Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10316.2/46473
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dc.contributor.authorHapner, Fernanda Aranha-
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-30T14:18:13Z
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-24T17:45:07Z-
dc.date.available2019-04-30T14:18:13Z
dc.date.available2020-09-24T17:45:07Z-
dc.date.issued2018-
dc.identifier.issn0872-0851-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10316.2/46473-
dc.description.abstractNem sempre é claro o método que os juízes utilizam para interpretar a lei aplicável aos casos a serem julgados. Vários filósofos do direito argumentam que se deve investigar a intenção do legislador para alcançar um julgamento adequado. Por outro lado, autores dentre os quais se inclui Ronald Dworkin explicam como esse método de interpretação não é útil e nem deve ser considerado correto. Este ensaio enfoca especialmente no pensamento de Ronald Dworkin e em suas explicações sobre o assunto.por
dc.description.abstractOn ne sait pas toujours quelle méthode les juges utilisent pour interpréter la loi applicable aux affaires à juger. Plusieurs philosophes du droit soutiennent que l’on devrait enquêter sur l’intention du législateur de parvenir à un jugement approprié. D’autre part, des auteurs comme Ronald Dworkin expliquent en quoi cette méthode d’interprétation n’est pas utile et ne devrait pas être considérée comme correcte. Cet essai se concentre particulièrement sur la pensée de Ronald Dworkin et ses explications sur le sujet.fra
dc.description.abstractIt is not always clear what method the judges use to interpret the law applicable to the cases to be ruled. It is argued by some philosophers of law that one should investigate the drafter´s intention in order to reach an adequate judgement. On the other hand, authors including Ronald Dworkin explains how this method of interpretation cannot be useful and neither considered correct. This essay focus especially on Ronald Dworkin´s thought and his explanations on the subject.eng
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherImprensa da Universidade de Coimbra-
dc.rightsopen access-
dc.subjectlaw interpretationeng
dc.subjectdrafter´s intentionseng
dc.subjectRonald Dworkineng
dc.subjectinterprétation juridiquefra
dc.subjectintention du législateurfra
dc.subjectRonald Dworkinfra
dc.subjectinterpretação legalpor
dc.subjectintenção do legisladorpor
dc.subjectRonald Dworkinpor
dc.titleIs statutory interpretation solely an exercise in retrieving the drafters’ intentions?: R. Dworkin’s view of judges’ interpretation of the lawpor
dc.typearticle-
uc.publication.collectionRevista Filosófica de Coimbra, vol. 27, nº 54-
uc.publication.firstPage249-
uc.publication.issue54-
uc.publication.lastPage256-
uc.publication.locationCoimbra-
uc.publication.journalTitleRevista Filosófica de Coimbra-
uc.publication.volume27por
dc.identifier.doi10.14195/0872-0851_54_3-
uc.publication.sectionArtigos-
uc.publication.orderno4-
uc.publication.areaArtes e Humanidades-
uc.publication.manifesthttps://dl.uc.pt/json/iiif/10316.2/46473/242726/manifest?manifest=/json/iiif/10316.2/46473/242726/manifest-
uc.publication.thumbnailhttps://dl.uc.pt/retrieve/11667634-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
item.grantfulltextopen-
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