively that that interpretation cannot be accepted, because, in the first place, for Russell, as happens with Wittgenstein from another perspective, ordinary language is "in order, as it is"; studies the historical and philosophical origins of the concept of such a language in both philosophers and especially in Russell's reading of Wittgenstein's Notes dictaied to Moore in Norwav; and shows that for Russell, contrary to the standard reading on the subject, it essentially has an onto-epistemological nature.