Da moral cristã à justiça profana através do interesse: comentário de um texto de Leibniz

Abstract

As a kind of replique to his ontological «principle of the best», Leibniz has proposed, in some, not too well known writings, what we might call a «principle of the worst». This principle is the most convenient way to envisage human affairs. In a mental experiment, each subject should put himself at «another’s place» (la place d’autruyj, not as a friend, but as an enemy contriving the worst deeds against the subject. If the experience is accomplished by everyone, it shall appear — some conditions being given and at the end of a number of steps, retraced in this paper — that it is in each one’s interest not to harm his neighbour and to favour social peace. Thus, Leibniz’s position is a special form of utilitarianism. Its relation to the monadology is evidenced and it is suggested that, in some way, Leibniz anticipates John Rawl’s theory of contract.