A génese da génese: a noção de 'desenvolvimento' na fenomenologia do espírito de Hegel e o seu desenvolvimento

Abstract

Subject of this paper is the problem of the subsumption, in the process of knowledge, of its manifold content under the unity of subjectivity. Hegel's critique of Schelling in the Foreword of the Phenomenology of Spirit is exposed, and it is shown that Schelling conceived an unity that is motionless and exterior to the concret richness of the manifold. Hegel's own conception of unity as the movement of the content, culminating in subjectivity, is then confronted with R. Chisholm's conception of the "first person". lt is shown that Hegel's position, revised as a defense of an open, plural and dialogical unity, can still be helpful for a criticism of Chisholm's concept of the "first person", that must be regarded as an unity that is motionless and devoid of self-developement.